The Holodomor of 1932-33

Papers from the 75th-Anniversary Conference on the Ukrainian Famine-Genocide

University of Toronto, November 1, 2007

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on the Ukrainian Famine-Genocide

Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (University of Alberta)
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Preface

When, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Ukrainian diaspora communities in the West initiated plans to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Great Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33, they encountered not only a lack of awareness among the general public, but also a dearth of scholarship on the Famine. Although Sovietology was a privileged field of research in North America and Western Europe and the study of the Soviet Union of the 1920s and 1930s was at that time being transferred from the discipline of Soviet politics to that of Soviet history, very little scholarly work had been devoted to the Famine. Indeed one of the most prominent scholars on Soviet agriculture and the peasantry, R.W. Davies, commented that most Western accounts of Soviet development had treated the famine of 1932-33 as a secondary event, though he believed it should occupy a central place in the history of the Soviet Union. Such neglect of the Famine to a considerable degree explains the tremendous resonance in 1986-87 in scholarly publications and the mass media of Robert Conquest’s *Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine*, which had come out of the Famine research project at the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University.

One of the reasons so little attention had been devoted to the Famine was that up until the late 1980s the Soviet Union denied any major famine had occurred in 1932-33 and denounced all those who saw the Soviet authorities as culpable for the Famine. Only under the influence of glasnost in the late 1980s did discussions of the Famine appear in the press, and only in August 1990 was an international symposium devoted to this issue held in Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of a Ukrainian state have radically changed the environment in which the Holodomor (Extermination by Hunger), as the Ukrainian Famine has been increasingly referred to both in Ukraine and abroad, is commemorated and studied.

In the twenty-five years that have passed since the fiftieth anniversary commemorations of the Ukrainian Famine, the level of international public awareness of the tragedy has increased dramatically. While the Ukrainian diaspora has played a significant role in this process, the Ukrainian government has played an ever greater role by sponsoring official commemorations of the Holodomor and raising the issue of its recognition as a genocide by foreign governments and international organizations. Although the number of Holodomor scholars in North America and Europe is still not great, a substantial body of literature has emerged, expressing varying viewpoints on the classification, origins, dimensions, and consequences of that great tragedy. Here too, however, the major change to the study of the Famine has come with the opening up of archives, the gathering of eyewitness testimonies, and the publication of research in Ukraine and other areas of the former Soviet Union.

In planning a scholarly conference for Toronto, an organizing committee consisting of members of the Toronto office of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta, the Petro Jacyk Program for the Study of Ukraine at the University of Toronto’s Centre for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, and the Ukrainian Canadian Research and Documentation Centre in Toronto decided to concentrate on highlighting the contribution of Ukrainian scholars in amassing source materials and conducting research on the Famine as well as on the role of the Holodomor as a public issue in Ukraine. The co-operation of the Toronto Branch of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress and the Buduchnist Credit Union Foundation made organizing the conference possible.

The committee was pleased that a number of eminent scholars from Ukraine were able to speak at “The Holodomor of 1932-33: A 75th-Anniversary Conference on the Ukrainian Famine-Genocide” on Thursday, November 1, 2007. The session also benefited greatly from the contributions of the North American academics who served as discussants. Mykola Riabchuk (Ukrainian Centre for Cultural Studies, Kyiv) spoke on “The Famine in Contemporary Ukrainian Politics and Society,” followed by a commentary by Dominique Arel (Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa). Liudmyla Grynevych (Institute of the History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine) presented a paper on “The Present State of Ukrainian Historiography on the Holodomor and Prospects for Its Development,” with Terry Martin (Harvard University) commenting. Hennadii Boriak (then at the State Committee on Archives of Ukraine, now at the Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine) spoke on “Holodomor Archives and Sources: The State of the Art.”

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Iryna Matiash (Ukrainian Research Institute of Archival Affairs and Document Studies) delivered a paper on “Archives in Russia on the Famine in Ukraine.” Lynne Viola (University of Toronto) commented on the latter two presentations. A webcast of the entire conference and the lively interchange there between Ukrainian and North American scholars and the academics and members of the public present can be viewed at <http://hosting.epresence.tv/munk/archives/2007_nov1_633295348322877500/?archiveID=32>.

The Ukrainian presenters have kindly revised their papers for publication in the Harriman Review. This special issue constitutes one component of the commemoration of the Holodomor by the Ukrainian Studies Program at the Harriman Institute. The Ukrainian Studies Program is also sponsoring the conference “Visualizing the Holodomor: The Ukrainian Famine-Genocide of 1932-1933 on Film” on December 2, 2008. The Program is grateful to Andrij Makuch of the Toronto office of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies for serving as guest editor of this special issue, and to Ronald Meyer, editor of the Harriman Review, for his expeditious editing of the issue.

Frank E. Sysyn
University of Alberta
and Ukrainian Studies Program, Harriman Institute
Holodomor: The Politics of Memory and Political Infighting in Contemporary Ukraine

Mykola Riabchuk

Introduction

The Politics of Memory in a Divided Country

In the past five years, the issue of the Holodomor, that is, the man-made Famine of 1932–33, has occupied a much more prominent position in Ukrainian politics and society than it was ever accorded during the 1990s, let alone in the previous decades when the issue was effectively silenced by the Soviet authorities, and any references to Holodomor were criminalized. For example, twelve years after independence and fifteen years since Gorbachov’s glasnost, only 75 percent of respondents in a 2003 national survey confirmed their awareness of the event, while 13 percent confessed that they knew nothing about the Famine, and 12 percent declined to express their opinion.¹ Three years later, in September 2006, as many as 94 percent of respondents confirmed their awareness of the event, even though a substantial number of them (12 percent) considered that the Famine was mainly caused by natural phenomena.² The main divide, however, shifted from a rather crude ideological controversy over Holodomor recognition versus Holodomor denial towards a more sophisticated controversy over interpretations of the Holodomor as either genocide against Ukrainian people or a Stalinist crime against humanity, which targeted both Ukrainian and Russian, Kazakh and other Soviet peasants.

In both cases, however, the controversy reflected and continues to reflect the divided character of the Ukrainian polity, two different visions of the Ukrainian past and future, two different historical narratives and, as a matter of fact, two different national identities.³ Ukraine is still a battlefield, where two different national projects compete for dominance, drawing their discursive and symbolic resources from various aspects of colonial and anti-colonial legacies.

The main hypothesis underlying my paper is that the official politics of memory in Ukraine have been as ambiguous and inconsistent as the politics of officialdom in general, both domestically and internationally. This ambiguity stems from the hybrid nature of the post-Soviet regime that emerged from the compromise between the former ideological rivals (“national democrats” and “sovereign communists”), but also reflects the hybrid and highly ambivalent nature of Ukrainian postcolonial and post-totalitarian society. Since 1991, official politics, including the politics of memory, had been masterminded in such a way so as to not only exploit the societal ambivalence inherited from the past, but also to preserve and effectively intensify it for the future. The practical manifestations of such a policy under Kuchma are considered in the first part of my paper, where I discuss the vacillation of Ukrainian authorities over the Holodomor issue.

In the second part, I present some observations about the politics of memory of the “post-Orange” governments. Here, I come to the conclusion that the Party of Regions cannot simply continue the manipulative practices of its crypto-Soviet predecessors, nor can the “Orange” parties rid themselves of post-Soviet inconsistencies and ambiguity, determined by the internal divisions and general ambivalence of Ukrainian society. A slight hope is expressed, however, that the new politics of memory, albeit still lacking consistency and integrity, is gradually coalescing in Ukraine to serve the interests of the nation rather than those corporate interests of any particular group.

¹ Den’, 21 October 2003, p. 1. The survey was conducted by the Kyiv Institute of Sociology and the Sociology Department of the University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.
² “Not enough information,” The Day Weekly Digest, 21 November 2006.
Part I: Political Compromise and Ambiguous “State-Building”

Independent Ukraine came into being in 1991 as a result of the political compromise brokered by two very different, essentially opposite forces, which pragmatically joined their efforts to emancipate their country from the crumbling Soviet Empire. On one side, the so-called “national-democrats”—a broad opposition movement that came together during perestroika under the slogans of civic and national emancipation; on the other side, the so-called “sovereign communists”—an opportunistic group of local nomenklatura that also evolved during perestroika within Gorbachev’s camp of Soviet reformers, under the official slogans of democratization and decentralization.

Both the national democrats and the sovereign communists (who, all of a sudden, embraced democracy and the free market) desperately needed each other at that historical moment. The Ukrainian national democrats were too weak to take power alone: by all accounts, they enjoyed the support of about one-third of Ukraine’s population, while the Sovietophile majority still perceived them as dangerous “nationalists” rather than moderate “democrats.” In the meantime, the sovereign communists enjoyed greater, albeit mostly passive public support, merely as a “lesser” or, perhaps, “better known of two evils.” Unlike the national democrats, they lacked any coherent national ideology, any “grand narrative” to legitimize themselves, both domestically and internationally, as a new regime that embodies and implements the people’s right to self-determination.

Thus, Ukrainian democrats provided the ruling nomenklatura with all the slogans and programs, symbols and narratives needed for state-nation building. This does not mean that the post-Soviet rulers embraced all this “nationalistic” stuff wholeheartedly. Rather, they accepted it opportunistically as something to be further bargained, negotiated and re-interpreted. On virtually all key points, they left some room for maneuvering. While the Ukrainian national narrative, in its moderate form, was accepted officially and adopted in textbooks (e.g., celebration of holidays, commemorations, memorial sites, etc.), the post-Soviet elite has cautiously distanced itself from full identification with these new symbols and, at the same time, refrained from fully disassociating themselves from the old symbols of the colonial/totallitarian past. Semantic uncertainty facilitated political ambiguity: the lack of a clear commitment signified that nothing was predetermined, everything was subject to reconsideration, and it was up to the ruling elite to decide whether to continue the pending project or to retreat to its opposite. This protected their self-assigned status as the main power brokers who sent different messages to different groups, thus manipulating them for their own personal, political gain.

The story of the Great Famine as appropriated ambiguously by the Ukrainian post-Soviet authorities provides a graphic example of their “pragmatic”, i.e., instrumental, manipulative and opportunistic policies.

In the first years of Ukraine’s independence, the post-Soviet elite apparently was made uncomfortable by the official commemoration of the upcoming sixtieth anniversary of the Great Famine. Even though they had made some concessions to their national-democratic allies (unbiased coverage of the Famine-Genocide was included in historical textbooks, a commemorative stamp was issued in 1993, and some minor monuments to the victims of the Famine were erected in Kyiv and elsewhere), in most cases, however, commemorations were pushed ahead by civic/national democratic activists, while the post-Communist officials either kept low profiles or, in some regions, openly resisted. The evidence shows that the post-Soviet authorities declined to allocate any substantial resources and to actively participate in national commemorative events.

Ten years later, the situation appears to have changed. In 2003, on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the tragedy, the Ukrainian parliament endorsed an official statement to the Ukrainian people, in which the man-made Famine was condemned as a crime against humanity; the Ukrainian government initiated adoption of a similar document in the United Nations; the Ukrainian president signed a decree that established the day of a similar document in the United Nations; the Ukrainian parliament endorsed an annual commemoration of victims of the Great Famine on November 22 and envisaged other commemorative events in which both local and national officials would participate.

In his commemorative speech delivered that day, President Kuchma emphatically underscored the importance of Ukraine’s independent statehood (l’état, c’est moi) as the only reliable guardian of Ukrainians’ freedom and, implicitly, their future survival:

Millions of innocent victims call out to us, reminding us of the price of our freedom and independence, and affirm that only Ukrainian statehood can guarantee free development of the Ukrainian people. […] We are obliged to convey to the international community the bitter truth about the Holodomor, unprecedented in world history, so that the community of free nations can properly appreciate the dimensions of this tragedy, and the sinister plans and criminal deeds of those who masterminded and organized it.4

In addition, Kuchma clearly outlined the need to raise the Holodomor issue at international fora, in order to condemn the perpetrators of genocide and, im-

licitly, elicit sympathy for the victimized nation and its beleaguered president. The latter assumption seems more than likely, if one takes into account Kuchma’s domestic and international troubles after Tapegate and the Kolchuga affair. Hence, the appeal to the “community of free nations,” to which Ukraine (and its president) presumably belong, as well as the discursive distancing from unspecified (but presumably Soviet) criminals and the symbolic (however sham) separation from the Soviet legacy of lawlessness.

Kuchma’s personal problems may have catalyzed the shift in official policy in regard to the Holodomor, but they alone would not have sufficed if certain changes in public opinion had not occurred during the preceding decade. Roughly speaking, both society and the ruling elite had become less “Soviet” and, therefore, less biased in regard to certain historical facts and developments. A national survey, carried out in fall 2003, revealed that 40 percent of respondents believed the Famine of 1932–33 was “genocide carried out by the Bolshevik authorities against the Ukrainian people.” Twenty-five percent of respondents placed the blame on the Bolsheviks, albeit with the reservation that the man-made Famine resulted from their policy against all peasants, not only the Ukrainian peasantry. Only 10 percent supported the traditional Soviet view (still defended by the Communist Party of Ukraine) that the Famine was not masterminded by the authorities, but instead was the result of natural calamities. However, 13 percent confessed that they knew nothing about the Famine; and 12 percent declined to give their opinion.5

The manner, however, in which the Ukrainian authorities carried out official commemorations, as well as some peculiarities of both the domestic and international situation at the time, lead me to believe that they probably had many more personal reasons to embark on the project than merely reestablishing historical truth and justice or meeting public expectations.

First, the official commemorations had obviously been “export-oriented.” The Ukrainian officials had been much more active and visible in New York and Paris and in the capital city of Kyiv than in the regions, primarily those that were the most affected by the Famine. In the regions, the local authorities, by and large, declined to participate in commemorative events and, in some cases, openly sabotaged NGO initiatives.6 One should note that the central government had sufficient authoritative levers at the time (2003) to achieve, if necessary, the full obedience of the local bosses. The same could also be said about national TV, which was firmly controlled (and censored) at the time by the president’s staff. All of them, however, conducted business as usual, making no changes in their programming of primarily entertainment broadcasts even on the Commemoration Day of November 22, for the most part addressing the issue only in news programs in a typical manner, that is, praising the solicitous government for taking new steps in the right direction, but making no attempt to investigate or discuss this serious issue.7

Second, in all the official documents not a single word was said about the Communist nature of the Famine-Genocide. Among the thousand words in the statement of the Ukrainian parliament, one may find angry references to the “Stalinist totalitarian regime,” “the devilish plan of the Stalinist regime,” “criminal nature of the regime,” “premeditated terrorist act of the Stalinist political system,” and even “high-level authorities of the USSR,” but nothing is said about the Communist origins and Communist nature of that regime, that system, and that leadership.8 It would appear that Stalinism was a supernatural phenomenon, a historical aberration that had little, if anything, to do with the essence of Soviet Communism.

And third, a lukewarm commemoration of victims of Soviet totalitarianism and a rather formal and superficial condemnation of the Communist (“totalitarian,” as it is referred to euphemistically) crimes went hand-in-hand with a much more coherent and eager celebration of Communist/totalitarian leaders (e.g., Volodymyr Shcherbyts’kyi), organizations (e.g., Komsomol) and symbolic events (e.g., the so-called “re-unification” of western Ukrainian lands with Soviet Ukraine, i.e., implementation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement).

All these facts suggest that the Ukrainian post-Communist rulers tried to appropriate the symbolic value of the Famine and to capitalize on it both domestically and internationally. Domestically, they aspired to complete the project of their “succession of power,” which entailed preservation, by all possible means, of the dominance of the post-Soviet nomenklatura-cum-oligarchy. Internationally, they intended to whitewash the image of the regime badly tarnished by various scandals, by switching public attention to different matters and exposing, on this occasion the “human face” of the post-Soviet clique.

In 1993, the “genealogical” connection between the post-Communist rulers and their Communist predecessors was probably too close and obvious, so that an extensive exposure of Communist crimes would be self-

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5. Den’, 21 October 2003, p. 1. The survey was conducted by the Kyiv Institute of Sociology and the Sociology Department of the University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.


8. The document was published in Holos Ukrainy, 16 May 2003, 3.
defeating. They might simply lose the political initiative to the national-democrats who, as allies, could not be excluded from the commemorations and who therefore had a good chance to take the lead and benefit symbolically from the event.

In 2003, the post-Communists had nothing to lose, because the national democrats by this time had been unequivocally in opposition. Now, the post-Communists could win—by taking initiative from their former allies-cum-rivals and, at the same time, excluding them from commemorations—at least in the mainstream media on which the authorities kept a firm grip.

The opportunistic nature of the post-Soviet elite was revealed, in this case, most graphically. In May 2003, the parliamentary statement that condemned the man-made Famine as a crime against Ukrainian people was supported by only 226 MPs—the minimum vote needed to pass the bill in the 450-seat parliament. While the Communists voted against the measure and the national democrats voted in favor, the majority of the pro-government factions abstained. Clearly, they had received a signal that abstaining was permissible, perhaps even desirable, because the president at this time had an obedient majority in parliament and could mobilize up to 250 votes if necessary—even without the national democrats. In this instance, however, mobilization was not required. On the contrary, the post-Communist rulers wished to demonstrate that they did not fully associate themselves with the “nationalistic” cause nor had they completely broken with the Communist legacy. It was merely a reminder that they held a golden share and were keeping everybody on the hook.

Such a purely instrumental approach to historic events emerged naturally from the post-Communist strategy of holding the “centrist” niche and marginalizing their rivals as dangerous radicals, stupid fanatics or infantile romantics out of touch with reality. Discursively, they strived to monopolize the role of supreme all-national arbiter who would decide how much of the Communist legacy should be abandoned and how much of the anti-Communist legacy should be “rehabilitated.”

### Part II: “Post-Orange” Developments

Three years after the spectacular Orange Revolution that engendered so much hope and delivered so much disappointment, we may aver soberly that it was neither a great success in the sense of a radical break with the Soviet past, its political culture and institutional arrangements, nor was it a great failure in the sense of a resurgence of old oligarchic practices and corrupt schemes. It did not push the country dramatically ahead, towards “Europe” and European practices (meaning primarily rule of law, not just democracy). But it definitely precluded the country’s decline and slipping towards post-Soviet authoritarianism. The revolution, in fact, re-established the evolutionary development of Ukraine, derailed at the end of the 1990s by the authoritarian practices of Leonid Kuchma.

Within three years of his tenure, President Yushchenko, despite his many mistakes and notorious indecisiveness and incoherence, has proved rather clearly that his politics of memory would not be tailored opportunistically, but rather are based on moral principles and an unequivocal commitment to historical truth and justice. Such a policy clearly contradicted the conservative strategy pursued by his predecessors under the slogans of “stability,” “consent” and, ultimately, “succession of power.”

