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From Solidarity to Survival: The Motivational Life Cycle of Transnational Activism

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Abstract: Why motivates transnational activism? Some previous works portray the groups that choose to invest in overcoming the significant costs of working transnationally as normatively motivated actors, guided by solidarity with activists abroad. Others describe these organizations as pragmatic actors, chasing funding and valuing survival over their mission. This paper develops and tests a theory of the motivations behind transnational activism, proposing that at the movement-level, they change over time and follow a cycle from principled to pragmatic. The argument is that transnational movements emerge around a core of solidarity-motivated actors, but over time, organizational survival becomes a leading motivation for many of the movement’s activities. Thus, while both principled and pragmatic motivations drive transnational activism, the overall importance of these two types of motivation to individual movements changes over time.
From Solidarity to Survival:  
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What motivates transnational activism? Previous works on social movements and non-state actors in international affairs disagree about why social movement organizations undertake transnational work. Some authors portray these groups as normatively motivated actors, guided by solidarity with activists abroad. Other authors describe these organizations as pragmatic actors, chasing funding and valuing survival over their mission. This paper proposes a solution to this debate, asking: When are social movements motivated by solidarity and are they driven by pragmatic, organizational-survival concerns?

This paper develops and tests a theory of the motivations of social movements for participating in transnational activism, proposing that these motivations change over time and follow a cycle from transnational solidarity to organizational survival. The argument here is that transnational activism emerges around a core of solidarity-motivated actors, but over time more pragmatic considerations related to organizational survival become a leading motivation for the majority of movement efforts. In other words, while both principled and pragmatic motivations drive transnational activism throughout a movement’s lifecycle, the overall importance of these two types of motivations to each movement changes over time.

This paper proceeds by theorizing the evolving motivations behind transnational social movements. The paper then illustrates and tests this theorization by explaining the activism of the Eastern European movements supporting democracy and human rights abroad. Transnational democracy and human rights activism represents a crucial case for both the solidarity- and the survival-oriented accounts of transnational activism, while the Eastern EU countries represent new cases against which to test and refine previous theories of transnational activism. These cases also correct a bias in this literature that regards non-Western societies primarily as recipients of such activism.

This study thus contributes to the literature on social movements and non-state actors in international affairs both theoretically and empirically. First, the paper offers a solution to the debate about the motivations behind transnational movements. If previous studies have overlooked the dynamic nature of the principled and pragmatic drivers of transnational activism—treating them primarily as competing and mostly mutually exclusive—this paper examines how their importance changes during the life of individual transnational movements. Second, this paper also adds nuance to previous investigations into how the global governance system has shaped the transnational movements, which have both benefited from and contributed to its development. Third, this paper addresses the general neglect of the normative leadership of non-Western/Eastern European societies and of their motivations for participating in the diffusion of the norms and values underlying the contemporary international liberal order.

Theorizing the Motivations Behind Transnational Activism

What motivates transnational activism? Much of the literature points to shared liberal norms, emphasizing “the centrality of principled ideas and values in motivating the formation” of transnational networks (quote by Keck and Sikkink, 1998:1; see also Clark, 2001 and Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and Sikkink, 1999). Scholars in this tradition find that activists interested in addressing an injustice often reach out to others abroad for help; they thus set in motion transnational “solidarity” and “rights” activism (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:13-15), the
participants in which are “bound by shared values” (Sikkink, 1993: 415, Florini 2000). These activists and their organizations are seen as responding to aggrieved populations and as promoting principles shared at home and abroad, thus fostering a “global consciousness” (Nadelmann, 1990; Shaw 1992, Smith et al., 1997; Boli and Thomas, 1999; Evangelista, 1999). In other words, activists “strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their communities”—both domestic and international—is often said to be motivating their transnational work (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 74). That this activism is principled is sometimes even underscored by explicitly downplaying the material rewards of such action: these activists and their organizations “are motivated mainly by ideals, not profits” (Mendelson, 2001: 71).

Yet a growing body of works has documented much more pragmatic, and in some cases even opportunistic, behavior of many contemporary groups working across borders. This literature emphasizes the organizational insecurity, competitive pressures, and fiscal uncertainty that have characterized the transnational sector since the 1990s (Cooley and Ron, 2002; Barnett 2005; Simeant, 2005; Hertel, 2006; Bush, 2013). Authors in this tradition paint a global governance system, which is populated by a growing number of transnational actors and increasingly subject to market pressures, as many donors and intentional organizations have come to rely on non-state actors to implement their objectives, often on a competitive-tender basis (Carroll, 1992; Fisher, 1993; Princen and Finger, 1994; Smillie, 1997; Berrios, 2000). Responding to this “lucrative, crowded, and marketized” environment, transnational activism is “shaped, often unintentionally, [primarily] by material incentives” such as the imperative of organizational survival (Cooley and Ron, 2002:12,13). Dependent on donor generosity, many organizations active transnationally have prioritized their survival over their social mission; many such groups are also frequently “chasing funding” and aligning their goals with the goals of their donors, at times to the exclusion of responding to their constituents (Smillie, 1995; Luong and Weinthal, 1999; Glenn and Mendelson, 2002; Richter 2002; and Narozhna 2004).