Yushchenko certainly should be credited for the decrees that, in particular, established the Institute of National Memory (based apparently on a Polish model), pushed ahead the construction of the memorial to victims of political repression and the famines of 1921-23, 1932-33, and 1946-47 at Kyiv, initiated the creation of the Babyn Yar historical and cultural reserve, and introduced Shevchenko Day as a national holiday. The most remarkable seems to be the decree that commissioned the Cabinet of Ministers to prepare and hold events to celebrate the anniversaries of leaders of the short-lived Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR, 1918-1920) and Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (ZUNR, 1918-1919), as well as Yushchenko’s bold support for the Museum of Soviet Occupation in Kyiv.

As to his political rivals from the Party of Regions, they seem to continue the ambiguous policy of Leonid Kuchma—at least at the national and international levels, where they distance themselves from their Communist allies and promote a “civilized,” “gentryed” self-image of oligarchs “with a human face.” On the regional level, however, their position looks less ambiguous and more defiant. Nevertheless, they wish to assume a national role and gain international recognition, though they remain deadlocked within their heavily Sovietized region and restrained by both their electorate and their...
own mentality. Kuchma’s team was certainly in a much better position, since it could firmly monopolize the “centrist” niche and present its members as moderates and peace-keepers between east and west, left and right, Moscow and Washington, and so on. They held power and controlled the media, so that public initiatives could be effectively controlled and official discourse could be skillfully tailored for different regions and situations.

The Party of Regions is on the defensive; its over-reliance on the Sovietophile electorate may bring them only temporary gains, as the gradual marginalization of the Communist Party shows rather graphically. Since more than two-thirds of respondents (69 percent) in a national survey believe that the Famine was caused mainly by the actions of the Soviet government, the Communist position of denying the Holodomor becomes not only morally and intellectually untenable but also politically unproductive.

The Party of Regions wisely abandoned the traditional Soviet view of the Holodomor as a non-event, or mere “natural” calamity exacerbated by sabotage of class enemies. They left the Communists to defend the indefensible, and adopted instead a more pragmatic (one may say opportunistic) approach that recognizes—fully in line with prevailing public opinion—that the Famine was man-made and the Soviet authorities had really committed the crime. They emphasize, however—again, fully in line with public opinion—that the Famine was not directed against Ukraine or Ukrainians only, but also against all the peasants in both Ukraine and beyond. They simplify, in fact, the argument of their opponents from the national democratic camp who do not claim so crudely that famine was a problem exclusively of Ukraine and of Ukrainians.

Such a simplification, however, provides them with a powerful weapon against the Ukrainian ethnic “nationalists,” identified rhetorically with the Orange camp, who allegedly try to ethnicize the genuinely social tragedy, to monopolize suffering and, moreover, to oppose and alienate Ukrainians against other groups, particularly Russians. This line of defense is much stronger, indeed, than the no longer tenable position of the Soviet/Communist stalwarts.

First, by recognizing the Holodomor as a Stalinist crime against humanity, the Party of Regions distances itself from the most abominable parts of the Soviet legacy, representing itself as a moderate, reasonable, responsible, “centrist” political force. It satisfies the majority of the population who hold the same view on the Holodomor, namely, that it was a Stalinist crime against peasants in both Ukraine and elsewhere, rather than genocide targeting primarily Ukrainians. And finally, it conforms to international public opinion, including predominant academic views of the Holodomor, and does not alienate altogether comrades in Russia who prefer the Communist interpretation of Holodomor events, but who are prepared to compromise.

The Party of Regions thus identifies itself with both “scholarly truth” and “common sense,” and from this quasi-centrist and presumably “scientific” position it marginalizes and discredits its Orange opponents as obsessed radicals, nationalists, and adventurers who rock the boat and sow ethnic discord for the sake of unspecified but partisan political gains. A limited but efficient set of arguments and key words is employed by the Party of Regions’ statesmen in all discussions about the Holodomor. They may vary in sequence and elaboration but essentially are as follows:

The enormous division within contemporary Ukrainian society is largely determined by the diametrically opposed points of view on many events and developments of our past. The supporters of radical views, from either one side or the other, dominate every discussion. And this does not help to reconcile the views or establish historical truth. Our society badly needs consolidation; a civilized dialogue and search for common ground based on recognition of the just aspects of each side’s position would help bring this about.

First, the Holodomor is presented—and rightly so—as a highly divisive issue in Ukrainian society. The recurrent key words are “split,” “division,” “break,” even “crack” (“пакол”)—and their semantic antonyms “unity,” “consolidation,” “compromise,” “consent.” The first “destructive” set is explicitly or implicitly attributed to the Orange opponents, while the latter, “moderate” and “reconciliatory,” is appropriated by the Party of Regions itself.

Since the second position is, presumably, fully in line with “scientific truth,” “common sense” and the national interest, it does not require any specific elaboration. Instead, the first, deviant position—of President Yushchenko and his allies—is closely examined and disproved as not only historically and legally wrong but also politically harmful. First, they suggest, it sows interethnic discord in Ukraine, and second, badly damages relations with Russia (or, euphemistically, with our “neighbors”).

A conscientious desire to assume moral responsibility and restore historical justice, in and of itself, cannot be exploited for a multi-step political-ideological game that has little to do with history, but rather with the most contemporary of today’s issues, and which is aimed pri-


arily at demoralization and weakening the positions of one or another elite group within society.

We believe that we need to form an ideological climate that would permit an honest condemnation of any mass crimes in Ukraine, committed either by Stalin’s regime or its adversaries, while not allowing the topic to be misused by political forces that are interested in creating a conflict between our country and its neighbors.16

Two questions, however, emerge from this type of argument—regardless of whether we interpret the Holodomor as genocide or not. First, it remains unclear (and is never explained) what kind of practical benefits (“political dividends,” as another speaker implies17) can Orange leaders gain from this “multi-step political-ideological game”—if the majority of the population does not share their view of Holodomor as genocide and seems unlikely to change this view in the foreseeable future. Would it not be more reasonable to suggest that President Yushchenko is sacrificing, in fact, certain electoral “dividends” for the sake of moral principles he believes are crucial for the whole nation?

And second, why should the president and his Orange allies be “interested” in any conflict between Ukraine and Russia (or, as another “regional” speaker put it, in “creating an atmosphere hostile to Russia and representing the Russian people as responsible for the Famine and genocide, and charging Russia as a successor to the Soviet Union, both morally and financially”18)? In fact, neither Yushchenko nor any of the Orange leaders have ever attempted to identify Russia explicitly with the Stalinist regime that masterminded the Holodomor. Certainly such accusations could emerge on the fringes, and such claims could be made implicitly in heated anti-Soviet and anti-Communist rhetoric—but only to the extent to which today’s Russia identifies itself with the Soviet legacy, with the dubious “glory” of Stalinism and Great-Russian imperialism. And since neo-Stalinism, indeed, tends to resurface in today’s Russia, Russian anxiety over Ukrainian de-Sovietization has clear ideological grounds.19

It is up to Russia, of course, whether it chooses to commemorate its own victims of the Gulag and man-made famine—in the Kuban and elsewhere—or to celebrate Stalin as a “great statesman” and to bemoan the end of the Soviet Union as the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.” Ukrainians, however, may have their own ideas about Soviet “statesmen,” as well as great twentieth-century catastrophes.

True, the Party of Regions and, more generally, Russian-speaking eastern Ukrainians may be “uncomfortable with the label of genocide because of fear that it could drive a wedge between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians in Ukraine.”20 But the same could be said about the wedge between black Americans and white Americans in the U.S. No fear, however reasonable, can preclude scholars from exploring the truth and calling slavery slavery, and genocide genocide.

Conclusion

Three years after the Orange Revolution, Ukrainian history remains an ideological battleground, and the Holodomor issue stands prominently as one of its crucial parts. Indeed, any approach is “politicized,” as Dominique Arel aptly noted not long ago.21 Not only those who condemn Soviet crimes undermine politically their Sovietophile opponents, but also those who defend Soviet views and values undermine their anti-Soviet and presumably pro-European rivals. In some cases, curiously, the Holodomor as a crime of the Soviet regime is counterbalanced rhetorically by references to real and alleged crimes of anti-Soviet guerillas (OUN-UPA) and demands to condemn both crimes within the same document.

Nevertheless, the changes in public opinion, however slow, inconsistent and contradictory, enabled not only an unprecedented level of public mobilization during the Orange Revolution, but also the unprecedented vote in Ukrainian parliament in November 2006 designating the Terror-Famine of 1932-33 as genocide against the Ukrainian people. Even though the vote passed by a small margin of seven votes, only due to the crucial support of the Socialist Party, which once again took the “Orange” side, no less important was the fact that nobody dared to vote against the measure—the opponents of the law, with one exception, merely abstained. Indeed, “that wouldn’t have happened if Ukraine’s intellectuals hadn’t been arguing the case for the last fifteen years, thereby creating a discursive force that even sceptics couldn’t resist.”22


21. Ibid.

And, one may add, if Ukrainian society had not proved itself to be an active agent interested in the matter.

Of course, the relics of Sovietism are still salient, and Ukrainian society is still at odds with itself, still divided and bitterly grappling with both colonial and totalitarian complexes and stereotypes. The ruling elite is a part of the same society, so it would be rather naïve to believe that they are completely free of the imprint of Sovietism. All their policies, including that of memory, would hardly mark a radical break with the Soviet legacy and would probably not be as consistent and comprehensive as many Ukrainophiles and Westernizers would like to believe. Some ambiguities in official policies seem unavoidable; however, they would probably not be deliberately devised and employed for manipulation under “Orange” governments, and duplicity would not be the essence of the official politics.

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The Present State of Ukrainian Historiography on the Holodomor and Prospects for Its Development

Liudmyla Grynevych

The question of the Famine-Genocide of 1932–1933 will remain at the center of heated social and political debate in Ukraine for some time to come. This is a matter not only of deeply traumatized memories and a wholly understandable yearning to smash the wall of silence built up over the decades by the Communist regime about this terrible human catastrophe. The significance of the Holodomor issue lies in the fact that the manner of its perception allows one to clarify Ukraine’s place in a temporal matrix of “past—present—future,” to be aware of the importance of safeguarding the state independence of Ukraine, as well as her professing to democratic values and to the fact that there is no alternative to a European path for her development.

While defending the academic principle of distancing historical study from politics and rejecting a didactic role for history, one cannot argue against the weighty role of historians in influencing how society imagines its own past. By the same token, one cannot deny social influences on the process of “creating historical scholarship.” The aim of this article is to analyze the evolution of research on the Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine over an extended period of time, beginning in the 1930s and ending in the present day.

I will examine the complicated path followed by Ukrainian historical scholarship—from the denial of the very fact of the Holodomor under the Soviet policy of “imposed amnesia” to its acknowledgment and the identification of this crime as an act of genocide on the part of the Soviet regime. In fact, today a large number of professional historians realize the importance of researching the Soviet collectivization of agriculture and the Famine through the prism of a simultaneous analysis of socio-economic, political, ideological, and nationality issues. This should be viewed as an undeniable achievement.

Nevertheless, some negative trends also affect contemporary Holodomor studies, including a lingering closed-mindedness among Ukrainian historians, who tend to participate anemically in the sorts of scholarly discussions on the matter taking place in the West. Moreover, there are obvious signs of the issue’s politicization, manifested by the presence of Communist and anti-Semitic interpretations of the Holodomor in the field of historical writing in contemporary Ukraine.

Holodomor Historiography to 1991

In order to better appreciate the development of the historiography of the Holodomor, it is useful for one to have an idea of how the matter had been dealt with in Soviet times.

The earliest treatments of the Famine basically involved its total denial—an “imposed amnesia,” if you will—which enabled an obliteratorive celebration of the gains of socialism in the Soviet countryside in the early 1930s. These were “codified” in 1938 in the Short Course of the History of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Soviet Union.1 Rather than providing a truthfully apocalyptic account of the horrors that took place in the countryside, these accounts painted a picture of the victorious strides made by the regime towards the establishment of a happy and prosperous rural life. For several decades thereafter, the political and ideological concepts of the Short Course remained the norm throughout the USSR, including the Ukrainian SSR.2

However, notwithstanding the Stalinist regime’s repressive and punitive actions, as well as its pervasive

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1. Istoriia Vsesoiuznoi Komunistychnoi partiii (bil’shovikiv). Korotkiy kurs (Kyiv, 1938).
2. For example, see the dissertation synopses (“avtoreferaty”) M. I. Tsapko, “Bor’ba bol’shevikov Khar’kovschiiny za kollektivizatsi-iu sel’skogo khoziaistva (1928-1932)” (Kyiv, 1952); A. P. Jaroshenko, “Bor’ba komitetov nezamozhnyih selian Ukrainy pod rukovodstvom bol’shevistskoi partiiz za kollektivizatsiiu sel’skogo khoziaistva (1929-1930)” (Lviv, 1952); and S. N. Ioffe, “Bor’ba Kommunisticheskoi partiiz za kollektivizatsiiu sel’skogo khoziaistva (1928-1934): Na materialakh Chernigovskoi oblasti” (Kyiv, 1953) as well as D. F. Virnyk et al, eds., Narovy rozvytku narodnoho hospodarstva Ukrain’skoi RSR (Kyiv, 1949); Sergey Trapeznikov, Bor’ba partiiz bol’shevikov za kollektivizatsiiu sel’skogo khoziaistva v gody pervoi staliniskoi piati-letki (Moscow, 1951); and Didiichenko et al, eds., Istoriia Ukrainskoi SSR, vol. 2 (Kyiv: Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, 1956), 558 and passim.
propaganda, memories of the Famine of 1932–1933 never faded in Ukraine, particularly at the level of social consciousness.

During the brief period of the Thaw under Nikita Khrushchev, the problems involved in the collectivization of agriculture could be alluded to, but the subject of the Famine remained prohibited in public discourse. This is hardly surprising: the criticism of Stalin’s cult of personality, initiated by the ruling Communist Party, had clear ideological limits, and it could certainly not extend to the existing system of authority. In this context, the subject of the Ukrainian Famine remained “politically dangerous”: the open recognition of the millions of deaths during the Famine could not only potentially undermine the effectiveness of the Communist regime, but also its legitimacy. Sensitive to this issue, in the early days of the Brezhnev era Bolshevik ideologists re-imposed a strict information embargo. The so-called “liberal interpretations” of “food stocks problems” in early 1933 made by historians at the time of the Thaw were “corrected” and suppressed.

Soviet authorities also tried to maintain an informational blockade abroad, but various organizations in the Ukrainian diaspora constantly “hindered” these efforts, and sought for decades to direct world attention to the crimes committed by Stalin and his totalitarian regime. The success of the Ukrainian diaspora in attracting public attention to the issue of the Famine during the commemoration of its fiftieth anniversary in the early 1980s and the continued action on the part of diaspora Ukrainians and Western scholars—particularly the work of the U.S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine—compelled the Soviet authorities, on the eve of the release of the Commission’s preliminary results, to reconsider their total ban on mentioning the Famine. This led to the publication of some cautious articles. The first appeared in the November 1987 issue of the theoretical journal of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s Central Committee, Kommunist. It suggested a new “historical scheme,” acknowledged problems with agriculture in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and even mentioned the fact that a famine had occurred in 1932-1933. This item was accompanied by an explicit statement that the fault for this lay not with the regime (i.e., the ruling Communist Party), but in “the breach of the principles of Lenin’s cooperative plan” by Stalin. It also suggested that the Famine of 1932-1933 should be seen as a common disaster suffered by all Soviet people: “from Ukraine, the Don and the Kuban; to the Middle and Lower Volga region; and to the Southern Ural Mountains and Kazakhstan.”

Of course, the decision by Communist authorities to stop denying the fact of the Famine was not simply the result of external pressure. The liberalization of social and political life in the USSR in the era of glasnost and perestroika also contributed significantly. This did not mean, however, that the authorities themselves were ready to pursue active research into the matter or to offer assistance to Westerners looking to investigate it further. Perestroika and glasnost notwithstanding, ordinary professional Soviet historians had no access to the necessary archival documents regarding the Famine; these records were opened only to a limited group of Party scholars who were considered reliable.

Throughout 1988 the leading all-Union and republican Party and Soviet periodicals continued to publish material that reflected the official historical scheme of the events in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Nevertheless, there was a substantial growth in the number of authors, mainly journalists and other writers, who sought to present an alternative to the official interpretation of events by showing the tragedy in the way it was preserved in the people’s memory. This task was primarily undertaken by the historical and educational organization Memorial, founded in 1988. One of its major projects, spearheaded by the late Volodymyr Maniak, was the publication of a Kniaha-memorial (Book-Memorial) that would challenge the reigning policy of forgetfulness.

All the same, the Communist Party expected to assume the role of ideological curator to scholars interpreting the “difficult chapters” of the historical past.
that had recently come out into the open. In January 1990, it instructed scholars and educators to start studying the Famine, Stalinist repressions and other problems “caused by the cult of personality and its consequences,” with the findings to be submitted “for the consideration of the Central Committee.”

But the times had changed, and the Party’s ideological grip over historians was becoming weaker and weaker.

The staging of a landmark international symposium titled “The Famine of 1932–33 in Ukraine” in September 1990, with scholars from the United States, Canada, Italy and West Germany also taking part, reflected the growing activity of non-Party bodies with regard to the issue. Interestingly enough, the publication of the Party-sponsored Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: Ochyma istorykiv, movoiv dokumenit (The Famine 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the Eyes of Historians, in the Language of Documents) was formally approved on the first day of the symposium. When the book appeared in November 1990,13 many readers were shocked by its contents. At this point, Ukraine’s Party leadership affirmed that the subject of the Famine had been “finally clarified” and was now “closed to public discussion.” Given the general indifference shown by the broader Ukrainian public to the matter, as well as vociferous criticisms mounted by neo-Stalinist elements of how collectivization and the Famine had been presented, initially it seemed that this might happen. Nevertheless, Famine research would continue.

The Famine of 1932-33 as Interpreted by Today’s Ukrainian Historians

After the declaration of Ukraine’s independence, thanks to the resulting absence of ideological pressure and the new-found freedom of access to archival resources, a number of Ukrainian researchers of the Famine of 1932–33 directed their energies towards creating a more comprehensive factographic map of the tragic events in Ukraine as a whole and at the regional level. And yet, there emerged a dominant tendency to regionalize research, as attested by numerous scholarly articles, dissertations, and monographs. The desire to provide a dramatic increase in documentary proof that a genocidal famine had taken place also prompted a series of works in which scholars adopted the role of commentators on published archival materials and eyewitness testimonies. Typical of these were 33: Holod: Narodna Knyha-Memorial ([19]33: Famine: A People’s Book-Memorial), Chorna knyha Ukrainy (The Black Book of Ukraine)16 and others.

As scholarly analyses of the Holodomor proved ever deeper, it became increasingly apparent that the divisions (which emerged both in Ukraine and beyond its borders) between the proponents of “economic history” (those who sought to elucidate the reasons for and mechanisms of the occurrence of the Famine by way of a detailed analysis of Stalin’s agrarian policy) and “political history” (those who focused primarily on the study of politico-ideological processes and the specifics of the nationalities policy in Stalin’s “Revolution from Above”) were historiographically unproductive. However, the structuralist approach to historical processes, which involves the study of collectivization through the stranakh Vostochnoi Evropy (20-30 gody XX veka) (Kharkiv, 1994), vol. 1, 223-230; S. V. Markova, Nasele plenniki Kam’ianochhyny v period holodomoru 1932-33 rokiv, in Kam’ianets’-Podil’s’kyi State Pedagogical University, Naukovi pratsi, 1998, vol. 2 (4); Istoriychni nauky, 191-194; N. Babych, “Dramatychni tryschtsi (do temy “Velykyi holod na Myrhorodshchyni 1932-33 rr.”), in Storinki istoryii Myrhorodshchyny; vyp. 3 (Poltava 2002), 157-187; V. M. Zubovsk’i, “Holodomor 1932-1933 rr. na Zaporizhhzhi,” Naukovi zapysky, vyp. 46; (istorychni nauky) (Kyiv-Berdians’k, 2002), 109-113; and M. Sribniak, “Sumshchyna v umovakh holodomoru 1932-1933,” Stovo Prosvity, 2005, no. 42 ff.

The following is a list of dissertations dealing with the Holodomor, each with is own 18-20 page synopsis published in the city in which it was completed: N. P. Romanets’, “Selianstvo i radian’ska vladia u 1928-1933 rokakh: problema vizaemovidnosny (na materialakh Dnipropetrovsk’oi oblasti)” (Dnipropetrovsk’ University, 1995); I. Iu. Iatsenko, “Holodomor 1932–33 na Kharkivs’khyni” (Kharkiv State University, 1999); S. V. Markova, “Holodomor 1932–33 na Podill’” (Chernivtsi National University, 2002); and A. M. Bakhint, “Kolektivyzatsiia sil’s’hoho hospodarstva i holod na terytorii Pivdnia Ukrainy (1929-1933 roky)” (Kyiv Mohyla Academy National University, 2006).


prism of a simultaneous analysis of socio-economic, politico-ideological, and nationalities issues, provided a way of moving beyond the limitations and inadequacies of research caused by the abovementioned division.

A structuralist approach underpinned Holod 1932–1933 rokiv v Ukraini: prychyny i naslidky (The Famine of 1932–33 in Ukraine: Causes and Effects, published by the Institute of the History of Ukraine.17 In its eleven chapters an array of scholars, most of whom were well known in the field in Ukraine, analyzed the socio-economic, political and ethnonational aspects of the collectivization of agriculture and the Holodomor, as well as the latter’s demographic effects. Also examined were elements of the information blockade imposed on the subject; contemporary efforts to overcome this blockade by Ukrainian émigré political and community organizations; and the successful actions to this end by the Ukrainian diaspora, the U.S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine and the International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932–33 Famine in Ukraine in the 1980s, among others. These articles were complemented by a study of extant sources, a historiographic study, and a bibliographic study.

The fracturing of Soviet-era intellectual isolation from the international scholarly historiographical community, as well as the ongoing study of archival sources and the memoirs of eyewitnesses, created the necessary conditions for the creation of new conceptual models appropriate to a deeper understanding of the complex dilemmas of the period of collectivization and famine, as well as for the establishment of a connection to the current period of Ukrainian history. The issue of the genocidal nature of the Famine of 1932–33 acquired a particular importance in this regard.

Russian historians have uniformly maintained that the description of the Famine as genocidal is juridically inaccurate and politically motivated, dismissing the term “Holodomor” as an ideologically tainted neologism. For their part, Western historians have expressed varying views on this issue, while those in Ukraine have for the most part been in agreement that “genocide” and “Holodomor” are entirely appropriate terms for the events of 1932–33. Opposition to these terms in Ukraine today is, as a rule, expressed by representatives of particular political forces outside the context of scholarly discussion.

The social significance of this issue has prompted scholars to focus on the adoption in 1948 of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (commonly, the Genocide Convention) and the various definitions of the concept of “genocide.” This question was examined by George Grabowicz in the article “Holodomor i pam’iat’ (The Holodomor and Memory), published in the journal Krytyka in 2003.18 Grabowicz noted the particular political conditions surrounding the adoption of the Convention (including the demands by the USSR and the UK to exclude “political and other groups” from the definitional list of victims) and provided a sketch of the current scholarly discussion about the concept of genocide. The Harvard-based scholar also expressed his conviction that “more important than a basic and fixed juridical definition of the concept of genocide is the dynamic of its development, its evolution during the course of the genocidal twentieth century, and its function in the future.”19

Current interpretations of the UN Convention of 1948 in international jurisprudence were the subject of an analysis by Prof. Oleksii Haran’ of the Kyiv Mohyla Academy, in his article “Recognition of the Holodomor as Genocide: A Problem of Interpretation or Political Manipulation?”20 The author refers to material that appears on Prevent Genocide International’s Web site (http://www.preventgenocide.org/) and pays particular attention to the differentiation by jurists between the concepts of “ethnic” and “national” groups as used in the Convention,21 Haran’ stresses the consequent importance of “speaking of the genocide of the Ukrainian people, which includes representatives of other ethnic groups who also fell victim to the Holodomor.”22

Grounds for describing the Ukrainian Famine as genocide in politico-legal terms were presented by Stanislav Kul’chyst’s’kyi in his monographs (in Ukrainian) Holod 1932–1933 rr. v Ukraini iak henotsyd (The Famine of 1932–1933 as Genocide) and (in Russian) Pochemu on nas unichtozhal? Stalin i ukrainskii Golodomor (Why did he annihilate us? Stalin and the Ukrainian Holodomor).23 Dr. Kul’chyst’s’kyi proceeded from what he maintains is the necessity of viewing the tragedy of the Holodomor in Ukraine not in ethnic but in national terms. “The Ukrainian people,” he emphasized, “should be understood not only as an ethnos, but also

19. Ibid.
21. Notably the author puts forth a judicial definition of these concepts: “A national group means a set of individuals whose identity is defined by a common country of nationality or national origin”; “an ethnic group is a set of individuals whose identity is defined by common cultural traditions, language or heritage.”
22. Ibid.
as a political nation, and Ukraine not only as a territory where Ukrainians live, but also as a country. If we adopt this approach to the events of 1932–33, then we should recognize that the genocide was a terror campaign with famine as a means, directed at Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR and the Kuban region under the guise of a grain procurement operation.24

Dr. Kul'chyn’skyi was also drawn to the constructive ideas of Terry Martin about a “national interpretation of the Holodomor,”25 and of Andrea Graziosi about the differences that distinguish various instances of starvation in 1931–33 in the USSR as a whole, the Kazakh famine and epidemics of 1931–33, and the Ukraine-Kuban Holodomor of late 1932 and early 1933.26 In his development of these concepts, Kul’chyn’skyi attempts to integrate the events of the Famine in Ukraine with the general context of the Communist Revolution of 1918–38, and thus sets apart those events/elements, which were common to the overall Soviet and specific Ukrainian situations.27 In so doing, he also highlights those phenomena which were unique to Ukraine and the Kuban region in late 1932 and early 1933, in particular the massive number of deaths caused by the confiscation of all foodstuffs, not only grain, from the peasants of these territories.28

In examining the Famine-Genocide through the prism of analysis of the functioning of the Ukrainian SSR as a state entity (albeit a de facto state with limited jurisdiction), Kul’chyn’skyi makes the fate of the various ethnic groups of which the republic’s population was comprised an important consideration. Research of this topic in Ukraine is only now beginning to gain momentum, for example, the series of scholarly articles published on the impact of the Famine on Ukraine’s Germans and Jews.29 This issue has also been examined as part of more general overviews of the life of one or another of the republic’s ethnic communities in the 1920s and 1930s.30

Closely related to the matter of ascertaining the genocidal nature of the events of 1932-33 is the problem of establishing the motive and intentions of those who caused the Holodomor. Although most Ukrainian researchers agree that the Famine was caused by the large-scale political and socio-economic experimentation conducted by the Stalinist authorities, and more directly, by the confiscation of foodstuffs and the blockade of those regions afflicted by starvation, the country’s scholars are nevertheless divided on their interpretation of the motives for such actions. Some emphasize Stalin’s desire to destroy the economic independence of the peasantry and force them onto collective farms31; others believe that eliminating the Ukrainian national movement’s base of support and neutralizing the threat of “Ukrainian separatism” to be of primary importance32; and still others (this approach is gaining wider acceptance) propose that a combination of social and national motives stood behind the actions of the Stalinist leadership.33

Another important aspect of assessing the regime’s motives is the examination of the threats perceived by the Communist authorities (real or imagined), as well as the determination of whether a close connection can be made between Stalin’s urge to eliminate such threats and the Holodomor. In this respect, the studies of the forms and the scale of the Ukrainian population’s opposition to forcible collectivization, published by Valerii Vas’ylev, Oksana Hanzha, and Kul’chyn’skyi,34 as well as those

include N. V. Ostasheva, “Kryza menonis’koj spli’noty ta zakordonna menonis’ka dopomoha (1914–poch. 30-kh rr. XX st.)” (Dnipropetrovsk, 1996); V. O. Dotsenko, “Ivrei’s’ke hromads’ke zemleoblashtuvannya v Ukraini (20-ti–30-ti roky XX stolit’ia)” (Kyiv, 2005); L. L. Misinkeyvych, “Natsional’ni menshyny Podilia v 20–30-kh rr. XX stolit’ia” (Kyiv, 2000); and others.

31. I. H. Shul’ha, Holod na Podill’i (Vinnitsia, 1993); M. M. Shytynuk, Nas’lyntsi’ka kolektivizatsiia sil’s’koho hospodarstva iak odna za holovnykh prychn holodu 1932–1933 rokiv; i Holod-genotsyd 1932–33 rokiv na terytorii Mykolaiiv’s’koho rynok (Kyiv, 2000); and others.

32. V. I. Ulianovych, Teror holodom i povstants’ka borot’ba proty henestsydu ukrainitsiv u 1921–1933 rokakh (Kyiv, 2004).

33. Holod 1932-1933 rokov v Ukraini: prychny i naslidky (Kyiv, 2005); S. Kul’chyn’skiy, Pochemu on nas unichtozhal? Stalin i ukrains’ki holodomor (Kyiv, 2007); and others. Professor Simon Gerhard of the University of Cologne provides some perspective on this approach when he rightfully notes that from the point of view of Stalin regime “both the economically independent peasant and the nationally conscious Ukrainian were enemies and had to be humbled.” See Gerhard’s “Why did Holodomor 1932-1933. instrument 1’likvidatsii ukrains’koho natsionalizmu?” Ukrain’s’ki istorychnyi zhurnal, 2 (2005): 118.

by James Mace, Nikolai Ivanitskii, and Lynne Viola are particularly significant. All the scholars mentioned have provided evidence that this opposition was massive, that it took many forms (active and passive), and that oppositional attitudes to the regime were spreading throughout all strata of Ukrainian society, including the republic’s Communist nomenklatura. Kul’chyt’s’kyi reached an interesting conclusion (although one which has yet to be additionally substantiated) that Stalin turned the Ukrainian SSR into the epicenter of repression, because of his fears of opposition from the Kharkiv-based Communist apparat and its potential as a catalyst for a crisis that “could transform from a red one into a blue-and-yellow one, and exploit its border status and constitutional rights to effect a separation from Moscow.”35

The effect of the Stalinist “Revolution from Above” on the political loyalty of the Ukrainian SSR’s population, the growth of anti-Soviet sentiment in its largest demographic (the peasantry), their anticipation of a coming war in which the USSR would lose, the increasingly nationalist nature of these sentiments, and the Stalin regime’s repressive actions against the bearers of such sentiments are the subject of a series of my own publications.36 I advance the hypothesis that there is a possible connection between the Holodomor and the strategic military planning of the Soviet leadership, in particular with regards to the preparation of the USSR for a future war. Elements of such a preparation would have included not only the modernization of the state’s military-industrial complex, but also the “political preparation of the rear-guard.” It is suggested that this preparation was achieved by way of propaganda campaigns and by a purge of disloyal elements that could be dangerous during wartime. The obvious disloyalty to the Communist regime of a significant segment of the Ukrainian peasantry could well have prompted Stalin to employ famine as an instrument of physical liquidation of a potential “fifth column.”

The question of identifying the perpetrators of the genocidal crimes in Ukraine is becoming a matter of increasingly active interest. Some researchers, clearly prompted by subjective factors, ascribe guilt exclusively to the person of Stalin, or to the leader and his closest entourage (Molotov and Kaganovich). This approach has not gained much acceptance by Ukraine’s scholars, among whom there is a discernible trend of broadening the responsibility for the mass killings beyond Stalin to the entire Party-state power structure, as well as to the rank-and-file executors of the genocide, for example, the local activists.

Positions taken by the upper echelon of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR during the Holodomor have been examined by Valerii Vasyly’iev,37 Yurii Shapoval,38 and Hennadii Iefymenko.39 Mykola Dorosshko’s monograph on the Ukrainian SSR’s Party-state nomenklatura includes a special analysis of this question. In particular, Dorosshko concludes that “the leadership of the republic failed to stand up to the dictates of the center, and actually became a leading force in the execution of a policy that cost the Ukrainian people a multitude of victims.”40

In recent years, articles have been published and dissertations defended devoted to the analysis of the functioning of various governmental structures in the conditions of collectivization and famine, including the organs of state security, internal affairs, and the justice ministry.41 In addition, Ukrainian researchers have made an effort to understand the phenomenon of participation in repressive campaigns in the countryside by particular groups, such as members of poor peasants’ committees (komezamye) and militant atheists’ associations.42

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35. S. Kul’chitskii, Pochemo on nas unichtozhal? Stalin i ukraïns’kih golodomor (Kyiv, 2007), 89.
42. O.A. Mel’nykiv, Komiteti nezamoznykh selian na Podilii (1920-1933 rr.) (Avtorreferat dissertatsii) (Kyiv, 1998); V. O. Vološenko, Komiteti nezamoznykh selian v Donbasii (1920-1933) (Avtorreferat dissertatsii) (Donets‘k, 2003); T. Ivieievich, “Dial’nist’ spil’ko ‘voiovnychykh bezymivky’ Ukrainy pid chas sutsi’noi kolektyvizatsii 1929-1933 rr.,” Problemy istorii Ukrainy: fakty, sud-
However, the issue of “silent witnesses” has not yet been adequately addressed.

The effects of the tragedy of 1932-33 are being studied by Ukrainian scholars primarily in the form of assessments of demographic losses. Alongside studies by Russian and Western researchers, such as Robert Conquest, Sergei Maksudov (aka Alexander Babyonshev), Stephen G. Wheatcroft, and Valentina Zhiromskaia, are those of Ukrainian scholars Stanislav Kul'chyts'kyi and Serhii Pyrozhkov.44 Despite the variations in statistical methodology, and certain differences in the total number of victims, there is general agreement that demographic statistics have made it possible to determine, with varying degrees of accuracy, some indicators of the demographic catastrophe that occurred in the early 1930s. Pyrozhkov, the director of the Institute of Demography and Sociological Research at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, calculated that the sum total of direct and indirect losses in population in Ukraine amounted to 4.6 million.45 Kul'chyts'kyi put the figure at between 3 to 3.5 million.46 Generally speaking, Wheatcroft agrees with the latter numbers.47

Researchers have also turned their attention to changes in the direction of Soviet nationalities policy, the ending of Ukrainianization and the intensification of Russification tendencies, and other political shifts and transformations that took place in the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR after 1932-33. In particular, according to Vasylyiev, “1933 became one of the decisive moments in the Sovietization of Ukraine, the strengthening of the Stalinist system in the republic, and the intensification of the repressiveness of the totalitarian regime.”48 Ukrainian scholars have uniformly stressed the heavy moral and psychological impacts of the Holodomor, although research on this subject remains a task to be undertaken in the future.

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The Harriman Review

Politicized Interpretations of the Famine of 1932-1933

In 1990, Marco Carynnyk delivered a presentation at the first scholarly conference in Ukraine on the topic of the Holodomor, in which he drew attention to the emotional content of discussions concerning the famine, and underlined the negative influence that this had on their conduct. Seventeen years later the situation is largely unchanged. Just as a recollection of the Famine is traumatic to those who experienced its events, so it appears to foster an ongoing crisis in Ukraine’s historical scholarship, to the point of a crisis of identity among historians themselves. Treatments of the topic continue to be highly politicized, and a significant number of Ukrainian scholars appear to be unable to jettison the approach, characteristic of the Soviet period, which stresses the didactic role of history. The Holodomor has also become a topic of significant interest to certain anti-Semitic and xenophobic writers.

Ethnocentrism in portraying the Famine shows up among some Ukrainian scholars who, shunning comparative analysis and analogies, strive to view the matter...
outside a broader historical context. Emphasizing the exclusive national character of the Holodomor, a number of them sometimes remain deliberately silent about the fact of famine in other parts of the Soviet Union—notably Russia—during the early 1930s, while others even deny its existence. This ethnocentric approach is further marked by the intentional neglect of the problem of the participation of some Ukrainians in conducting repressive measures in the countryside and, in its stead, by an attempt to demonize the northern neighbor, attributing to Russia and Russians a genetic hatred of Ukraine and Ukrainians and the establishment of a “linear connection” between the events of the famine years 1921-1923, 1932-1933 and 1946-1947. Finally, the accompanying construction of stereotypical images of “enemies of the Ukrainian people” and “enemies of the Ukrainian nation,” with Russians and Jews usually cast in this role, should be mentioned.

Special attention should be paid to publications that appear under the banner of scholarly studies, but actually send out a xenophobic message and introduce anti-Semitism to a mass consciousness. The absolute majority of such works in which the theme of inter-ethnic confrontation is highlighted has been produced by the Inter-regional Academy of Personnel Management (Ukrainian acronym: MAUP), a non-governmental higher educational establishment based in Kiev. In 2002, a conference titled “The Famine of 1932-1933 as an Enormous Tragedy for the Ukrainian Nation” was organized under its auspices, which some participants used as an opportunity to demonstrate their xenophobia. Other conferences organized by MAUP have been convened under such anti-Semitic titles as “The Jewish-Bolshevist Revolution of 1917 as a Prelude to Red Terror and the Ukrainian Famine” in 2005 and “Punitive Agencies of the Jewish-Bolshevik Regime” in 2006 (the latter being expressly identified as “a forum on the Holodomor in Ukraine”).

The Famine Researchers’ Association has unfortunately also been guilty of provoking inter-ethnic tensions through some of its publications. Particularly notable is Andrii Kulish’s “scientific-publicist” work Genocide.