Material incentives have thus redirected accountability toward the activists’ patrons and away from the activists’ constituencies (Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Fisher, 1994; Luong & Weinthal, 1999; Jamal 2010). In sum, the embeddedness of transnational actors and their organizations in the contemporary global governance system has reinforced and amplified the pragmatic, survival-oriented, behavior of many organizations active transnationally today.

This latter group of studies hints at, but does not explore, the dynamic nature of the motivations behind transnational activism. There is further some work that documents but does not explain or theorize this dynamism. For example, some find that, in the 1990s, connections to activists abroad “facilitated” transnational activism, whereas, by the 2000s, state participation in international organizations and treaties became “more predictive” of participation of civic organizations in transnational movements (Wiest and Smith, 2007; Smith and Wiest, 2005). This paper builds on these studies and suggests that, like many aspects of social movement activism (Tarrow, 1994, McAdam, 1995, and Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), the motivations behind transnational activism evolve during the lifecycle of a movement. The argument here is that transnational movements emerge with the solidarity efforts of normatively-motivated actors, but organizational survival becomes the leading driver of some of the latest programs of

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1 Some even estimate that more aid to developing countries is funneled through the non-state sector than through the UN or the WB (“The NoSMOvemental Order.” The Economist 353.11, December 1999, 20-21).
2 These authors set out to explain the levels of transnational mobilization, rather than the motivations behind it and propose (but do not test) a resource-based explanation of this dynamism.
movements as they grow and become increasingly embedded in the global governance system. This movement-level motivations cycle is produced by the changes over time in the aggregate balance of the principled and pragmatic motivations driving the organizations that make up a movement, changes that result from the evolving environment in which these groups operate.

**Solidarity as a Motivation Behind Transnational Activism**

In the early stages of a transnational movement’s development, solidarity with activists in other countries is an especially important motivator because it mitigates the high costs of working across borders. Organizations working abroad face a number of challenges: distance, cultural diversity and the influence of nationalism, varying political contexts, and economic strain and complexity (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Tarrow, 2005; Bandy and Smith, 2005). Such obstacles make transnational activism costly, not just financially, but also in terms of the difficulty of the work and its opportunity costs, as scarce resources are devoted to international projects. In this way, transnational activism bears similarities to some of the most costly forms of domestic activism when it comes to inviting and sustaining participation of individuals and their groups (on domestic high cost/risk activism, McAdam, 1982; Wiltfang and McAdam, 1991).

Social movement scholars studying costly domestic participation like political protest attest to the causal importance of solidarity—that is, salient shared identity and values⁴—in drawing individuals and their civic groups into a movement (Durkheim, 1965; Fireman and Gamson, 1979; Featherstone, 2012). Such solidarity facilitates commitment to the cause, the leadership, and network through the affective loyalties it generates (Gould, 1995; Whittier, 1997; Passy and Giugni 2000; Polletta & Jasper 2001). Accordingly, scholars of movements ranging from the French commune (Gould, 1995) to the Russian revolution (Bonnell, 1983) and to the 1964 Mississippi Summer in the US (McAdam and Paulsen, 1993) have found that recruitment has taken place primarily through preexisting solidarities. Solidarity creates a sense of obligation and responsibility toward and a perceived stake in the fate of other members of the same collectivity; this obligation draws individuals and their groups into the movement. Likewise, such solidarity felt by existing movement members ensures their continued involvement. An individual is likely to contribute to the movement, particularly when collective action is (perceived as) urgent and even if the impact of that contribution is not noticeable (Fireman and Gamson, 1979). In sum, a strong identification with a collectivity makes participation on behalf of that collectivity more likely, especially when participation is costly (McAdam and Paulsen, 1993: 659; Klandermans, 2004).