53. These proceedings appeared as ievreis'ko-bil'shovyts'kyi perevorot 1917 riku iak peredumova chervonoho teroru ta ukraïns'kykh holodomoriv: Materiały IV Mïzhnarodnoï naukovoï konferentsiï, 25 lystopada 2005 r. (Kyiv: MAUP, 2006).


exoneration for the destruction of the Jews during the Second World War—seem quite shocking.57

These amateurish authors can scarcely be considered the creators of an academic historical narrative. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the writings of individual professional historians who strive to present various ideological approaches in the form of “historical schemes,” buttressed by supporting scholarly argumentation. In this respect one could and should pay attention to the concept of “Jewish statehood in Ukraine” put forward by the doctor of historical sciences Serhii Bilokin’ in his presentation “Terror by Famine: Reflections about the Character of Statehood in Ukraine in the 1920s-1930s” at the international scholarly conference “The Holodomor of 1932–1933: Its Major Participants and Mechanics of Realization,” held in Kyiv in 2003.58 Bilokin’ cites the following as the main reason for the genocide of the Ukrainians: (1) lack of independence; (2) the non-Ukrainian character of the authorities; (3) Communist Party activities.59 He especially concentrates his attention on the question of the “un-Ukrainian character of state authority,” which then segues into a discussion about the “large” and “even crucial” role of Jewry in the social-political developments that took place on the territory of Ukraine during the first third of the twentieth century. The method suggested by Bilokin’ to personify the concept of “Jewish statehood in Ukraine” was partially realized by Kyiv University Professor V. Yaremenko in his 2006 MAUP-published work, Just Who Carried Out the Genocide of the Ukrainians?60

The Ukrainian intelligentsia expressed its negative attitude to displays of xenophobia in a “Statement” (of principle) published in 2005 in the journal Krytyka.61 All the same, this comes in the face of the institutionalization of “scholarly centers” around which the authors of anti-Semitic writings group themselves, the launching of accompanying “scientific-organizational” and publishing activity (i.e., the staging of scientific conferences, a growth in the number of newspaper and journal articles, the appearance of brochures and even books) and the occasional inclusion of that sort of article on the pages of serious academic publications. Regrettably, this is leading to the danger of xenophobic and anti-Semitic interpretations of the Famine of 1932–1933 establishing some legacy in the realm of Ukrainian scholarship.

Soon after Ukraine’s independence was declared, the country’s Communist Party was banned, and for a time Communist interpretations of the Famine were excluded from the public arena. This did not last long, however, since the Party was reinstated as an officially-sanctioned organization in late 1993. Over the last few years the attention paid by Communist historians to the Famine of 1932–1933 has grown considerably. Items noting the Communist versions of the causes of the Famine appear regularly on the pages of the Communist press. Several brochures on the topic have seen the light of day, including L. Hladkaia, L. Duz’ and V. Sydorenko’s 1933: Holodomor??? and G. Tkachenko’s The Myth of the Holodomor—the Discovery of the Manipulators of the Mind.62

The authors of works upholding the Communist understanding of the Famine are for the most part Communist Party functionaries, some of them with only a basic history education. There is also a small circle of generally older scholars and lecturers (historians, jurists, philosophers) versed in Communist ideology and well-known for their public pronouncements in defense of the Soviet past. A few are highly-placed academics, such as Petro Tolochko, a specialist in medieval history. Exclusive interviews with Tolochko discussing the Famine were published in the Party newspaper Komunist and the tabloid Bul’var Gordona.63 They were republished in the Communist press and some Russian history websites and cited as an independent expert viewpoint.

Common threads running through Communist publications include an obstinate ignorance of the sources that have emerged in the field over the last fifteen years and a total lack of substantial analysis of important contemporary studies published in Ukraine since independence. Works by Western or other scholars are judged a priori as hostile and malevolent—writings motivated by the desire of “America and the West” to ruin the Ukrainian-Russian alliance. The Communist evaluation of eyewitness accounts of the Holodomor
published today in Ukraine is extremely emotional and offensive. The authors label such testimonials as “aggressive, unsubstantiated attacks” on the Communist Party.

The conceptual scheme adhered to by Communist historians was formulated by “official” Soviet historians in the late 1980s, when the CPSU finally lifted its longstanding ban on mentioning the Famine at all. They recognize the very fact of famine, but categorically deny its artificial nature and anti-Ukrainian (genocidal) thrust. Characteristically, there are efforts not only to minimize the Famine losses in Ukraine, with the Communists giving a figure of approximately 700,000 dead, but also to impose on Ukrainian society a concept of the 1932-1933 Famine as an “ordinary event,” one of many that took place in the lands of the former Russian Empire. One author, writing in this vein in Komunist, states: “Just think—a famine! In the nineteenth century alone, there were forty years of famine or semi-famine in tsarist Russia.” When writing the word Famine, Communist authors generally put the word in quotation marks or affix the epithet “so-called.” They also downplay the significance of the 1930s tragedy by suggesting that famine rages in present-day Ukraine, with the number of its victims reaching as high as 5.5 million.

As for causes, those proposed closely follow the historical line of the Stalinist Short Course: Trotskyist and kurkul (Ukrainian for “kulak”) wreckers are identified as culprits, with the latter shrouding most of the blame. They are said to have sabotaged collectivization efforts, hidden away enormous quantities of grain, slaughtered animals, and to have been so outraged with the Soviet regime that they starved their families and themselves to death. Drought is also commonly given as a cause of the Famine. Other themes that commonly appear in Communist accounts include the efforts of the Communist Party to provide assistance to those afflicted by famine as well as the characterization of the Famine of 1932–1933 as a “common sorrow for all Soviet peoples.”

Among the many publications that represent a neo-Communist version of Famine history, particular attention should be paid to an article written by Professor Valerii Soldatenko. Named “The Hungry Thirty-Third: Subjective Thoughts on Objective Process,” it was published in the newspaper Dzerkalo tyzhnia. It outlines a concept that contains a veiled justification of the Famine as a response on the part of the Soviet government, “provoked by the capitalist world,” to prepare for a future war, thus directly linking the radical measures undertaken by the Stalinist leadership in the agricultural sphere to the Soviet victory over Germany in the Second World War.

In recent years the Communist historians’ activity has been increasingly intense, and their pressure on scholars who research Famine-related issues has been quite aggressive. In early 2007, V. Shekhovtsev, a historian and lawyer who had worked in the Public Prosecutor’s office for 35 years, famous today for his active defense of Stalin, addressed V. Kalinichenko, head of the Ukrainian history department of Kharkiv National University, in an open letter to the socialist newspaper Dosviti vohni, which summoned him to a public hearing at which the professor would act on behalf of the prosecution, while Shekhovtsev himself would take the side of the defense. Shekhovtsev had been provoked by the publication of Capital of Despair: The 1932–1933 Famine in the Kharkiv Region as Seen by Eyewitnesses, to which Kalinichenko had written the preface. In his letter, the jurist threatened that the professor had exposed himself to libel suits brought by the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Kosior, Postyshev, etc. He also called upon Kalinichenko to come forth with precise, extensive medical documentation to prove the wrongful deaths of every purported victim.

**Conclusion**

Ukrainian historical scholarship has traveled a difficult path in shedding light on the matter of the Famine of 1932-1933. This was almost guaranteed by the very difficulties of Ukraine’s historical development process. Under conditions in which the Communist Party monopolized authority and ideology, Ukrainian historical science stepped forward as an active instrument for the realization of a state policy of “imposed amnesia.” It stayed silent and denied even the very fact of the tragedy of the Holodomor. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian state independence created favorable conditions for a truthful accounting and deeper understanding of the events of 1932-1933.

In spite of an unstated policy of “inert ignorance” toward Holodomor topics persistently followed by post-Communist Ukraine’s higher leadership, Ukrainian scholars made considerable strides toward piecing together an outline of the facts of the Famine of 1932–1933, establishing an understanding of its causes and effects, and elucidating the genocidal essence of this

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crime committed by the Stalin regime. The field of Holdomor studies in contemporary Ukraine is extremely diverse, and the research being conducted clearly demonstrates a sea change in both the outlook and level of professionalism among scholars dealing with the topic. Also evident is the politicization of the Famine issue, which is revealed in particular by the existence of its ethnocentric, anti-Semitic and Communist interpretations. Despite certain achievements, Ukrainian historical study still remains insufficiently integrated into the global scholarly realm. A sociocultural inertia—approaching the sphere of Ukrainian history with an assumption of self-sufficiency—is clearly manifested by the fact that scholarly discussions concerning Holodomor issues taking place in the West very often remain generally unnoticed in Ukraine.

In October 2007, at a Fulbright conference in Kyiv, Dr. Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak noted that she felt modern Ukrainians were too prone to a negative evaluation of today’s reality and tended to picture everything darker than it actually was. I would not like to serve as proof of Dr. Bohachevsky’s statement, so in summing up my overview of contemporary Ukrainian historiography on the Famine of 1932-1933, I would like to state that in spite of the difficulties and arguments, the research process is proceeding and even accelerating. Its prospects, which I fully expect to be realized, give one hope.

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Holodomor Archives and Sources: The State of the Art

Hennadii Boriak

It was here, in Toronto, four years ago, that I spoke at one of the sessions of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) about the status and prospects for publishing documents related to the Holodomor in Ukraine in 1932–33. Naturally, the question follows as to why are we again talking about source materials and archives rather than the events, developments, causes and consequences of this most terrible catastrophe in Ukraine’s history?

To start with, I would like to underscore the fact that the Famine was one of the most taboo topics in the pages of Soviet history. In Ukraine no archival document about the Famine was published until the late 1980s. For over half a century, all Western historiography relied solely on oral evidence, intermittent documents from diplomatic archives, materials from journalists, and random photographs. Generally, this was the period of the “pre-archival” historiography of the Holodomor, as it were.

For decades, the prohibition on any information about the Famine-Genocide was an integral part of the official policy of the totalitarian Soviet regime. It affected the fullness of documentary focus on the tragedy in a negative manner. Nevertheless, the unprecedented scale of the terrorist action against the peasantry in Ukraine, the understanding by the contemporary Party and government leaders of the potential for social upheaval, the need for the authorities to break the Ukrainian peasantry, and, finally, the functioning of channels of secret record-keeping produced a great mass of written information about the pre-conditions, causes, scale and consequences of the Famine at all levels of power. Party committees, governmental institutions and newspaper editorial boards were deluged with letters, complaints, appeals and statements about the real situation in rural regions. Therefore, it was not possible to establish control over or prohibit the flow of documents “born of” the Holodomor, much less destroy it.

The most precarious time for these documents was the initial period of their existence. It may safely be assumed that a significant number of records related to the registration of diseases and deaths in hospitals and village councils was destroyed without delay, “while still hot”; today we have at our disposal some documented direct instructions issued by governing bodies about such destruction, as well as about the falsification of causes of death in extant medical records of that time.\footnote{On 13 April 1934, the Odesa Oblast Executive Committee sent “Top Secret” Instructions to all local councils and district (raion) executive committees of Odesa oblast (with copies to all Party district committees and inspectors of the Directorate of National Economy Register, later—the Central Statistical Board). This document, recently found at the State Archives of Odesa Oblast, provides direct documentary evidence testifying to 1934 large-scale actions performed by state authorities to wipe out traces of crime against the Ukrainian peasantry. According to the instruction, all “the 1933 deaths records from all village councils without exception” must be withdrawn. “The above records have to be transferred to district executive committees to be kept secretly” (State Archives of Odesa Oblast, f. R–2009, op. 1, spr. 4, ark. 91, 92; published in: Holodomory v Ukraini: Odes’ka oblast’ (1921–1923, 1932–1933, 1946–1947). Doslidzhennia, spohady, dokumenty, compiled by L. Bilusova, D. Badera, P. Bondarchuk (Odesa: Astroprint, 2007), no. 78 (facsimile).
In 1993 similar records from the State Archives of Vinnytsia Oblast were first referred to and quoted by Ivan Shul’ha. In 2003 same flat conclusion about the destruction of ZAGS offices’ books was repeated by Stanislav Kulchytskyi and Hennadii Efimenko. Russian historian Nikolai Ivnitsky (2000, 2003) followed his Ukrainian colleague’s conclusion (with no reference to archival documents) about the withdrawal and total destruction in 1934 of the ZAGS office register books from 1932-33, noting that only a few of them were preserved. In fact, at that time they could not know that approximately 4,000 death register books survived in Ukraine (I. Shul’ha, “Holod 1932-1933 rr. na Podillii,” Holodomor 1932-1933 rr. v Ukraini: Prychyny i naslidky: Michnarodna naukova konferentsiia. Kyiv, 9–10 veresnia 1993 r. Materialy (Kyiv, 1995): 141; S. Kulchytskyi, H. Efimenko, Demografichni naslidky holodomoru 1933 r. v Ukraini. Vsesoiuznyi perepis naselennia 1937 r. v Ukraini: Dokumenty i materialy (Kyiv, 2003): 189, fn. 73 (on-line version: http://www.history.org.ua/kul/content.htm); N. Ivanitiskii, Represivnaia politika sovetskoi vlasti v derevne (1928–1933 gg.) (Moskva, 2000): 293; N. Ivnitsky, “Il ruolo di Stalin nella carestia degli anni 1932–33 in Ucraina (dai materiali documentari dell’ archivio del Cremlino del Comitato centrale del Partito comunista dell’ Unione Sovietica e dell’ OGPU),” La morte della terra. La grande “carestia” in Ucraina nel 1932–33. Atti del Convegno Vicenza, 16-18 ottobre 2003 (Roma: Viella, 2004): 90.)}


2. See, for example, the death record from the village of Antonivka, Stavyshche raion, Kyiv oblast (21 June 1933) with cause of the death “died of starvation” crossed out; instead of it it is added: “unknown” (State Archives of Kyiv Oblast, f. 5634, op. 1, spr. 969, ark. 86–86v.).
Paradoxically, in the period following the Second World War the preservation of republic and all-Union-level documents in secret, controlled-access archival collections [spetsfondy] ensured their conservation. In this instance the regime itself rendered a service to future historians. By contrast, the documents of local authorities, regional institutions and organizations were regarded as inconsequential and “neglected,” never to become a part of restricted collections.

After the collapse of the Communist regime the archival administration of Ukraine has undertaken a disclosure of documents unrivaled by any other territory of the former USSR. This process has continued for an extended period, and today the proportion of secret documents in the state archives of Ukraine (which stood at 0.55 percent by January 2007) is one of the lowest in Europe. Naturally, among the opened materials most in demand were documents related to the history of the 1932–33 Holodomor. They have become the principle source base for scholarly research into this painful topic, and have helped to destroy numerous myths of the twentieth century.

At the same time, new myths compel us to continue our research in these same archives. On the far Left we see open and cynical speculation about these documents, while democratic forces offer sincere but misleading statements born of unfamiliarity with the historical source material. As a result, in the whirlpool of contemporary political battles in Ukraine the source base for researching the Holodomor gets covered up by numerous layers of speculations that need to be cleared away. Therefore, I wish to start my presentation by examining several myths of recent vintage.

I. The closed nature, unavailability or inaccessibility of archives in Ukraine is a widespread stereotype, especially today when a stalwart Communist has been appointed the National Archivist and is threatening the country with a clampdown on access to archival materials. However, the truth of the matter is that the former Archive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (now the Central State Archives of Public Organizations) has completed the full process of disclosing its collections and closed down the unit responsible for processing secret documents. The Archives of the State Security Service of Ukraine is now one of the most accessible in Ukraine. It energetically makes available materials that were previously totally secret—and even posts them on the Internet. It is impossible to make these documents secret once again, because the legislative regulations that protect public access to disclosed state information resources are too strong in Ukraine today.

Notwithstanding attempts by the Communists to censor its web portal, the State Committee on Archives of Ukraine continues to develop openly accessible documentary Internet resources on the history of the Holodomor, the Great Terror and other crimes of the Soviet regime.

A new myth was recently pronounced by the Ukrainian Communists. Their leader Petro Symonenko, cynically misconstruing documents of the higher Party administration, has included Stalin’s henchmen of the 1930s as being among the first to publish historical sources related to the Holodomor:

Communists were the first to provide information about the Famine in Ukraine. It was still in 1933 that the Politburo of the Communist Party of Ukraine published all the most significant materials about the situation of 1932–33, not hiding the truth about these events.

Furthermore, this archives expert assuredly declares, “Today one cannot find a single document that proves that the Famine was an intentional policy to eradicate the peasantry.” His conclusion: “Therefore, the position of the Communist Party today is the following: there actually were famine and tragedy, but this was not a tragedy just of the Ukrainian nation but of all the peoples of the Soviet Union and Ukraine.” Thus, the thesis is quite simple: there indeed was a Famine, and the Communists were the first who recognized the starvation and published all the documents related to it themselves. Therefore, we need to close the books on the Holodomor archives.

In keeping with this logic, the Head of the State Committee on Archives of Ukraine went one better in her public speeches: “Who needs this? My generation

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5. Here the author refers to Olga Ginzburg, a former Verkhovna Rada deputy for the Communist Party of Ukraine and building-materials factory director who was appointed as head of the State Committee on Archives of Ukraine in September 2006. During her tenure she raised great concern by stating that she wished to curtail the openness of the archives in respect to politically sensitive materials. Ginzburg was replaced as head of the State Committee on Archives in April 2008 by Oleksandr Udod, a professional historian [Ed.].


does not want it.” The national archivist goes one step further and, contrary to the stance of her Party boss, has produced one more myth: documents about the Holodomor were falsified by “nationalists” when the Archives of the CPU Central Committee were transferred to the state in 1991. Therefore, these documents should be subject to forensic investigation with respect to their authenticity. The absurdity of such an assumption is obvious.

Fittingly, the position of the Ukrainian Communist leader falls in line with the concept of another document, namely, the guidelines proposed by the Russian State Archival Service for a collaborative project titled “Famine in the USSR. 1932–33.” I would like to cite some cynical instructions of that concept:

Considering the “Ukrainian factor,” we should select the documents in such a way that they prove the universal character of the grain requisitioning agricultural procurement process in 1932 [...] in the crisis regions. [...] At the same time, document selection should be conducted in such a way as to portray a tragedy of the Soviet peasantry as a whole without emphasizing Ukraine. To this end, we could publish a selection of Civil Registry Offices’ certificates with particular records about starvation deaths in the Lower and Middle Volga regions in 1933. This is basically saying that by selecting several samples of starvation deaths in Ukraine, the Volga region, and the Northern Caucasus region one could conclude that the entire country suffered from the Famine.9

Of course, there certainly is no denying that famine struck other parts of the Soviet Union. However, this should in no way diminish the fact that Soviet authorities had deliberately targeted ethnically Ukrainian rural areas with measures to ensure the starvation of the peasantry there and that the devastation wreaked by this action was massive.