The literature on transnational activism also highlights the importance of solidarity for mobilization. Its networks are held together by commonalities: a common language (figuratively and literally), common values, or a shared identity among the leaders, if not the

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3 “Movement” is defined as a loose network of socially mobilized individuals and grass-roots and/or professionalized civic groups engaged in sustained, but not necessarily continuous through time, contentious interaction with power-holders in at least one state other than their own, on behalf of constituents in at least one state other than their own, or against an international institution or a multinational economic actor (based on Tarrow, 2001). Intermittent cross-border interactions by informal actors are thus not covered by this paper.

⁴ In other words, “solidarity” is defined as “identification of and identification with: the identification of a collective entity [around a set of shared values] and participants identification with a body of affiliated actors” (Hunt and Benford 2004, 439). As in the colloquial use of the term, solidarity here is understood to include feeling of devotion and enthusiasm for belonging to the collectivity, a sense of loyalty and emotional interest (Taylor and Whittier, 1992).
members of a movement (Routledge and Cumbers, 2009). At the international level, the commonality of cross-border injustices and problems needs to be constructed and acknowledged. This production and recognition of similarities between different actors across borders make transnational activism more likely (della Porta et al., 1999). Such “attribution of similarity” bridges the perceived differences between activists across borders and creates a sense of shared struggle, which in turn facilitates transnational cooperation (on the “attribution of similarity” as a necessary condition for transnational activism, see McAdam and Rucht, 1993). In other words, solidarity facilitates the attribution of similarity that eases the perceived uncertainty of international work and further creates a sense of obligation towards other members of the same community.

Solidarity could develop in several ways. Solidarity does not require, but is usually produced within and reinforced by, direct ties relevant to the cause (McAdam, 1982; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson, 1980; Passy and Giugni, 2000; Diani and McAdam, 2003). By facilitating the recognition and construction of shared identity, values, and cause, direct interpersonal contacts increase the likelihood of developing solidarity. Solidarity in turn strengthens these networks. Not all ties, however, produce solidarity or motivate transnational activism—only the ones that result in the attribution of similarity and that are highly salient (McAdam and Paulsen, 1993). Also, pleas for assistance, even from previously unknown foreign fellow-activists, can some times facilitate the attribution of similarity and heighten its salience, thus creating or strengthening solidarity between activists across borders. Solidarity could further be ignited through the intentional efforts or the unintended impact of “brokers,” such as shared patrons or the media, who inform activists in different countries, understood to share an identity, values, and a cause, about each other.

Lastly, it should be noted that solidarity is constructed within civic groups through the perceptions and leadership of individual member activists, so that their organizations can “perceive” and act on this solidarity. This paper examines this organization-level solidarity to explain resultant movement-level motivations for transnational activism.

Organizational Survival as a Motivation Behind Transnational Activism

While crucial for the emergence of a transnational movement, solidarity’s importance diminishes as the movement grows and it and its cause become increasingly embedded in the global governance system. As the number of cross-border programs by a certain country or in a particular beneficiary state increases, the perceived costs of related transnational cooperation diminish. On the one hand, the cultural and political differences between the societies participating in the movement no longer seem as difficult to bridge. They have already been constructed as surmountable and have actually been overcome by early participants in the movement. On the other hand, the development of transnational movements frequently benefits from and contributes to the embeddedness of the movement’s cause in the global governance system (Tarrow 2005, Friedman et al., 2005; Smith, 2008). Defined here to include other

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5 It should be noted, however, that there is still some debate about the explanations of the ties-participation relationship and that solidarity is only one of the primary mechanisms proposed to be at work. On this debate, see, for example, Kitts, 2000 and Diani, 2004.

6 On the factors underpinning the success of such pleas, see Bob, 2005.

7 The attributes of the groups around whose transnational work a movement develops are not particularly consequential as long as these groups are not perceived by other civic groups in the country as somehow unique in their ability to surmount the costs of transnational activism.
movements, international institutions, and the various government agencies and private donors working on solving cross-border problems, the global governance system provides focal points and opportunities for transnational mobilization. As the movement seeks to take advantage of them, it becomes embedded in the global governance system, that is, its significant exchanges with and interdependence on global governance actors grows (after Granovetter, 1992), which makes the movement both sensitive and vulnerable (after Keohane and Nye, 1977) to their influence (on the “political embeddedness” and interplay of changing political opportunities at the domestic and international levels, see von Bulow, 2010). At the same time, as movement activists pressure and persuade such global governance actors to take action on issues related to their cause, the financial and institutional support for it and for transnational activism, organized around it, grows (Tsutsui, 2004; Tsutsui and Wotipka, 2004). This support comes in the form of different types of resources: moral (such as, legitimacy); material (such as, money), informational (such as, know-how), and human (such as, personnel time) (Cress and Snow, 1996; see also, Edwards and McCarthy, 2004).

Accordingly, as more and more global governance actors place the movement’s cause on their agenda, the financial and physical obstacles to related transnational activism become more surmountable. The increasing supply and diffusion of relevant experience and expertise help make such activism more efficient. Funding opportunities often become not only available, but also increasingly attractive (Smillie, 1997; Simmons, 1998; Berrios, 2000). The increasing support by global governance actors further legitimizes transnational activism, often even to the point of making it prestigious. As a result, activists might increasingly strive to win social and institutional approval and backing (Klandermans, 1984; Opp, 1989; and della Porta, 1988) of relevant global governance actors. Seeking their support makes the movement increasingly anchored (and dependent) on the global governance system. At the same time, however, related activism becomes increasingly subject to competition and marketization pressures. Such an environment compounds activists’ preoccupation with accumulating economic and socio-political resources to ensure their survival (Cooley and Ron, 2002; Hertel, 2006; Hopgood, 2006; Bush, 2012). Pragmatism related to organizational survival, thus, might increasingly motivate the transnational movement’s efforts.

This proposition builds on and combines insights from previous social movements studies on resource mobilization and on movement-environment relations. Scholars of the latter emphasize that movements exist in a changing environment to which they must adapt and that such adaptation often requires and results in changes in the internal structures of participating organizations (Zald and Ash, 1966; Minkoff, 1999). This view of social movements treats their goals/motivations, such as enacting solidarity and organizational survival, as the outcomes, at least in part, of a struggle to serve the movement’s constituencies and patrons in the face of inter-organizational competition and broader societal changes. Accordingly, the embeddedness of the movement and its cause in the global governance system could be argued to serve to “open up” the movement environment (Barnett, 2005; also, on open/restrictive social movement environments, Minkoff, 1999), creating opportunities and resources for mobilization as well as competition for them.

Like many domestic social movements today (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), most transnational movements are populated primarily by professional organizations (Smith et al., 1997; Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Barnett, 2005; Stroup, 2012), which mobilize resources from external donors and strive to speak for rather than mobilize direct beneficiaries. Previous work on resource mobilization has found that the goals and actions of such resource-dependent
organizations are often likely to be oriented mostly towards organizational development and financial management (Piven and Cloward, 1997; Haines, 1984; Jenkins and Eckert, 1986). Indeed, some have documented that many of the organizations embedded in today’s lucrative but competitive and marketized transnational sector are driven by the same goals (Edwards and Hulme, 1997; Smillie, 1995; Smillie & Helmich, 1993; Barnett, 2005). Because they need to meet the accounting, reporting, and auditing requirements of their patrons, many of these groups are corporate-like entities (Smith and Gronbjerg 2006; Verbruggen et al. 2011; Carpenter, 2007; Prakash and Gugerty 2010), accountable firstly to these patrons and only secondly to their constituencies (Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Fisher, 1994; Luong & Weinthal, 1999; Jamal 2010).

In sum, when working abroad, social movement organizations are usually motivated by some combination of solidarity and survival considerations, with some groups being motivated more by one than by the other. In general, however, the overall aggregate importance of these two motivations for each movement changes over time. Groups driven primarily by solidarity are likely to be in the majority in the early years of a movement, because solidarity helps to offset some of the costs of working abroad, which are particularly high especially in the beginning. However, as their environment opens up over time, some of these groups respond to its competitiveness by ceasing their (transnational) work; others take advantage of the increasing legitimacy and profitability of their work to ensure their organizational survival; and lastly, new organizations join the movement, primarily to collect some of the various available economic, political, and social resources. In other words, the evolving environment might both transform the goals of movement organizations and attract certain types of organizations to join the mature movement (on the second trend, see also Weinstein, 2007). These organization-level changes produce a movement-level shift in the motivations for transnational activism.

How quickly this movement-level shift from solidarity to survival occurs depends in part on the leadership and individual circumstances of the participating organizations, but even more importantly, on the domestic and international environment in which they operate (on organization-level variation in this trend, see Barnett, 2005). The more embedded a movement and its agenda in the global governance system, and therefore, the more support for related activism and competition for this support, the more pronounced the shift to organizational survival motivations.

Finally, this shift to activism driven by organizational survival does not necessarily imply that the values of the movement are ignored or compromised. Some of these groups might be pursuing support opportunities that allow them to “pay the bills,” while also continuing to promote the movement’s values. Other organizations might be more opportunistic, chasing funding or building their reputation at the expense of their mission and beneficiaries. In both cases, these groups might build on their ties with colleagues from abroad or look for new partners to win a tender. However, in both cases the activism of such organizations differs from solidarity-driven activism: the survival-driven kind is structured primarily by the concerns and priorities of patrons whereas the solidarity-driven type is structured by the objectives and needs of beneficiary constituents. In other words, distinguishing between these two ideal types of goals and assessing their overall importance in motivating transnational activism are critical for both theoretical and practical reasons.