Moreover, in keeping with the best traditions of Communist propaganda, the above document recommends emphasizing that “anti-Soviet organizations” “used the existence of the Holodomor in the USSR to achieve their propaganda aims.” Obviously, it follows that this is how scholars should view the efforts of the Ukrainian public in western Ukraine who sought to deliver information about the Holodomor to the world. Viktor Kondrashyn, a professor at Penza University and the project director, is the author of this concept. Moreover, in a recent interview he characterized the law of Ukraine (adopted in November, 2006) acknowledging the Holodomor as act of genocide as “dancing on the bones of victims” and an attempt by “certain political forces” aimed at “lining their pockets” from the history of the Famine.10

Ukrainian historians and archivists categorically rejected this approach and proposed to prepare several individual volumes of the documents related to the situation in specific regions of the USSR with relevant comments and conclusions in each tome. We insisted on discriminating between famine as a result of State grain procurements and artificial famine as a result of grain procurements coupled with total non-grain food requisition. This incurred displeasure. Our proposals were labeled as an attempt “to whitewash the overall picture of this phenomenon [of starvation] in the common history of the state that existed at that time. The differentiation of the situation between “famine” and “Holodomor” will not withstand scholarly criticism.” And then we were presented with the initial results of our Russian colleagues’ manipulation of the source material: “Studies of the documents revealed in the Russian State Archives of the Economy about the natural migration of the population in 1933 have already shown that the correlation of mortality and birthrates in Ukraine and Russia in the epicenter of the Famine were roughly the same. No unique distinction of these processes in Ukraine was observed when compared to Russia.”11

There is nothing left to do but to present my condolences to those Russian colleagues and archivists who are forced to engage in the realization of political ideologies coming from above, acting against their conscience and professionalism (as well as their code of ethics).

Long-anticipated documents on the Famine from the Russian Federal Security Service’s (FSB) Archive, which are being declassified as part of the above-mentioned Russian project and are soon to be made public, may become the subject of new manipulations. In talking about the documents, Professor Kondrashyn assuredly promises: “The FSB’s archives will make it possible to reveal the truth of what had happened in Russia’s rural regions in the 1930s.” And then we hear the standard formula: “This was not only a Ukrainian tragedy; rather it was a tragedy of the Soviet peasantry as a whole.”12

There is more to it. Documentary photographs provide fertile ground for speculation, especially for those

11. From the author’s archives.
who deny the Famine-Genocide. For obvious reasons, one cannot find significant photographic evidence about the regime’s crimes in the state archives. Only a tiny group—something in the range of 100 plus items—may be considered authentic. I am referring to the thirty photos of victims of the Famine in Kharkiv taken by the engineer Alexander Wienerberger (from the collection of the Viennese Cardinal Theodore Innitzer); the collection of about eighty photos by Marko Zhlezniaè from the village of Udache in Donetsk’ oblast; several unique photos by Mykola Bakan’, the repressed rural amateur photographer from Chernihiv oblast; and some photos taken illegally by foreign correspondents.13

Understandably, the very limited number of Famine photos has led to the unfortunate practice of substituting photographs of another historical period and different regions as depictions of the 1932-33 Famine in Ukraine. As a rule, they are photos from the period of the First Soviet famine in 1921-22, mostly from the Volga Region.14 And vice versa, some Russian authors use authentic Ukrainian Famine pictures to depict the famine in the Middle Volga region.15

This negligence and sometimes even deliberate attempts on the part of authors to use striking but inauthentic photos as the symbols of the awful tragedy are used by critics to claim falsifications (and not just of the photos). The latest publication by Ruslan Pyrih16 and the traveling documentary exhibition from the archives of the Security Service of Ukraine, entitled “Declassified Memory,”17 have already become the objects for such charges, particularly on the part of the Communists. Oleksandr Holub, a Communist and the only member of the Ukrainian Parliament who voted against the Law “On Famine-Genocide,”18 actively uses the arguments about falsified photos of the Famine to criticize the work.

On the other hand, the underestimation of the value of the huge collection of official photo and film documents from the period of collectivization and the Holodomor is, in my opinion, a great mistake. There are no dead bodies or emaciated corpses in these propaganda photos. However, they reproduce the frightening atmosphere in which the tragedy of the Ukrainian village took place: children gather frozen potatoes while smiling for a reporter; kulaks (in Ukrainian: kurkuli) are dekulakized and dispossessed in a dramatic fashion; so-called “enemies of the people” are denounced; there are meetings of collective farmers, meetings of committees of poor peasants; and columns of Chekists on the march; and there is harvesting with modern agricultural equipment and the issuance of rations to collective farmers.

Official photo-documents of 1932-33 could be a powerful instrument in shaping public awareness. This was well understood by Andrei Marchukov, the author of a recent publication of documents titled Operatsiia ‘Golodomor’ (Operation ‘Holodomor’) in the popular Russian historical magazine Rodina.19 Besides providing generally uninformative textual documents, he shows a sequence of eleven photographs that evoke the peaceful and steady, almost pastoral, atmosphere of harvesting without a hint of the catastrophe. Photos from Ukraine are shown alongside photos from the Volga region, effectively “leveling out” any differences in the situation between Ukraine and other regions of the USSR. The one and only photo showing famine, titled “Starving People...

13. Most of the authentic photos are presented in a special section of the web-portal of the State Committee on Archives of Ukraine: http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/photos.php.

14. Misuse of the 1921-1923 photodocuments (mostly without any captions, or references to sources) to depict the tragedy of 1932-1933 is becoming increasingly popular; below are some samples: http://rep.ua.com/show/print.php?id=56413; survey “Holodomor in Kyiv”; http://sian.info/index.php?module= pages&act=p rint_page&pid=13090; survey “Holodomor in Chernihiv Region: Traces of Crime”; http://www.oda.ck/index.php?article=254; Survey “The Harvester of Death” (Cherkasy region); http://www.oda.kherson. ua/cezi-bin/control.pl?lang=uk&type=body&id=-./control/uk/data/poli tics/gniva.html; Essay “Time has no power on Memory” (revealed are 11 photos, mostly from the times of the first Soviet famine, including photos from criminal cases of those condemned for cannibalism); http://www.intv-inter.net/news/article?id=577092609; report “An exhibition about the Famine-Genocide opened in Berlin museum”; picture taken by UNIAN and republished in Svoboda (26 October 2007), no. 43: 1; President Yushchenko shows photo with victims of famine in Samara guberniia during the famine).18

15. See the publication by the Izvestiia editorial office entitled “The unique documents from the FSB Archives about the victims of Famine” illustrated by the documents from the State Committee on Archives of Ukraine web portal: http://directory.com.ua/news/101429.html.


Both photos supposedly depict the pastoral life of collective farmers in Dnipropetrov’sk oblast, 1933. Official photo documents from the Russian State Archives of FilmPhoto Documents, published in the magazine “Rodina” (no. 1, 2007).
in Ukraine,” looks unconvincing and somehow fantastic. To add insult to injury, the single Famine photograph is—seemingly on purpose—missing any reference to an archival source, while all the others—without exception—have specific references to archival collections. The reader, thus, receives the message that the provenance of the photograph is unknown and that it is, thus, suspect. It cannot be attributed to a reputable archival source, otherwise the author would have mentioned it.

Unfortunately, such myths are produced not only by those who adhere to the postulates of totalitarian thinking. Sergei Maksudov, the well-known scholar who has been studying collectivization and the Famine question for over a quarter of a century, poses the following question in a recent interview with the newspaper *Moscow News*:

> Why was an organization not set up [in Ukraine] to collect all the relevant evidence and to draw up the lists of those who died and perpetuate their memory? Only a few collections of government decrees and several memoirs have been published […], and precious as it may be, this represents a teardrop in the ocean. […] It is quite possible […] to take advantage of contemporary registers kept by rural councils, state registration offices, etc. Tens of thousands of such tomes and other valuable documents are rotting in Ukrainian archives.

Only a person who has never seen how the documents are kept in the archives could refer to them in such a careless and superficial way. And the terms “a teardrop in the ocean” and “tens of thousands” of volumes with lists of victims are myths that are accepted by the public, especially when they are brought to life by a credible scholar.

Certain undertakings initiated at the upper state level face definite pitfalls, if their realization is approached in an unprofessional manner and without taking into account the documentary base. Here I have in mind the compilation of a full list of Holodomor victims. Without a doubt the need to eternalize the memory of the millions who died in the artificial Famine is our sacred duty. But the majority of people involved in such grandiose plans are unaware that it is impossible to make a full register of the victims. The basis for compiling credible lists lies only with mortality registers, medical certificates, other medical or local documents, and, to some extent, oral evidence. But according to preliminary estimations, the extant mortality/birth registers for the years of 1932–33 cover a maximum of one-third of the territory afflicted by Famine, and the direct mortality records related to the Famine constitute no more than 1.5 percent of total mortality records of civil registry offices. The cause behind this was the strict prohibition at the time on recording starvation as the reason for death. I do not know who committed the sin of dividing the souls of innocent victims into the categories of those who died because of starvation and those who died because of other causes. In addition, medical and sanitary documents were assigned names only for local residents, so that hundreds of thousands of unfortunate people fleeing starving villages remain anonymous in documents that list them as nameless “beggars.” As a result, if one were to rely on civil registry books for a list of Famine victims, they would find in Odesa oblast, for example, a total of only…4,000 (!) persons. Certainly, the low number of documented names of victims could itself become a factor for new insinuations.

Sometimes unprofessional but patriotic circles set up wildly adventurous projects. Recently, a press release was issued regarding the approval of a projected Museum of the Victims of the Famine-Genocide in Kyiv. The Museum was projected not only to have exhibition halls, but also “a library with research center for recovering lost historical data.” However, it was unclear as to how it is possible to recover lost data and who would do this.

The long list of explicit, hidden, and potential insinuations that surround archival documents about the Famine-Genocide should serve as something of a warning to us for the future. Today we are completing the second decade of intensive exploration for materials as well as their large-scale declassification and publication. The time has come to draw conclusions and answer the following questions: what is the documentary base for studying the Famine-Genocide? What is its information potential? Are there groups of documents that have yet to be studied? What is the correlation between the published and unpublished documents? Should we count on sensational new archival findings? I will try to answer at least some of these questions.

**II**

First of all, let me briefly characterize the large and diverse complex of sources of which we are aware today. For this purpose, the scheme proposed by Ruslan Pyrih, the well-known Ukrainian historian of the Famine-Genocide and former National Archivist is quite acceptable.21

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21. The first general professional survey of sources on Holodomor and their classification was offered by Ruslan Pyrih in 2003 in a special chapter “Dokumenty z istorii holodu u fondakh arkhivoskhozyshch Ukraїni” of the fundamental volume published by the Institute of the History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine titled *Holod 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraїni: Prychyny i naslidky*.
1: The first group consists of the documents of the Soviet Union’s supreme organs of authority: the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR, the People’s Commissariat of Land Resources, the Committee for Procurement, the General State Political Administration (OGPU), the All-Union Committee for Migration, and many others. The documents in this group are of crucial importance for studying the main questions about the Famine-Genocide. They are kept in Moscow at the Presidential Archives, the Russian State Archives of Socio-Political History, the State Archives of the Russian Federation, and the Russian State Archive of the Economy.

The documents of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, the supreme state and Party authority, reflect the true policy followed in all areas of public life. Some 270 cases directly related to Ukraine were discussed during the 69 meetings of the Politburo held in 1932-33. The reason for such careful and consistent attention to the republic was, according to Stalin, “the danger of losing Ukraine,” a strategic region for the Soviet Empire in which the rural population retained its spirit of patriotism and aspirations to independence and resisted collectivization, grain and food procurements, and Sovietization.

A mass of Cheka documents from the General State Political Administration (OGPU) preserved at the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service (FSB) also belongs in this group. Here are dispatches, reports, circulars, and instructions regarding the social and political situation in rural regions of Ukraine: discontent, resistance to grain confiscation, group protests, the intent to emigrate, a mass exodus out of Ukraine and measures in response, including the repression of participants in protests, hunting down and arresting kulaks and [people in] nationalistic organizations, more confiscations of grain and bread, and the organization of blockades at railroads.

The statistics stemming from the higher levels of the OGPU should be treated with considerable caution since they were subjected to an almost unbelievable downward projection. For example, one report from April 1933 contains information about “83 cases of swelling because of starvation and 6 cases of death because of starvation … [in Ukraine].”22 One can only imagine the sort of manipulation such data had undergone.

The first category should also include a group of archival fonds of the NKVD at the State Archive of the Russian Federation. It concerns specially displaced persons, the so-called ‘kulak deportation’ to the Ural region and the other parts of the GULAG. There are 32,000 personal files of Ukrainian displaced persons held at the State Archive of Sverdlovsk oblast that also pertain to this matter.23

Key documents from the archives of higher Party and government agencies were published extensively in the early 1990s, usually with the financial support of Western institutions. This was the decade of “skimming off the cream” from declassified Russian archives. Most recently, thanks to the efforts of leading Russian historians, some landmark titles have appeared, including The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence (2001), ‘Top Secret’: Lubianka to Stalin on the Situation in the Country (2001), and the distinguished five-volume edition of The Tragedy of the Soviet Village by the prominent historian Viktor Danilov (the third volume contains documents from 1920 to 1933, [published in 2001]). Also notable is the volume edited by the Ukrainian historians Yuri Shapoval and Valerii Vasy’liv, which contains the travel diaries of Viacheslav Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich during their visit to Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus in 1932–33, along with contemporary Politburo minutes and other documents from the Russian State Archives of Political and Social History (2001). Later many documents of this group were republished in Ukrainian editions.

2: The second group includes the documents of republican-level governmental and administrative bodies: the Central Committee of the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, the People’s Commissariat of Land Resources, the Ukrainian Collective Farms Centre, the State Political Administration (GPU), the People’s Commissariat of Justice, the General Prosecutor’s Office, the Supreme Court, and various People’s Commissariats (e.g., Health Care, Education and others). These documents are preserved in Ukrainian central and departmental state archives: the Central State Archives of Public Organizations (TsDAHO), the Central State Archives of Supreme Bodies of Power and Government (TsDAVO), the State Archive of the Security Service,


An updated version of the survey by Ruslan Pyrih is published as introduction to the recent publication: Holodomor 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraini: Dokumenty i materialy, compiled by Ruslan Pyrih (Kyiv: Vydavnychyi dím “Kyjevo-Mohylans’ka akademiia,” 2007),5-33.

Also, in the 2003 volume are represented some other special surveys of the sources on Holodomor: from the State Archives of Ministry of Internal Affairs (N. Platonova. V. Vrons’ka, pp. 26–41), from Russian archives (V. Marochko, pp. 41-50), from the State Archives of the SBU (V. Danylenko, V. Prystaiko, pp. 81–98), analysis of the published documents (O. Veselova, V. Marochko, pp. 50–81).

and the State Archive of the Ministry for Internal Affairs. Almost all of the documents of the Communist Party and a part of the key documents of Soviet governmental agencies have already been published.

A general characteristic of this group is the high level of information as to the immediate causes, conditions, mechanics, technologies and executors of the man-made Famine. There is extensive factual material regarding the total confiscation of foods, extensive food shortages, widespread bloating [from starvation], mortality, and cannibalism. The absolute subordination of these local authorities to instructions from Moscow is quite evident from documents here. They are similar in scope to the first group as they were produced by the republican counterparts to all-Union structures.

The fullest representation of the Holodomor is provided by the documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, because of its key place among governing bodies. It should be noted, however, that almost always the degree of information in a document is inversely proportional to the level of its origin: the higher its level of origin, the less concrete information it contains about the Famine.

Documents of republican executive authorities (mainly the People’s Commissariat of Land Resources, Ukrainian Collective Farms Centre, All-Ukrainian Union of Agricultural Collectives, People’s Commissariat of Worker and Peasant Inspection) contain extensive factual material about the Famine according to the sector of administration involved. As for the Archives of the People’s Commissariat of Health Care, at least 12,000 files from the early 1930s were destroyed in 1941 in Kyiv as Soviet troops retreated.

The documents of law enforcement bodies—the General Political Administration (GPU), People’s Commissariat of Justice and the General Prosecutor’s Office—are of particular importance as these institutions participated intensively in the mass repression of the peasantry and they carefully documented their activities.

The Archives of the General Political Administration (GPU)—the most powerful branch of the republic’s repressive penal system—became the last major collection related to the Holodomor to be declassified in Ukraine. More than 150 documents (exceeding one thousand pages) were made public in 2006 in digital form through an Internet posting; they have subsequently been displayed for over a year in the large-scale touring exhibition titled “Declassified Memory.” During this period, the exhibit has traveled to every oblast center (usually supplemented with local documents from the state oblast archives) and arguably has become the most influential instrument for raising the awareness of the people in Ukraine about this tragedy. The process of making these documents public reached its apogee in August 2007 with the publication and launch of a documentary collection bearing the same name (and comparable content) as the exhibit.

The GPU’s operative papers document the extent of Cheka and militia involvement in the mass confiscation of foods through intensive repressions.

The GPU’s statistics, as mentioned earlier, include falsified data about the scale of starvation and mortality; even the Chekists themselves recognized this fact. One can cite the chief of the Kyiv oblast branch of the GPU from April 1933 to appreciate just how much the agency’s figures deviate from the real situation in Ukraine and complicate the process of drawing up a register of victims’ names: “The GPU’s raion offices do not keep a tally, and sometimes even a village council does not know the true number of those who died from starvation.”

We have no reasons to believe that the situation in other regions was any different.

The documents of the People’s Commissariat of Justice and the Prosecutor’s Office of the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR provide evidence of government-led terrorism against the peasantry through court repressions.

The key documents of the Departmental State Archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are concentrated in the collections titled “Protocols of Special Proceedings and Tribunals [Triiky or Troiky]” and “The Criminal Cases of Court and Out-of-Court Bodies.” The criminal files reveal the shocking truth about the total social collapse in rural regions and mental aberrations that led to the eating of corpses and cannibalism. Of the 83,000 cases launched by the NKVD in 1932-33, we have records for no more than 3,000 today (the rest were destroyed in 1956). Approximately 426,000 criminal cases of so-called special deportees—persons interned in 1932-33 in the Krasnoiarsk region, Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Tomsk oblasts and other oblasts, and the Komi Republic—constitute a separate block of documents of this archive.

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26. Ibid.

More than 2,500 people were convicted of cannibalism. The documents for 1,000 of these cases have survived. They include photographs of the material evidence and of those who committed these crimes. This unique indictment of the Communist regime remains the sole body of documents related to the Famine that is still unpublished. In my opinion, society is still not ready today to accept these grizzly photos and textual records. It is a matter for the future.

3: The third group is the largest one. It includes the documents of local Party and Soviet organs: oblast, city and raion committees of the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of Ukraine; oblast and raion executive committees; local organs of the GPU; militia, court, the prosecutor’s office, health care bodies, education institutions, worker and peasant inspectors, village councils; and the like. The orders of these agencies provide little information as they essentially extrapolated political estimations and measures from above to local conditions. In contrast, the reports and correspondence of Party oblast committees to the Central Committee of the CP[B]U in Kyiv provide the utmost detail about the processes involved. This group of documents presents a striking picture of starvation and death, local political attitudes, and manifestations of mass protest and resistance. Comparable documents were sent by local governing agencies (oblast executive committees) to the republican authorities.

The documents of this group are concentrated primarily at state archives of those seventeen (present-day) oblasts on whose territories the Holodomor raged, in the network of regional archives maintained by the security services (i.e., in seventeen archival divisions tied to the oblast administrations of the SBU and the Ministry of Internal Affairs), and also at the TsDAHO and TsDAVO and central archives of the SBU and MVS.