Although answering these questions is beyond the scope of this paper, it should also be noted that what distinguishes movement organizations working only domestically from those that work internationally is probably not just the strong motivation of the latter to be involved abroad; these groups also need to possess the capacity to work across borders, that is, to
overcome the significant economic, cultural, and political costs of working transnationally. Previous social movement studies have found that it is groups with high capacity, usually manifested by a wide range of domestic activity and substantial organizational resources, that are most inclined to expand their work to the international level (Imig and Tarrow, 2001; Rohrschneider and Dalton, 2002; Ron et al., 2005; Smith and Weist, 2005; Stark et al, 2006). In other words, the organizations that engage in strong and sustained activism across borders are those with high capacity and with strong motivations.

**A Cycle from Solidary to Survival?: Research Agenda and Design**

To illustrate and test this theorization of the motivations behind transnational activism, this paper examines the transnational human rights and democracy activism of the Eastern European countries that are members of the European Union (EECs). This activism provides a crucial case for both the solidarity and the organizational survival explanations. On the one hand, human rights and democracy are central to the liberal consensus some identify as the main principled driver behind the proliferation of transnational networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). On the other hand, as others observe, the notion that individuals possess human rights and a right to democracy has already gained some expression in international law (Franck, 1992 and Rich, 2001). This embeddedness of the human rights and democracy agenda in the global governance system has engendered the conditions believed to give rise to pragmatism related to organizational survival. Therefore, the global human rights and democracy movement, which began developing in the late 1970s and matured during the third wave of democratization, offers an excellent opportunity to study the two types of motivations behind transnational activism.

In addition, studying the EECs allows this paper to correct a bias in the relevant literature, which regards non-Western societies primarily as recipient beneficiaries of human rights and democracy activism. Indeed, because much of the non-Western world has only recently become democratic, its efforts to support human rights and democracy abroad have been overlooked. This is not only an empirical but also potentially a theoretical oversight. Transnational human rights and democracy movements originating from these countries represent new cases against which existing theories can be re-examined and refined. This paper focuses on the EECs since they provide crucial cases for both the solidarity and the organizational survival explanations. These movements were born in one of the world’s regions with the strongest regional identity (Bunce and Wolchik 2011), which creates an especially favorable environment for the development of regional solidarity. At the same time, as priority recipients of Western aid, these movements have become well-embedded in the global human rights and democracy movement and are to this day heavily support/resource-dependent on the global governance system.

Additionally, the EECs have produced very active movements working to support human rights and democracy abroad, which have included some of the largest, most influential, and most recognized SMOs in these countries. These movements are not unique in terms of

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8 While capacity is not always and only about resources, even resource-poor groups are sometimes able to engage in sustained transnational activism, as the global justice movement has demonstrated (Smith at al, 1997).
9 Crucial cases are ones that must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity (Gerring, 2007 and Eckstein, 1975).
10 Most of these movements emerged shortly after each country’s own democratic breakthrough; still, it is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate whether there is a relationship between a country’s democratization stages and the transition from the national to transnational activities of democracy and human rights organizations.
the types of organizations populating them or the types of activities they engage in. These movements represent a loose network of some very bureaucratic and hierarchical organizations, some grassroots groups, and other organizations in between, which cooperate in different configurations mostly with each other but also with other Western groups towards supporting human rights and democracy abroad. These organizations work directly with beneficiary democracy and human rights groups abroad; they monitor, name and shame, and sometimes even educate/train foreign governments, which violate human rights and democratic practices; and do advising and advocacy work by targeting their own governments as well as a number of other global governance actors, such as the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe. Lastly, these movements’ efforts have been embedded in the foreign policy framework of their states. The EEC movements not only advise on the strategy but also participate in the implementation of these foreign policies and are often guided by shared national values, experiences, and perceived interests.

To explain the motivations behind EEC activism, this paper conducts a paired comparison, which combines the qualitative comparative method with process tracing. The comparison focuses on the efforts of the Polish and the Slovak movements supporting democracy and human rights abroad (on the importance of the national origins of transnational actors, Tarrow, 2005; Stark et al, 2006; Stroup, 2012). Both transnational movements are typical within the EEC group (Jonavicius, 2008) and build on the work of two of the most active civil societies in Eastern Europe. At the same time, Poland and Slovakia differ on the two theoretically important dimensions of interest in this paper. Poland was a democratization leader in Eastern Europe, so the organizers of the Polish democratic breakthrough are believed by many in the West and in the post-socialist space to have a “special responsibility” to support human rights and democratization in the rest of Eastern Europe (Jonavicius, 2008). There is no such expectation of Slovakia, which for much of the 1990s was among the democratization laggards in the group. Therefore, if both the Polish and the Slovak transnational democracy and human rights movements emerged around solidarity-driven groups, that would be evidence in support of the solidarity-to-survival motivations cycle. Also, the Polish movements arose in the early 1990s whereas the Slovak one emerged in the late 1990s. Yet, the democracy agenda became embedded in the global governance system as a “business” over the course of the 1990s. As a result, the Slovak movement became anchored in a more resource-rich global governance system more quickly. Therefore, if the Slovak movement became more survival-driven more quickly than the Polish one, this would be evidence in support of the proposed motivations cycle from solidarity to survival. In addition to this comparative logic, this paper leverages process-tracing evidence to understand and document how movement motivations change over time.

The null hypothesis in this study is that the motivations behind both Polish and Slovak movements are primarily principled or pragmatic. Given Poland’s role as a post-communist democratization leader, and since democracy promotion was already a business when the Slovak movement emerged, evidence that the Polish movement is motivated by solidarity and that the Slovak movement is mostly survival-driven would support the null hypothesis.

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11 Process tracing provides a dynamic view of political interactions and of the social processes at work in a case (Alexander and McKeown, 1985 and George and Bennett, 2005). Paired comparisons are an intermediate step between single-case and multi-case studies (Tarrow, 2010), which provide richness in detail and allow both theory-testing and theory-building.
To test these hypotheses, this paper examines organization-level motivations to explain the resultant aggregate movement-level drivers of transnational activism. The case studies of the Slovak and the Polish movements are based on the organizational archives and interviews with representatives of the organizations that make up each movement—a total of 29 Polish groups and 15 Slovak organizations. These totals include organizations, which joined the movement in its mature stage. Also included are some groups that were active in the movement’s early years but then died or transitioned to working primarily on domestic projects. This avoids biasing the paper’s analysis by documenting the motivations of “founding” or “survivor” organizations. Most but not all of these Polish and Slovak groups with strong and sustained international democracy and human rights programs abroad are also members of each country’s national platform of international development NGOs—respectively, Zagranica and PMVRO. To provide some context for the work of each country’s movement, 8 additional international development organizations from these platforms were interviewed, as were other domestic groups working in the human rights and democracy issues areas. All interviews were conducted with the lead activist(s) managing the international programs of the organization or with the founder of the domestic groups.

To understand and classify the motivations of the organizations that make up the Slovak and the Polish movements, this paper relies on one of these motivations’ observable implications highlighted repeatedly in the literature on transnational movements: solidarity-driven activism is designed around the needs of beneficiary populations, whereas activism driven by survivalist pragmatism follows first and foremost the priorities of the movement’s patrons. Accordingly, the interviewed Polish and Slovak activists were asked to describe how they began supporting democracy and human rights abroad and how they began work on each relevant project. They were also asked a series of clarifying questions about the sequencing of (1) coming up with the idea for each democracy and human rights program or project of their organization and (2) searching for financial or political support for each program/project. The interviewed Polish and Slovak activists reported that some of their projects began when they saw a call for proposals or an opportunity to work with a particular donor or other global governance actor. These activists also reported that other projects started when foreign activists asked for their help or when they saw an opportunity to help foreign colleagues they felt close to, prompting them to go look for support to realize the project. These reports were made without much pride or shame and guilt, which would have indicated possible under- and over-reporting of certain types of motivations. For most projects and to the extent possible, the sequencing was also double-checked against the organizational archives of these groups. This “support v. beneficiary need” sequencing matters because it documents whose goals ended up structuring the project—the recipients or the movement’s patrons.

This paper thus relies on the sequencing of program design and implementation support to cut through the ambiguities of these strategic decisions. Social movement groups often wrestle with internal divisions and tensions surrounding most organizational decisions and processes. Irrespective of such individual level differences in motivations, however, whether the project’s principal was the group’s patrons or beneficiary recipients significantly shapes the project’s reception and impact.