Only a tiny portion of the documents from this group have been published, naturally in local editions. Over the course of the last year, by order of the President of Ukraine, this large body of documents, which constitutes up to half of all the known materials on the Holodomor, is being processed by the state archives under the rubric of the project entitled “National Register of Memorial Collections.” The document-by-document or group annotation for the collections and their separate parts, files, groups of documents and individual items is centered in Kyiv and is being prepared for posting on the website of the State Committee on Archives of Ukraine.

4: The fourth group of documents includes materials from foreign diplomatic legations, political and public organizations, and the foreign press. This is the smallest and least studied group of documents in Ukraine. Included in this category are reports of the German and Italian consulates general in Kharkiv, Kyiv and Odesa; information from British diplomats and economic experts; and analyses by the Polish police. Some of these materials have appeared in various editions published since the late 1980s.

A prominent feature of all the material in this group is its attempts to assess the situation and the conviction of its authors of the undeniably artificial nature of the Famine, that is, it represented a deliberate measure taken by the regime to suppress the Ukrainian peasantry. It was not accidental that Stalin demanded that Kaganovich “isolate those whining, rotten diplomats.”

5: The fifth group includes letters, affidavits, complaints, petitions and diaries. These are vivid, deeply psychological depictions of the reality and tragedy of this event.

Letters were typically sent to republican institutions in Kharkiv (the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee [VUTsVK], the Council of People’s Commissars [RNK], and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine) or addressed personally to high-placed officials (such as Hryhorii Petrov’skyi or Vlas Chubar) or to local Soviet land and law enforcement bodies. The letters of peasants sent to the editorial boards of central newspapers, although addressed to Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, et al., constitute a significant block of documents. Mikhail Kalinin’s office alone received approximately 30,000 letters. These letters, which reflected the slaughter that had become the reality of life in the village, informed higher Party and governmental leaders of what was happening. It is hardly accidental that 5 million letters from the 1930s disappeared from the Russian State Archive of the Economy without a trace. Only a small number of items from this group has been published. No special editions with such documents have appeared in Ukraine.

Recently the Archive of Security Service of Ukraine made public excerpts from two unique diaries from the Famine era, written by the teacher Aleksandra Radchenko and Dmytro Zavoloka, a Party investigator and official with the Kyiv Oblast Auditing Commission. Both reveal a profound understanding of the situation and attempts to come to grips with the tragedy emotionally. Both the diaries and their authors were repressed.

The diagram on the following page shows how each group of documents figures in an overall representation of source materials for studies of the Holodomor (includ-
ing published oral accounts). According to our very preliminary estimates, the archival legacy of the Holodomor consists of about 70 to 80 thousand documents concentrated in approximately 2,000 archival fonds and collections. An absolute majority of them—the documents of local authorities—are to be found in the regional archives of Ukraine.

III

The next question is how to describe the existing body of published documentation, i.e., that part of the archival documents that is out in the open and has entered academic and public circulation? The bibliography of works related to the Holodomor of 1932–33 includes about 1.5 thousand items. Of these, only about 250 are documentary publications. Book editions of documents which appeared between 1990 and 2007 number a little more than 30 volumes (of which 23 are regional in scope). The remainder—over 200 items—are articles. In total, the documentary publications reproduce about 5 thousand archival documents, representing some 6–7 percent of their total number. 33

Regional collections of documents have been published for 15 of the 17 oblasts located in the Ukrainian SSR in the early 1930s. Kyiv and Donets’k oblasts present a geographic lacuna in the circle of regional publications.

Electronic publications are becoming increasingly popular as the most efficient and cost-effective way of making editions available. For example, about 50 facsimiles of documents were posted on the web by regional archives. A database entitled “Electronic Archives of the Holodomor” on the web portal of the State Committee on Archives includes about 1,500 documents.

This begs the question: Is this a large or small number? I would simply say: It is enough. Disregarding the relatively small number of items, the most important and crucial materials in term of range and content have been published. They afford the possibility of making conceptual and legal conclusions about the conditions, causes and consequences of the man-made Famine. Moreover, Regional collections of documents have been published for 15 of the 17 oblasts located in the Ukrainian SSR in the early 1930s. Kyiv and Donets’k oblasts present a geographic lacuna in the circle of regional publications.

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today there is not much hope for making sensational discoveries of documents concerning the Holodomor. It would be worthwhile to look at increasing the focus on regional materials and the micro-historical level in order to create the most accurate chronicle of the Great Famine possible.

The continual republication of documents that have appeared in earlier editions is a strong testimony to the exhaustion of the (readily-available) source base. The share of recycled materials in documentary publications is 30–70 percent. The publishers of documents are beginning “to go round in a circle.”

The newest documentary publications provide some proof for such a thesis. I would like to mention just a few of them.

First and foremost is the comprehensive Holodomor 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraini: Dokumenty i materialy (The Holodomor of 1932–33 in Ukraine: Documents and Materials) by Ruslan Pyrih, which was published in August 2007. The author is not only a renowned researcher, but also a pioneer in publishing documents from the former Archive of the Central Committee of the CPU (Communist Party of Ukraine). Let me cite some quantitative details about this publication. This is the largest known collection of documents. It contains approximately 700 documents from 20 Ukrainian and 5 Russian archives (using all the central and 14 of the 17 regional archives of Ukraine). Of 87 resolutions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 65 are published for the first time. They fill in the gaps in the documents pertaining to the highest level of policy-making. Moreover, the extensive use of sources from Moscow archives made it possible for the author to describe the all-Union context of the situation, i.e., the state of agriculture production, the realization of plans of harvesting, and the situation with food supply, without which one could not objectively analyze what was happening in the Ukrainian village.

Reprinted items constitute more than 60 percent of the documents. Thus, while the task of searching for archival documents was the primary task for publishers of archival materials in the late 1980s, today’s authors face the no less daunting problem of selecting documents for their compilations. Generally, the book may be considered the first documentary encyclopedia and at the same time the first scholarly anthology of the Holodomor. It truly marks the culmination of a series of ground-breaking and pan-Ukrainian (both in content and composition) documentary publications that have appeared through the efforts of historians and archivists over the two last decades.

A volume of previously secret documents of the Security Service of Ukraine (the successor to the Ukrainian branch of the KGB; Ukrainian initials: SBU) under the title Rozsekrechena pam’iat: Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv v Ukraini v dokumentakh GPU-NKVD (Declassified Memory: The Famine-Genocide of 1932-33 in Ukraine in the Documents of the GPU-NKVD) came off the presses during this same period. The publication includes almost all of the 1,000-page collection of documents made public a year earlier and posted on the official website of the SBU in digital format.34

The operative reports of the Cheka reflect a detailed awareness of Party and governmental officials about the situation in the Ukrainian village and thus, about the intentional and criminal nature of their actions. In addition, they identify the little-known instrument for realizing the regime’s policy—I am referring to the lower level of the Party leadership, the mediators between the peasants and the authorities, who emerged in Cheka documents as “adversaries with a Party membership card in their pocket.” But the exceptional value of these documents lies in the fact that they bring into focus the lesser-known elements of the mechanics of creating the Famine and also the scale of resistance from the Ukrainian village. First of all, they clearly document the confiscation of non-grain foodstuffs from villagers, which signals a specific operation that transformed the grain confiscation into a widespread Famine. Second, these documents reconstruct the grand picture of the spread of anti-Soviet sentiment: the mass walkout of peasants from collective farms and their claims for the return of their horses and plots; the seizure of assets; and open acts of protests. This, naturally, spurred the authorities to an energetic fight against this “counterrevolution.”

After Stalin’s openly anti-Ukrainian message—he order not to lose Ukraine in August 1932—the agencies of the GPU were transformed into an instrument of terror against the peasantry. It is in the Cheka’s documents that we find the (in my opinion) sensational definition used by the Chekists themselves for their operation in the villages: “rural terror.” That is the official terminology. The epithet “Petliurite,” i.e., nationalistic, is always used alongside the adjective kulakish (“kurkulish” in Ukrainian) to mark that the foe was not only a class enemy, but also an ethnic enemy at whom the Genocide was aimed.35

A collection of documents of the GPU’s organs in the Crimea includes clear instructions on establishing a blockade on railroads in order to prevent the shipping of grains northwards, i.e., to the starving Ukrainian villages. Correspondence opened and inspected by the Cheka—letters of Ukrainian peasants to their sons who were

34. See note 17.
serving in the Red Army—add to the picture of infernal catastrophe.

One more recent Kyiv publication, *Ukrains’kyi khlib na eksport: 1932-33* (Ukrainian Bread for Export: 1932-33) compiled by Volodymyr Serhiichuk, is an example of a successful thematic collection of documents.36 The source base of the book is the archives of the organizations responsible for removing grain from Ukraine, both in order to meet the needs of the domestic market (i.e., the USSR) and to dump them aggressively onto the European market in the late 1920s–early 1930s. Millions of Ukrainian peasants paid the terrible price for this policy with their lives.

As for the recent regional publications, it would be worthwhile to note the volumes prepared by Sumy, Vinnytsia, Odesa, Kharkiv, Donets’k, Cherkasy and Luhans’k archivists in 2005-2007, based primarily on local archives with illustrative local factual materials.37

I will mention only one example from the Vinnytsia collection. It is the resolution of the Vinnytsia Oblast Committee of the CPU, dated August 1, 1932, regarding the confiscation of millstones from peasants with the following motivation: “the availability of the millstones promotes bargaining away grain and speculating in cereals.” A year later the Oblast Prosecutor informed the Oblast Committee that the resourceful peasants were using meat-grinders instead of the confiscated millstones to mill cereals, and he proposed the confiscation of meat-grinders from peasants as well. The intentions of the organizers of the Famine-Genocide are quite obvious.38

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R
turning to the topic of the exhaustion of the archival source base for revealing key moments in and the mechanisms of the creation of the Famine, I would like to outline the prospects for investigating new bodies of materials, especially for a careful reconstruction of the course of the tragedy of the Ukrainian village and an estimation of its consequences.

1: Certainly, the local press materials mentioned above provide one area for new research. Utilizing this resource requires considerable effort, a special methodology, and a carefully organized work plan, mainly because it is dispersed over a number of libraries, and also because of its great volume. According to the Book Chamber of Ukraine, more than 1,000 newspaper titles were published in the 486 raion centers of Ukrainian SSR in 1932-33 with varying periodicity. A preliminary estimate allows us to put the total quantity of the press materials at about 150,000 items.

2: A second segment of the documentary base, absolutely unused and unavailable until recently, is the Vital Statistic Registers kept by local civil registry offices. According to enacted legislation, they must be held in the archives of the Ministry of Justice for 75 years and closed to researchers. The seventy-fifth anniversary of the Great Famine coincides with the termination of the confidentiality measures for the personal information in the registers. The State Committee on Archives of Ukraine initiated a large-scale project aimed at pre-term acquisition by oblast archives of the extant registers for 1932–33 and the subsequent years for state preservation. (In many cases, one volume of such a register will contain entries up to the end of the 1930s).

Generally, we can speak about four thousand Vital Statistic registers. This amounts to at least 1 million pages of records for 1932–33. According to very preliminary calculations, they contain information about no more than 3 million deaths.39 As was noted above, the extant registers cover about one-third of the territories in which the Famine raged. Direct indications of death because of starvation (starvation, decay, atrophy, dystrophy, and avitaminosis) are rare. At the same time, there are certain regularities in identifying euphemistic diagnoses (like dropsy, heart dropsy, sharp pain, pneumonia, intestinal tuberculosis, swelling, etc.), and certain compound diagnoses (like pneumonia-atrophy, myocarditis-atrophy, etc.). Special methods will need to be employed for obtaining specific demographic information, as well as for reconstructing the instructions given to local physicians in making diagnoses.

The concentration of the Registers today in 25 state archives (whereas previously they had been dispersed among hundreds of raion and local depositories) will open up the possibility of studying this unique group of documents. At the same time, it is understood that this will be a complicated undertaking and that it may raise more questions than it answers.

3: A group of “problematic” documents are photos from the time of the Holodomor. In my opinion, it is high time to make a definitive identification of these, possibly with the participation of researchers via a special Internet-forum, in order to dot the i’s in the on-going discussions regarding the quantity and authenticity of the documents of this group. In particular, I would like to stress the necessity for the centralized memorial registration and the publication of all photo documents without exception which contain scenes from everyday life in the Ukrainian village during the early 1930s, which are presently scattered throughout various archival and museum repositories. According to preliminary calculations, there are no more than 10 thousand such items. The publication of these documents will make possible a reconstruction of the landscape of the tragedy in a widest sense.

4: The fourth segment of the documentary base I would like to mention when speaking about future prospects are materials from the regional archives. They constitute the largest group in terms of quantity, but they are the least utilized to date in terms of research and publication. By the order of the President of Ukraine, since last year all State Archives have started working on preparing a “National Register of Memorial Collections.” Documents related to the Great Famine became a core of the Register. All of the materials would require annotation at the fond/collection, file group, individual file or document levels. The first results of this work are already displayed on the web portal of the State Committee on Archives of Ukraine.40

5: And in conclusion I would like to outline the project titled “Electronic Archives of the Famine-Genocide: A Consolidated Register of Archival Documents Online.”41 The project, initiated last year at the State Committee on Archives of Ukraine, aims to provide open access to an archive by publishing (electronically) all the documents related to the Famine-Genocide on the Com-


40. See: Selected Materials for the National Register of Memorial Fonds: http://www.archives.gov.ua/Archives/Roesteg. Listed so far are funds from the TsDAVO as well as the Dnipropetrovsk, Luhans’k, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kherson, Khmelnyts’kyi, and Chernihiv state regional archives.

41. 1932-33 Famine-Genocide Electronic Archives (http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/) is the core of a special section of the official web portal of the State Committee on Archives of Ukraine “Genocide of Ukrainian People: 1932–1933 Famine”: http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/index.php
committee’s website. The texts would appear in the database in transliterated versions taken from the publication (in php format), or as facsimiles of digitized originals (in pdf format). Each document would provide the requisite information: date, caption, place of storage, bibliographic information (if need be), and so on.

The pilot version of the database includes approximately 1,500 documents from 1929 to the mid-1930s, approximately 10 volumes of documents as well as all the digitized documents from the State Security Service archives. Consequently, it is the largest electronic documentary resource and most comprehensive chronicle dealing with the day-to-day life of the Ukrainian village at that time.

Combining documents from different levels, origin, orientation, geography and content in a single database and the increasing opportunities for providing groups of documents in both facsimile and text formats afford the opportunity to create a representative and useful documentary base of the Famine-Genocide. The next step is the integration of visual materials (i.e., photo and film documents) and the development of adequate search tools. It should be noted that this large-scale project was made possible due to the generous support of the Ukrainian Studies Fund, Inc. Naturally, it requires further support.

Generally, we regard this project as the final step in making available the broadest selection of Holodomor sources possible and the culmination of considerable efforts in working on documents and their publication over an almost twenty-year period. The Electronic Archives of the Holodomor will open up the possibility to improve future historiography in this field qualitatively, while purging the source base from the sort of speculative and unprofessional insinuations I mentioned earlier in my paper.

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Archives in Russia on the Famine in Ukraine

Iryna Matiash

The problem of the Holodomor in Ukraine is among the most complicated both in Ukrainian and in foreign historiography. Active research into the Great Famine in large measure spans only the post-Soviet period, since, as we know, the question “did not exist” in Soviet historiography. In studying such an important (and for the Ukrainian people painful) problem, historical sources possess a special significance and their unprejudiced analysis and interpretation is the duty of every historian. The initiation of the process leading to the declassification of archival information, which took place at different times in the various successor states of the Soviet empire, made it possible for a documentary substratum to be created for an objective study of the tragic pages of our history. Now there is no reason to complain that the necessary source materials are unavailable.

True, here one might mention the loss of some archival fonds or aggregates of documents, and the limiting of access to individual archives, fonds, or documents.

Generally, however, the documentary publications and collections of oral history, which have been appearing for more than 15 years now in Ukraine and the Russian Federation, provide a graphic representation of the political, economic, national, and social components of the Holodomor-Genocide in Ukraine. Nevertheless, difficulties arise with the interpretation of historical sources, particularly in the context of the Ukrainian-Russian scholarly discussion of this issue with its obvious political subtext. The archival information now available, as well as that which has yet to come to light, demands competent evaluation. The researcher who aspires to reveal the truth should turn to the primary sources, to archival information, at the same time bearing in mind that, for the most part, the most striking documents have already been published.

Archival documentation containing information on the Holodomor is held in the state archives of Ukraine, as well as the archives of governmental entities in states that were directly related to its organization, or which provided relief to starving Ukrainians, or those which became a second homeland to post-World War II Ukrainian emigrants. Perhaps the largest number of documents in terms of volume is to be found in the federal and local archives of the Russian Federation, which hold documents of all-Union state and Party organs, as well as their leading figures, that is, those who bore personal responsibility for the Ukrainian tragedy.

A large number of the documents accessible to researchers are already in scholarly circulation; Ukrainian and foreign scholars are actively using the information they provide in their specialized works. A large aggregate of documents has been made available in some fundamental publications.2 Concise data on the informational resources of the Russian Federation’s archives regarding Holodomor issues have been supplied by V. Marochko3 and H. Kapustian,4 while D. Khubova5 has consulted the Holodomor’s oral history.

All the same, it remains imperative that a detailed examination be conducted of the information bearing on the Holodomor in Ukraine that has accumulated in

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Russian institutions of memory (archives, museums, libraries), while a thematic analysis of such historical sources might well become a separate project. The present survey was carried out as an attempt to distinguish the aggregate of documented history bearing on the “organization” of the Holodomor in Ukraine in 1932-33 within the context of a broader theme, namely, “Archival Ukrainica in the Russian Federation.”

The documents bearing information that directly or indirectly reflects different aspects of the problem are concentrated in the State Archive of the Russian Federation, the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, the Russian State Archive of the Economy, the Russian State Military Archive, the Russian State Archive of Literature and Art, the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of Russia, as well as the governmental archives of the Briansk, Voronezh, Novosibirsk, and Sverdlovsk oblasts, the Krasnodar and Primorskoj krais, the Center for Documentation of the Recent History of the Krasnodar krai, and the Kursk and Voronezh oblast State Archives of Socio-Political History.

The nature, form, and contents of these documents were determined by the function they were intended to perform, as well as by the authority and duties of the bodies whose activities generated them. Direct evidence regarding the organization of a “man-made” famine among the peasantry is to be found in documents of an official provenance: legislative and other normative acts; minutes of meetings and decisions of the Politburo CC CPSU (Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and Party organs of various levels; stenographic reports of congresses, plenums, consultations, devoted to questions bearing on all aspects of the grain-delivery campaigns of 1931–33; diplomatic documents reflecting the international context of the problem; documents resulting from actions of the government’s executive organs; special bulletins; circulars; informational summaries; records of interrogations; official correspondence; documents of personal origin; auto-communicative documents (diaries, memoirs); personal letters; and oral history.

Documentation that reflects the problem or its individual aspects indirectly might include the statistics which record the dynamics of mortality rates; documents from bodies which organized and effected the export of grain; documents generated by activities of transport firms involved in grain export; documents that reflect the deportation and re-settlement of peasants from Ukraine and the Kuban; etc. The majority of documents is classified “Confidential” or “Secret.”

A more detailed examination of documents dealing with the Holodomor-Genocide to be found in the basic Russian state archives follows.

The Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History

This archive was formed out of the previous Central Party Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU and, in consequence, inherited holdings that are especially valuable for study of the Holodomor in Ukraine. Here have also been deposited part of the archives of the President of the Russian Federation. Of the 689 fonds in the archive, of particular interest are the CC CPSU fond (f. 17), and the personal fonds of Joseph Stalin (f. 558), Lazar Kaganovich (f. 81), and Viacheslav Molotov (f. 82).

The CC CPSU fond holds documents of the collective CC organs: the Plenums, Politburo, Orgburo, the CC Secretariat and apparat. Here are minutes of meetings, stenographic reports, decisions of the CC VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)], also official correspondence regarding organization of grain delivery. The Ukrainian aspect is clearly reflected, particularly in the following decisions of the CC VKP(b) and the Council of Peoples’ Commissars of the USSR:

(a) On grain delivery in Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and in the Western oblast dated December 14, 1932. This authorized the deportation of peasants to the North (and also the Communists who failed to squeeze grain out of them). It forbade Ukrainianization in the Kuban and called, as something not to be delayed, for the Ukrainian language in official dealings and the mass media to be replaced by Russian, that being the language “more understood by the Kuban population.”

(b) On Ukrainianization in the Far Eastern krai, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the Central Chernozem oblast, and other regions of the USSR, dated December 15, 1932, intended by autumn, 1933, to convert the press and educational institutions to the Russian language, thus forbidding their native tongue to Ukrainians re-settled in these regions.

(c) On grain delivery in Ukraine, dated December 19, 1932. This decision pointed to the “unserious attitude” of the Ukrainian leaders to the grain-delivery campaign, and sent Kaganovich and Pavel Postyshev to Ukraine.

These official documents are currently in scholarly circulation both in works of historical research and in published collections: Holod 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraїni: ochymа istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv (The Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: through the eyes of historians, and the language of documents, Kyiv 1990); Komandyry velykoho holodu (Commanders of the Great Famine, Kyiv 2001), and others. In this fond are also deposited copies of similar decisions of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukr SSR and the CC CP(b) Ukraine. An example is the bitterly familiar decision, dated
December 6, 1932, “On entering on the black board [blacklist] those villages that maliciously sabotage grain delivery” (op. 26, spr. 550). In this group of documents might also be included the decision of the Dnipropetrovsk’s obkom CP(b)Ukraine, “On undertakings in the struggle against famine,” dated February 10, 1933, where, in addition, there are facts on death by starvation even of collective farmers who had a large number of trudodni [workdays] to their credit.

Materials related to plenums and decisions of the CC VKP(b) testify to the role of the Party leadership in the organization of the Famine and the destruction of the Ukrainian peasantry. The People’s Commissariat of Trade was directed on August 30, 1930, to draw up and submit to the Politburo plans for fulfilling obligations related to the export of grain, and providing specific responsibilities for the “grain-producing regions (Ukraine, the Trans-Caucasus and others).” Personal responsibility for grain shipment to the ports was placed on the Secretary of the CC CP(b)U, Stanislav Kosior. The decision of May 10, 1931, “On the Grain Balance,” obligated Party committee secretaries to begin shipping grain from the “interior raions” and, within ten days, to send out of Ukraine 25,000 tons of grain to Moscow and 9,000 tons to the Crimea; and, within twenty days, 5,000 tons of flour to the Transcaucasus.

A check by “sampling” of available grain reserves in the storage facilities of Souzkhlib and of cooperatives was entrusted to the OGPU.

According to a decision regarding special settlers,” dated July 10, 1931, deportees were to be placed in the former Kherson okruha (in Kakhovka raion—400 families; in Khorly—800, in Skadovsk—400; Hola Prystat’—300; Heniches’k—350). In the Novovasylivka, Novotroits’ke, and the Akymovs’ raions of the former Melitopol okruha, it was planned to settle 250 families in each.

The familiar decision of October 30, 1932, “On steps for the intensification of grain deliveries,” obligated obkoms to institute a daily review and operational control over the fulfillment of grain-delivery plans and to submit reports every five days to the CC CP(b)U. Further, to “assist” the obkoms, it dispatched prominent Party figures into the field accompanied by not less than 100 leading workers from the central organs. The grain-delivery plan for November was set at 90,000,000 poods.

Information on which a general picture might be based is provided by the Plenum of the CC of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, which took place October 30-31, 1931. The noose on the Ukrainian peasantry’s neck was being tightened by the hand of S. Kosior. He called the grain-delivery plan for Ukraine of 510,000,000 poods (greater than that for other republics) “unreservedly realistic and possible to fulfill, without any particular sacrifice on the part of the collective peasantry and the Ukrainian village generally.” For comparison, the plan for Belarus called for 10,500,000 poods; for the northern Caucasus, 200,000,000; for Kazakhstan, 55,000,000, etc.

The archival fond of Kaganovich, the “200 percent” Stalinist, contains documents (431 items) that characterize all aspects of his activity from 1918 to 1957. He had been secretary of the CC All-Union CP(b) and from December 15 oversaw the agricultural department of the CC. The nature of the documents in his personal fond is quite varied. These are biographical documents, drafts, theses, stenographic records of reports and speeches at congresses of the RCP(b)-All-UnionCP(b)-CPSU at plenums of the CC and the CCC, consultations and other meetings, drafts of resolutions of Party forums, summaries of Party purge results, preparatory materials and manuscripts of newspaper articles, appointment books, correspondence with central and local Party organizations and leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet government, letters and notations with resolutions and comments by Stalin. In the context of the problem being studied, of particular interest is Kaganovich’s correspondence with Stalin and Molotov; documents on his trip to the Donbas in April, 1933; documents about the creation of political sections in the MTS, decisions and directives on agriculture (1930–1932), brief diary entries and stenographic records of his speeches during trips to Ukraine (1932–1934).

One of his diaries (f. 81, op. 3, d. 215, l. 1-24) records the progress of his trip to Ukraine on April 22-29, 1932). This senior Soviet office-holder found that in Kyiv a counter-revolutionary organization involving lecturers and students had been rendered harmless; “wreckers” had been unmasked at the Ukrainian Tractor Center; insurgent groups of Polish descent identified. These facts testify to the existence of systemic repression. The diary mentions a new form for influencing the peasants: “insistent discussion” of OGPU workers with the head of a collective farm and members of the farm’s executive. Some idea of the forms this discussion took might be gleaned from unofficial correspondence and oral accounts. The summary included this directive: grain, including the seed, must be delivered without any delay; 700 families must be expelled from Dnipropetrovsk’s oblast; 1,000 homesteads in Kharkiv oblast to be deprived of property, homes, land; 500 in Dnipropetrovsk oblast.

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6. RGASPI, f. 17, op., 162, d. 9, l. 21-22.
7. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1935, l. 7-9.
8. Ibid., f. 17, op. 162, d. 10, l. 35.
9. Ibid., op. 162, d. 10, l. 116-18.
10. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 26, d. 54, l. 192-97.
Another “Ukrainian” diary, this one covering April 10-20, 1933, (f. 81, op. 3, d. 216) is an account of Kaganovich’s trip to the Don region. Collective farmers’ “unsatisfactory work” was the reason for failure to fulfill the grain-delivery plan. Horses dropped dead of disease because of “poor management, bad care.” The possibility for improvement lay in the intensification of Party control. “The political section must have an agent, an informer in every collective farm, in every field and in every brigade” (f. 81, op. 3, d. 181-193). Behind every comment in the diary stand dozens and hundreds of mutilated lives.

Kaganovich’s diaries of his trips to the North Caucasus on November 1–8, 1932; January 30–February 5, 1933 (f. 81, op. 3, d. 215); June 20-24, 1933 (f. 81, op. 3, d. 216); and July 20-24, 1933 (f. 81, op. 3, d. 216) testify to the cynicism of those who organized the famine and the consistency with which they implemented their plans. They emphasize the “great resistance to the grain deliveries” in Krasnodar krai, and clearly state the primary political goal—to break that resistance, beginning with raikom secretaries and ending with rank-and-file collective farmers.

In terms of its bearing on the problem examined here, no less an important component of the Kaganovich archive is his correspondence with Stalin during 1931-1936, in which he was the main addressee. The body of this correspondence containing Stalin’s mostly terse directions and Kaganovich’s brief communications, lengthy commentary and detailed reports was published in 2001 by the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History as part of the Yale University “Annals of Communism” project.12 Individual letters have appeared in other publications, in particular, Komandyry velikogo holodu: Poizdki V. Molotova i L. Kahanovycha v Ukrainu ta na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz. 1932-1933 (Commanders of the Great Famine: Travels of L. Kaganovich and V. Molotov to Ukraine and the North Caucasus. 1932-1933, Kyiv 2001); “Tragedia sovetskoi derevni. Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie. 1927-1939: Dokumenty i materialy. V 5-ti tt./T. 3” (The Tragedy of the Soviet Village. Collectivization and Dekulakization. 1927-1939. 5 Volumes, Vol. 3, Moscow 2002).

In the personal fond of Viacheslav Molotov (Skiabin) there are 1,712 items for 1907-1986. In the autumn of 1932 Molotov headed the Ukrainian Special Commission, created by Stalin’s directive to intensify activities related to grain delivery. In his fond are to be found texts of his reports and speeches during his travels in Ukraine (1928, 1932-1933), particularly on deliveries in the USSR and Ukraine (December, 1931-January 1931; October-November, 1932). There is correspondence with Stalin and other Soviet leaders, CC CP(b)U materials on deliveries, statistical data about the situation in Ukraine,13 letters to Stalin from V. Chubar, Head of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, and from H. Petrovs’kyi, Head of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, about famine in Ukraine.

The dimensions of the Ukrainian tragedy are particularly evident from a report submitted to Molotov by M. Chernov, Deputy Head of the Committee on Deliveries, Council on Labor and Defense, which dealt with the extent to which Ukraine was supplied with foodstuffs. Chernov states: “The overall need in Ukraine for grain for the second quarter, according to the supply plan, is 410,000 tons in grain measure, or 136,000 tons monthly. On April 1, Ukraine had 80,000 tons of commercial resources and in April 55,000 tons were released from the NEP fond.”14 Even making allowance for the fact that numbers given in Party documents were often inaccurate, the extent to which the survival of Ukrainians was in peril is obvious.

The letters to Stalin from Vlas Chubar and Heorhii Petrovs’kyi, both dated June 10, 1932, are generally already known. Despite the taboo surrounding the word “hunger,” they both contain information that left no reason to doubt the tragic nature of the situation in Ukraine.

As a result of visits to thirteen raions in Kyiv oblast and four in Vinnytsia oblast, Chubar, obviously downplaying the proportions of the tragedy, informed Stalin that: “from March-April those who did not have enough to eat, who starved, swelled, and died of hunger could, in every village, be counted in the tens and hundreds” (f. 82, op. 2, d. 139). Petrovs’kyi was more circumspect in his account. “I was in many villages in these raions and everywhere saw that a notable part of the village is seized by hunger. Not many, but there are also those swollen from hunger, usually the poorest, but [including] even the middle peasants. They use such substitutes [for food] that couldn’t be worse, and even those substitutes are sometimes not there” (f. 82, op. 2, d. 139). Petrovs’kyi predicted that “the famine will intensify” and so asked for assistance in the form of buckwheat for sowing.

The results of such appeals have been analyzed more than once by researchers of the Famine in Ukraine. This information is closely tied to accounts provided by f. 17,15 already placed into circulation by Ukrainian scholars, about how on June 26 Chubar personally traveled to

14. RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 13, l. 133.
15. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 13, l. 4.
Moscow to convince Molotov and Kaganovich to release 15,000 tons of rye and rice flour for Ukraine from state stores.\(^\text{16}\)

Indirect information about the battle of the Soviet leadership with the Ukrainian peasantry is given in statistical data from July 4-5, 1932, on the amount of ploughed land in collective farms; issue of grain to sovkhozes and kolkhozes for seedling and consumption in 1932; on the yield of grain and technical crops in the Ukr SSR for 1928–1931; on agricultural productivity in the USSR and the Ukr SSR; on the gross harvest of grain in the Ukr SSR in 1927-1932; about grain deliveries in the USSR and the Ukr SSR in 1927-1932; about fulfillment of the grain delivery plan in the USSR by regions in 1931-1932. These have been gathered in spr. 139 of f. 82 (op. 2).\(^\text{17}\) They would, of course, need to be examined critically and collated with other sources.

The list of starving raions in Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk's, Vinnytsia, and Kharkiv oblasts (f. 82) with the notation that none of these oblasts has fulfilled the grain-delivery plan has already appeared in print a number of times. The value of these documents is not so much in the information about the spread of famine (this is no longer new for the scholarly community) as it is in their peripheral aspect which testifies to the cynicism of those who organized the Holodomor.

Quite informative are the telegrams of October 29 and 30, 1932, from Molotov to Stalin, on lowering the grain-delivery plan for Ukraine. As a result of an examination of this matter at a meeting of the CC CP(b)U Politburo in which obkom secretaries participated, the plan was reduced by 70,000,000 poods. Instead, Molotov proposed “directing 50-70 comrades with Party experience, along the lines of gubkom and okrkgom secretaries, for one month to work on grain delivery.” He also suggested using “depraval of a part of consumer goods as a form of repression.”\(^\text{18}\) Implementing these proposals resulted in loading on the peasantry the burden of the “Black of repression.”\(^\text{19}\) A telegram from Molotov to Stalin on November 20, 1932, Molotov reported to Stalin by telephone that he was led to issue a “directive” that 600 Communist workers be mobilized from among activists in Ukraine’s biggest industrial centers to work on grain delivery. Other communications from Molotov to Stalin (letters, explanatory notes, and others) can be found in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History fonds.

The Molotov fond contains reports from the GPU Ukr SSR with the signature of the deputy head, Karl Karlson. In a report dated December 28, 1931, “On the Progress of Grain Delivery in Ukraine,” the systematic “under-fulfillment of the delivery plan” is explained by the right-opportunist attitude of the village aktiv and raion functionaries, counter-action by “kulaks,” ineffective explanatory activities, insufficient delivery of consumer goods. Examples are given of the “free-thinking” of individual peasants: “They’re taking away our last bit of grain, all the policies of the government are intended to leave us hungry”; or, “The Soviet government has brought us to the point where we are forced to run away to distant horizons. Obviously, government policy is bringing about the destruction of the village.”\(^\text{20}\)

A general picture of how the grain deliveries were proceeding in December 1931, is given in the next report covering that month. Information provided there, about grain being hidden by individual peasants and collective farmers, shows that repressive measures were implemented [by the authorities] against their own people. In only six days in December, 62 investigations were initiated against workers in the Soviet apparatus for inactivity, poor management, concealing and wasting grain.\(^\text{21}\) A special report “On the Death and Mass Slaughter of Livestock” of December 28, 1931, tells of the completely unsatisfactory state of livestock in the collective farm and individual sectors and cites quantitative indicators. As an official version of the reason for the situation are proposed: poor administration, low level of veterinary services, and unfavorable state of feed supplies.

A number of telegrams from Molotov to senior officials in Ukraine (f. 82, op. 2, d. 141) testify to a mindset prepared to intensify repressive measures for failure to fulfill the grain-delivery plan. One such telegram from M. Khataiev and V. Molotov, of November 5, 1932, sent to obkom secretaries of the CP(b)U demanded: “to impose to the extreme appropriate repressions, particularly now, when it is indispensable that a decisive turning point in grain deliveries be achieved at all costs.”\(^\text{22}\) A telegram from Molotov to Kosior concentrates on the Chernihiv region. It is suggested that Mykola Skrypnyk be sent critical investigations of the matter to the obkom officials.

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\(^{18}\) RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 141, l. 7.

\(^{19}\) RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 138, l. 80-97.

\(^{20}\) RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 138, l. 103-114.

\(^{21}\) RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 141, l. 18.
there to apply control. In other telegrams to obkom secretaries it was stated that the Chernihiv region was bringing shame on the “successes” in grain delivery of other oblasts of Ukraine.

The Stalin fond (f. 558) along with other informative documents holds one of the most cynical documents of this period, namely, the Directive, dated January 27, 1933, of the CC VKP(b) and the Council of Peoples’ Commissars USSR on preventing the mass exodus of hungry peasants. This document forbids the entry of starving Ukrainian peasants into Russian territory and orders that “after separating counter-revolutionary elements, the rest are to be returned to their place of residence” (op. 11, d. 45, l. 109).

Part of Stalin’s archive is held in the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation. Here one finds additional evidence of how the Communist Party “cared” for the peasantry, particularly the Ukrainian peasantry. Especially eloquent are the materials on the progress of investigations into resistance to grain deliveries in Orikhov raion of Dnipropetrovsk oblast in Ukraine (f. 3, op. 58, d. 380), which have appeared in the publication Lubianka. Stalin i VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD. Arkhiv Stalina. Dokumenty vysshikh organov partiinoi i gosudarstvennoi vlasti. Ianvar’ 1922-dekabr’ 1936 g. (Lubianka. Stalin and the VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD. Stalin archive. Documents of the Higher Organs of Party and State Authority. January 1922-December, 1936, Moscow 2003). Copies of the interrogation of those Party leaders accused of undermining the grain-delivery plan in 1932 and of witnesses were sent to all Party and State Authority. January-February, 1933, Sholokhov relates in detail the situation in the Veshensk and Verkhodonsk regions and reports that one part of Stalin’s archive is held in the Archive of the Russian Federation. Here one finds additional evidence of how the Communist Party “cared” for the peasantry, particularly the Ukrainian peasantry. Especially eloquent are the materials on the progress of investigations into resistance to grain deliveries in Orikhov raion of Dnipropetrovsk oblast in Ukraine (f. 3, op. 58, d. 380), which have appeared in the publication Lubianka. Stalin i VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD. Arkhiv Stalina. Dokumenty vysshikh organov partiinoi i gosudarstvennoi vlasti. Ianvar’ 1922-dekabr’ 1936 g. (Lubianka. Stalin and the VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD. Stalin archive. Documents of the Higher Organs of Party and State Authority. January 1922-December, 1936, Moscow 2003). Copies of the interrogation of those Party leaders accused of undermining the grain-delivery plan in 1932 and of witnesses were sent to all CC and CCC members and candidates, obkom and kraikom secretaries and members of the Narkomzem USSR Collegium with an introduction by Stalin. This “performance” with its fabricated documentation was primarily intended to exert psychological pressure, to head off possible manifestations of disobedience.