For each organization, each project was labeled either “solidarity-driven” or “survival-driven”. If the group became aware of a funding or patronship opportunity and then designed a project to take advantage of it, the project was coded as survival-driven. Alternatively, if the organization devised a project and then sought support to realize it, the project was coded as
solidarity-driven. The project was still coded survival-driven, however, if it changed substantially as a result of patron input or conditionality. Each organization’s projects were then divided in two groups – those that began in the early movement period and those that started in the mature movement period. This paper covers the period of the first two decades after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe (1989-2009); for Poland, the early movement period was 1989-1999 and the mature movement period was 1999-2009, whereas for Slovakia, the early movement period was 1998-2002 and the mature movement period was 2002-2009. These time periods were defined by the participating activists and reflect the movements’ changing environment, which is of interest in this paper. For each movement period, the projects of each organization were aggregated, so that if more than half of its projects were survival-driven, it was labeled as doing primarily survival-driven work. If more than half of a group’s projects were solidarity-driven, it was labeled as doing primarily solidarity-driven work. The project’s budget was weighed to account for the size of each project in the aggregation.

**Explaining Eastern EU Human Rights and Democracy Activism**

The development of the Polish and Slovak movements is consistent with the solidarity-to-survival motivations cycle. Both movements emerged primarily in solidarity with other peoples struggling for democracy. Over time, however, both movements were increasingly motivated by organizational survival, with the Slovak movement becoming more survival-driven faster as it became embedded in a more resource-rich global governance system more quickly. [For this evolution of the motivations behind the Polish and Slovak transnational democracy and human rights activism, see Table 1.]

[Table 1]

**Poland**

*The Origins of the Polish Movement*

The transnational democracy and human rights activism of the Polish civil society was built on the international solidarity of the opposition movement, which in 1989 brought down the country’s communist regime. Leading Polish anti-communist activists wanted to support and ally with other activists who were fighting against the Soviet system (Snyder, 2003). Since its first congress in 1981, the Solidarity labor union, around which the Polish opposition movement grew, began directly and openly encouraging other dissident groups in the Soviet bloc to “follow the Polish example” and fight for freedom and representation (Kenney 2002). When martial law in Poland suppressed Solidarity that same year, the Polish underground broke the isolation of the nations within the Soviet bloc by initiating dialogue with dissident groups—most intensively with Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine (Kenney 2002). While the international community, and especially the US, came together in support of Solidarity, the Polish opposition in turn supported the development of other Eastern European oppositions (Kenney 2002).

The Solidarity movement then laid the ideological and organizational foundations of the Polish post-communist civil society, including its international activism (Czubek, 2002). After 1989, some of the groups that had operated either underground or semi-officially during the communist era, such as the Helsinki Committee and the Karta Center Foundation, legalized their activities at home and continued their support for democracy and human rights abroad. Additionally, in the mid-1990s, despite available foreign funding for their domestic work, a
growing number of organizations previously working mainly domestically became active in the post-communist region and beyond. By the end of the 1990s, more than two dozen of Poland’s largest civil society groups were active on democracy and human rights issues abroad, and four times as many civic groups had implemented an occasional international democracy and human rights project.12

This international work grew out of the personal and professional transnational ties and the resultant international solidarity of their activists. Like the Polish-American Freedom Foundation and the East European Democracy Center, for instance, most of the internationally active Polish civil society groups were founded and/or led by former Solidarity activists.13 Building on Solidarity’s international activism and the networks of their Western patrons and partners, these Polish activists have fostered, maintained, and further developed formal or informal relations with pro-democratic activists from other countries.14

Such transnational contacts to other peoples struggling for democracy created solidarity, reaffirmed it, and moved the Polish activists to action. Through such transnational interactions, many Polish activists learned, were reminded, and recognized that their counterparts abroad share similar democratic values, democratization goals, and challenges.15 Polish activists report that such similarities created a strongly felt normative “obligation,” a “sense of responsibility,” and “a duty” to assist their pro-democratic colleagues abroad.16 One Polish activist articulates how this similarity motivates his organization’s support for democracy and human rights abroad: “Poland has chosen freedom but with freedom comes responsibility. Having gone abroad [to the former Soviet Union], we saw that people there also want freedom as Poland did in the 1980s.”17 Similarly, many other activists report that they “have suffered under communism and know how painful living under a dictatorship can be”—an experience they claim compelled them to begin supporting democracy and human rights abroad.18