Some notes from Genrikh Yagoda to Stalin reflect the process of deportation (here called “the operation”) of families and individuals from the Kuban (f. 3, op. 30, d. 196). According to the documents, in November-December, 1932, 4,158 families were expelled to the Ural region (where their re-settlement was “looked after” by the OGPU); 1,992 families were sent to north Kazakhstan and to special settlements. In no document is the nationality of the “special re-settlers” mentioned, but the name of the stamitsa — Poltavskaya — that figures in many of the documents as a base of Ukrainian counter-revolution, lends credence to the conclusion that there was a notable Ukrainian component among the special re-settlers. Other documents also bear this out. The draft of an order to the OGPU on the campaign against theft of grain, dated July 5, 1933, sent to Stalin by Yagoda, anticipated a new wave of arrests, organization of surveillance by agents, increasing control by the OGPU over “unreliable” farmsteads (among which was the Novyi Svit commune in Ukraine), review of all cases in the course of two weeks (f. 3, op. 57, d. 60). This draft led to discussion among those that were to implement it but, on September 15, 1933, the CC All-Union CP(b) adopted a decision “On Safeguarding Grain” which broadened the OGPU’s authority to include organization of grain storage.

Letters [to Stalin] from the prominent Russian author, Mikhail Sholokhov, have a direct bearing on this matter. Sholokhov provided many instances of abuse committed against the stanichniki who failed to discern the advantage of the collective system: those who “disagreed” were beaten, stripped to their underwear and confined in storage sheds in January-February; kerosene was poured on women’s feet and skirts, set alight and then put out; they were buried to the waist in the ground; given pistols and forced to shoot themselves; made to sit on heated stovetops; driven barefoot through the snow; forced to drink large quantities of water mixed with pork fat, wheat, and kerosene.22 These methods of “interrogation” were applied for one reason: to find bread that did not exist, thus condemning them to death by starvation. In expectation of help from Stalin (or intending it as the final argument) in his letter of April 16, 1933, Sholokhov relates in detail the situation in the Veshensk and Verkhodonsk regions and reports that one sees people swollen with hunger everywhere. Promising relief, Stalin hinted to Sholokhov that the latter was not apprised of many matters, emphasizing that “the honorable agriculturalists are not as vulnerable as might appear from afar.”23 Before too long Sholokhov’s defense of the peasantry was to have a palpable effect on his own personal fate.

A great mass of documents with information on economic, socio-political, administrative matters (including the USSR’s social-economic policies regarding the countryside) is concentrated in the Russian State Archive of the Economy, reorganized in 1992 out of the Central State Archive of the National Economy of the USSR. In the 2,021 fonds in this archive there are more than four million documentary units resulting from the activities of people’s commissariats, ministries, state committees and other organizations which provided planning and financing, set standards and directed components of the national economy of the former USSR.

23. Ibid., 69. See also Tragediia sovetskoi derevnii, edited by V. Danilov, et al.
The fond pertaining to the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR (f. 413) contains documents for 1917-1988, among which, given the focus of this paper, the “Materials on the Export Activities of the Narkomzovneshtorg [People’s Commissariat for Foreign Trade]” covering 1932-1933 are particularly of interest. Gathered here are statistical data on the export of different groups of goods (primarily of agricultural provenance) which are an important source for general statements and conclusions on the extent to which the peasantry was deliberately deprived of the product of its labor. An explanatory note to the accounts report of the All-Union Society Eksportkhlib for 1932 (op. 13, d. 28) includes the basic indicators of its activity, among them those of its representatives in Ukraine. The files “References and Summaries of the Economic-Planning Administration on the Fulfillment of the Plan on Deliveries of Goods for Export in the Republics, Oblasts, Krai of the USSR and of Narkomzovneshtorg Organizations in 1933” (op. 13, spr. 595) and also “Reports of All-Union Societies Rybkonserveksport, Lektekhsyrovyna, Minerslykateksport, and Plodeksport on fulfillment of exports and income in the Fourth Quarter of 1933” (op. 12, d. 18401) deal with delivery of goods for export, particularly in Ukraine. This last document emphasizes that “as a result of the campaign to achieve the export plan in the Ukr SSR” a situation was reached by which “Party and Soviet organs through their directives obligated trade organizations to devote more attention to exports.”

The direct and primary victim of this campaign was the Ukrainian peasantry. In the fond are also a number of documents relating to the confiscation of gold, silver, and diamonds from the populace.

The documents of the All-Union Society for Trade with Foreigners “Torgsin” (f. 4333), which existed from 1931 to 1936, reflect the process of fulfilling the currency plan—the “mobilization” of so-called ritual-lifestyle gold (rings, pectoral crosses, earrings, family valuables, gold coins of old minting) for the building of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station (Dniprohes), the Kharkiv, Stalingrad, and Cheliabinsk tractor plants, the Magnitobud, and other giants of Soviet economy. As the noted Ukrainian scholar, Vasyl’ Marochko, has shown, in 1933 the All-Ukrainian Torgsin Office, located in Kharkiv, collected over 24,000,000 “old-value” rubles. At this same time more than 5,000,000 Ukrainian peasants starved to death. Research into documents with information on Torgsin’s activities is important as analysis of the state’s repressive policies towards those who were feeding it.

Instructions on depriving the population of the means of existence are found in the fond of the People’s Commissariat of Supply of the USSR (f. 8043) for 1930-1934. The document “Information Regarding the Progress of the Grain-Delivery Campaign of 1930-1931, Based on Materials from Local OGPU Organs” (op. 11, d. 13) illustrates the nature of this activity in the Ukrainian SSR. It describes the punitive and enforcement measures used for its “improvement” and shows the fashion in which grain deliveries were conducted on the eve of the Great Famine. The cynicism of those executing this work is highlighted by an amendment by Anastas Mikoyan to a proposal of the CC CPU regarding changes in a CC VKP decision to forbid the seizing of an only cow. “We should seize even an only cow if the contract calls for it.” On the other hand, a report “On the Progress of Grain Deliveries” of September 21, 1930, speaks of “unpreparedness” to implement “organizational measures” and “mobilization of the masses around grain deliveries” and the “resistance of the kulak element.” In the minutes of the “Grain Consultation” that took place December 3, 1931, an enjoiner regarding increasing delivery of bulk fodder and a stress on the obligation that annual plans be met by the set deadline stands out. A decision reached by the Collegium of the Narkomat for Grain and Livestock Sovkhozes of the USSR, July 14, 1933, calls for an increase in the grain-delivery plans of grain sovkhozes in Ukraine by 7,500,000 poods bringing the plan for all sovkhozes to 20,700,000 poods.

The fond of the People’s Commissariat of Finance of the USSR (f. 7733) has circulars from Narkomfin to union republics which state that it is imperative to use “decisive” measures to collect the agricultural tax from the kulaks, to take the indebted to court, to submit reports immediately on the results of this tax-gathering and how many had been brought before the law. It is indicated here that Ukraine is the most “owing,” having met the agricultural tax plan by only 55 percent as of March 1931. “The matter of identifying kulak farmsteads in the Ukr[a]inian SSR is especially disgraceful,” according to the circular for September 5, 1931. This accusation is bolstered by quantitative indicators: in 1930, 22,095 kulaks were subject to taxes, but 6,456 in 1931.

Similar information is recorded in the archival fond of the Ministry of Grain Products of the USSR (f. 8040). Particularly telling is a circular from the Committee for Deliveries of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR regarding implementing repressive measures against those “not fulfilling the law on grain delivery.” Instead, A. Grinevich, Deputy People’s Commissar for Agriculture sent a report, dated May 3, 1932, to 1a.

24. See RGAE, f. 413, op. 12, d. 18401, l. 183.
Iakovlev, People’s Commissar for Agriculture (f. 7486 “Narkomat zemlerobstva SRSR”) reporting famine in Zinoviiv raion of Odesa oblast. Here peasants were getting “on average” 76 kgs bread per each family member for the whole year.” He proposed that assistance be provided in foodstuffs for people and for livestock, and also to send tractors and trucks. A decision, dated September 2, 1932, of the Committee for Delivery of Agricultural Products recorded a reduction in the annual grain-delivery plan for Ukraine by 40,000,000 poods.

Data about the forced re-settlement in November–December, 1933, of 21,000 collective farmers from Belarus and Russia to Ukrainian villages whose inhabitants had died of hunger, and the settling of Kuban stanitsas whose Ukrainian population had succumbed to famine by de-mobilized Red Army soldiers, are kept in the fond of the All-Union Re-Settlement Committee to famine by de-mobilized Red Army soldiers, are kept in the fond of the All-Union Re-Settlement Committee (f. 5675). The archival information held there reflects the activities of the basic initiators of the re-settlement—Molotov and Kaganovich. It includes the geography of transport movements with re-settlers into Ukraine, the places of their distribution (Odesa, Kharkiv, Donets’k, Dnipropetrovsk’k oblasts) and the reasons for efforts by Belarusian and Russian peasants to return home.

Statistical data about the number of victims of famine and those that died during epidemics (of typhus, diphtheria, scarlet fever) caused by the deterioration in sanitary-epidemical conditions in Ukraine in the middle 1930s are found in materials from the 1937 census (f. 1562). Information provided by this archive shows that in 1932–1933 the rate of mortality was higher than the birth rate. Moreover, it showed that the geographical center of mortality was in Ukraine which in that period accounted for half of all deaths in the USSR.

In the State Archive of the Russian Federation, formed in 1992, are concentrated fonds of the USSR’s higher organs of power and of state administration from 1917 (other than those now in specialized state archives of the federal level, and in departmental archives). In these holdings are found documents directly bearing on the Holodomor. Among the 26,510 files for the period 1917-1940 of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR fond (f. 3316), particularly important are the minutes and decisions of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR stemming from reviews of representations by the OGPU and the NKVD regarding extension of the term of confinement under guard and confiscation of property for 1930–1934; citizens’ petitions to the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR against unlawful acts by persons in authority; documents pertaining to consultations and commissions of the Central Executive Committee. Documents from the fond of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars (f. 5446), with its 238,025 cases, are of similar content. Particularly important are the minutes of meetings and the decisions of the Council of People’s Commissars and the Council of Ministers of the USSR; minutes of the broadened sessions of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars and the USSR Labor and Defense Council, decisions of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars; correspondence related to the sowing campaign (1931); documents of the Secret Section for Management of Affairs of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars on the struggle with the kulaks, special re-settlers, etc.

Reports, papers, tables of indicators from inter-raion commissions and authorized officials of the State Commission on the Progress of the Grain Harvest, aggregate tables on the dimensions and dynamics of areas under seed and the gross harvest of grain, instructions for harvest calculations, samples of forms and other documents are gathered in the fond of the Central State Commission for Determining the Productivity of the Harvest and Size of the Gross Harvest of Grains of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars (f. 7589, 567 files, 1932-1937). The Commission was formed in December 1932, to determine the area for seeding, the harvest and gross yield of grains and sunflower by raions, oblasts, republics, and the USSR as a whole. Documents generated by this Commission’s activities contain information valuable for comparative analysis.

The fond of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (f. 9401) holds documents of the NKVD USSR from the 1930s. Several series of documents deserve attention: correspondence with People’s Commissariats, with republican and local organs of the NKVD on specific sensitive matters; orders; instructions; NKVD circulars, documents pertaining to operations (“special files”) of the NKVD Secretariat. This archive also holds documents reflecting the forced re-settlement of Ukrainians and special papers on the deportation of social and ethno-national population groups, mostly from the second half of the 1930s. In the course of 1930–1931, 63,720 families were deported from Ukraine (19,658 to Northern Russia; 32,127 to the Ural region; 323 to Western and Eastern Siberia. From the Kuban were deported 38,404 families, of these in particular, 25,995 to the Ural region. In connection with this, of importance are documents from the fond of the Main Administration of Places of Imprisonment MVD USSR (f. 9414, 7615 files); and, particularly, materials of the Main Administration of Camps of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars for 1930-1934.

The Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation holds specific documents that
reflect the situation in the famine-stricken regions, for example, reports in detail, special records of the Secret-Political Section of the OGPU about the expulsion of kulaks in 1931, and on the progress of collectivization for 1931-1932. These are arranged according to a geographic principle (Ukraine, Belarus, Western oblast, the Central Chornozem area, Moscow oblast, Nizhgorod krai, Central Volga krai, the Ivanov industrial oblast, and others). Almost all these documents have information about Ukraine. The special function of these documents and their limited distribution (as a rule they are classified “Secret” or “Top Secret”) explain why here the word “famine” is widely used. This word was generally avoided in Party documents (at least in 1931-1932), despite the fact that they, too, were classified.

According to a report, dated June 12, 1931, of the Special Section OGPU, “On the Progress in Expelling Kulaks,” 3,089 families and 11,527 individuals are to be transported to Ural oblast. Boarding of seven trains has been completed, four have been “unloaded,” 55 trainloads remain to be transported to their destination.34 An explanatory note to these figures, behind which lie thousands of maimed human fates, indicates that most of the transports, while en route, were without food. The numbers of those who died and of those who were shot while trying to escape are given. In addition, the “tendency to escape while en route” is recognized as being endemic to Ukrainian kulaks.35 Another special report, “On the Progress of Expulsion of Kulak Families and Anti-Soviet Manifestations in Connection with the Expulsion,” dated July 17, 1931, cites the “negative” reaction on the part of the population: organization of armed resistance; flight; the suicides of entire families. A special report “On the Progress of Expulsion from Nizhno-Volga krai, Ukraine, and the North-Caucasus krai of the Kulak and Counter-Revolutionary Element that Hampers Grain Deliveries,” of January 14, 1933, tells of expulsions from Odesa oblast to the Northern krai of 2,172 persons; from Chernihiv oblast of 1,320, and 4,037 from Dnipropetrovs’k oblast.36

Another special report “On the Progress of Collectivization and the Mass Action of the Peasantry in 1931 to January-March, 1932” attributes the famine in the Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovs’k, and Vinnytsia oblasts to “foodstuff problems,” cites 83 instances of swelling due to hunger, six deaths, consumption of carrion in twelve families, four cases of abandonment of children.37 These numbers, so obviously improbable, testify to how official reports minimized and distorted the true extent of the tragedy. Notice is also taken of the unsatisfactory condition of draught resources, of emigrational tendencies in border regions, a drastic increase in the number of mass protests (253 in half a year). To safeguard grain deliveries, the GPU arrested 836 persons on suspicion of participating in terrorist activities, and 327 for having committed terrorist acts. An addendum to a special report about the anti-kolkhoz movement and famine in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and individual regions of the USSR testifies eloquently to the condition of the Ukrainian village in the first half of 1932. Against the background of information about cases of swelling and death through starvation, the report speaks of cannibalism and suicide brought on by hunger. “In terms of mass anti-Soviet occurrences, Ukraine stands in first place” (in the period January 1 to July 13, 1932, the GPU “registered” 923 overt instances of opposition).38 By identifying Ukraine, the hungry populace of which was supposedly preparing for an armed uprising, as the epicenter of a threat to the regime, Soviet functionaries were free to intensify the terror.

Other subjects are also common to these special reports by the GPU (for example, the refusal of individual farms to sow). According to the GPU’s figures, in 1932, 19,198 peasants in Kyiv oblast refused to sow; 13,090 in Dnipropetrovs’k and 8,180 in Vinnytsia oblasts refused as well.39 Also found is the text of Yagoda’s report, made by direct wire, about the destruction of a Ukrainian counter-revolutionary organization in the Poltavska stanitsa in the Kuban and repressive measures by the GPU against the people of the stanitsa.40

A report from Yagoda to Stalin and Molotov, dated February 2, 1933, about the struggle against mass flight from the Ukr SSR, the North Caucasus krai, and the BSSR (f. 3, op. 30, d. 189) states that the transport sections of the OGPU have created screening and operational search groups. In the period January 22–30, 18,379 Ukrainians were detained, most of whom were sent back, the remainder arrested. Another report states that on February 11-13, 2,377 persons were detained; 2,354 were turned back, and 23 arrested (f. 3, op.30, d. 189).

Apart from the archives already mentioned, documents related to the problem of the Holodomor are also to be found in other archives of the federal and regional level. Thus in the fonds of the Russian State Archive of Literature and Culture, which holds documents on the history of literature, social thought, music, theater, film, and painting, may be found information about the state of literature at that time, the honoraria paid to authors for “commissioned” works, and also diaries and inter-personal communication. Of particular interest for

34. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 9, d. 539, l. 29-33.
35. Ibid.
36. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 11, d. 1310, l. 28-29.
37. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 10, d. 53, l. 1-64.
38. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 11, d. 1449, l. 106-18.
39. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 11, d. 1449, l. 144-46.
40. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 11, d. 896, l. 77-78.
Some fonds held in the Russian State Military Archive relate indirectly to the famine in Ukraine. There is, for example, the decision of the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR, “On the Organization of Red Army Kolkhozes,” of May 17, 1931, classified “Secret.” Other documents also deal with the same subject.

Documents bearing on the Holodomor in Ukraine are also found in regional archives. The State Archive of Sverdlovsk Oblast has information on the forced mobilization of peasants for work on the building of the giant projects of Stalin’s Five-Year Plans: Magnitogord, Uralugol, Uralstroindustria, Perandrles, Uralmashtroi, Khimstroii, and others. The 500,000 special re-settlers in early February 1932 included Ukrainians as well (primarily from the Kuban). To survive they had to fulfill the norm: production of 2–2.5 cubic meters of wood per day. For this the laborer received bread containing 90 percent sawdust. Failure to achieve the quota meant reduction of food to 75 percent, or to have it denied altogether.

The Documentation Center of the Recent History of Voronezh Oblast holds a notable quantity of documents about famine in regions that are today within the Russian Federation.

In the holdings of the Documentation Center of the Recent History of Krasnodar Krai there are many reports of Party conferences and plenums dealing with the introduction of collectivization, de-kulakization, the grain-delivery campaigns, and the deportation and repressions of the peasantry as the basic economic factors underlying the Famine, the positions of scholars regarding the political factors vary greatly. They range from seeing the Holodomor as the deliberate and intentional destruction of Ukrainians by the Communist regime to attenuating the Ukrainian tragedy, “diluting” it, by spreading it thinly among other republics.

A recent statement of the Russian view on the problem of the Holodomor in Ukraine can found in an article by Andrei Marchukov, a candidate of historical sciences. Marchukov tellingly titles his article “Operation ‘Holodomor.’” Seeking to show that the “Holodomor is an ideological conception, a powerful instrument for acting on the mass consciousness,” the author concludes that “there are no serious arguments to support the concept of ‘Holodomor.’”

This statement alone testifies to the urgent need to create a reference guide to the archives, so that researchers are in a position to consult the primary sources as they seek the truth about the Holodomor.

Iryna Matiash, doctor of historical sciences (2001) and professor (2003), is the director of the Ukrainian Research Institute of Archival Affairs and Document Studies in Kyiv. She is a leading authority on the history of archives in Ukraine.

Researchers is Oleksander Dovzhenko’s archive, which, however, is sealed until 2020.

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43. Ibid., 66.