In addition to underscoring shared democracy and human rights aspirations, transnational interactions also highlight the concrete opportunities for transnational action. Understanding how their experience and expertise might be “helpful” and “useful” to other nations further eases the perceived uncertainty of transnational cooperation.19 For instance, when visiting Ukraine to see relatives in the mid-1990s, a Polish activist working on promoting democratic values among the Polish youth learned of a Ukrainian civic group struggling to civically engage the local youth. The Polish activist explained, “We, Poles, have many contacts with Ukrainians, so we can not pretend not to see that Ukraine has similar problems. We, Poles,
feel that sharing our experience is a duty. We just can’t not share our experience with them."²⁰ The Polish activist convinced his NGO to train the Ukrainian organization, and to send a staff member to assist the implementation of three consecutive Ukrainian youth projects. Similarly, foreign activists have frequently asked their Polish colleagues for help with a particular problem seen as resolved in Poland. For instance, Organization-L reported that a few Ukrainian and some Belarusian local government leaders, fellow USAID grantees, were impressed with the results of the Polish decentralization reforms, and in the early 2000s asked Organization-L for assistance with a number of local governance issues.²¹

In sum, the early transnational democracy and human rights activism of Polish civil society was primarily solidarity-driven. 93% of the organizations studied for this paper and working internationally in the early and mid-1990s were motivated mostly by solidarity. [See Table 1.] There have been three principal overlapping communities/identities that have formed the foundations of this solidarity and drawn Polish activists into transnational work: receiving Western democracy support; belonging to the communist and post-communist world; and sharing a history in the Northeastern European historic-political space. Generally, a majority of these Polish civil society groups share the belief that “Poland has received aid for many years and it is now time to pay off this assistance debt.”²² The duty to assist aspirants to democracy has been felt primarily towards other countries in the communist and post-communist space. Several Polish activists report: “We see that people are interested in freedom and we have solidarity for them, so we are helping them and encouraging them. We believe in freedom because it ensures respectful treatment of individuals. So we want that not just for Poland but for our region because we feel solidarity with those in our region struggling for freedom.”²³ Finally, almost all Polish groups understand their work “as a kind of solidarity between us [Poles] and our neighbors [Ukraine, Belarus, and to a lesser degree, Russia].”²⁴ Their common history created multiple and very salient ties between Poland and these three nations—ties that produced and reinforced solidarity.²⁵

This solidarity, which allowed the Polish transnational democracy and human rights movement to emerge, has also shaped and found expression in the movement’s scope. [For the recipient countries in which the Polish civil groups have worked, see Table 2.] The Polish groups studied here have focused predominantly on Ukraine (93%), Belarus (78%), and Russia (70%). Ukraine and Belarus were also the first recipients of a majority of the Polish organizations.²⁶ In contrast, less than a quarter of these Polish groups work in the developing world, despite abundant available funding for democracy and human rights work in these countries, as a result of fewer and less salient perceived similarities with activists and populations there.²⁷

²⁰ Interview with A. M., October 8, 2008.
²¹ Interview with K. M., October 7, 2008.
²² Interview with J. M., October 27, 2008; interview with A. M., October 8, 2008; interview with K. S., October 25, 2008; interview with P. W., October 16, 2008; interview with M. P., October 10, 2008; and interview with K. S., October 8, 2008.
²³ Interview with O. S., October 28, 2008.
²⁴ Interview with G. B., October 13, 2008.
²⁶ For example, interview with L. S., October 11, 2008; and interview with K. S., October 8, 2008.
²⁷ Interview with K. M., October 7, 2008; interview with M. S., October 13, 2008; interview with K. S., October 25; interview with Z. P., October 9, 2008.
The Evolution of the Polish Movement

Over time, the importance of solidarity in motivating Polish transnational activism diminished. In the early and mid-1990s, many of the transnationallly-active Polish groups were themselves primarily beneficiary recipients of transnational democracy and human rights activism; these Polish organizations, thus, competed amongst one another for resources earmarked for Poland. These Polish groups were thus linked to and targets of some global governance actors but not embedded with them in the system these actors constitute. As democracy began “consolidating” in Poland in the late 1990s, most American and Western European patrons supporting democracy and human rights groups in the country began gradually pulling out of the country. This trend and Poland’s anticipated membership in the EU prompted many of the Polish organizations working abroad to begin integrating in the relevant global and especially European regional networks and to begin transitioning from being mostly recipients to becoming primarily contributors. Similarly, a couple of organizations, which had previously mobilized resources mostly from domestic constituents and patrons, were now stepping up their international work. Responding to democracy and human rights crises abroad at a time of perceived consolidation of democracy in Poland, these groups were also becoming more integrated in the global governance system. By the early 2000s, the organizations participating in the Polish movement supporting democracy and human rights abroad had changed the nature and/or increased significantly the number and diversity of their exchanges with and interdependence on global governance actors.\(^{28}\) Since democracy and human rights promotion had become a business, these Polish groups were now competing with other movements for the support of various such actors. Such support, however, was not only lucrative but also prestigious for the Polish organizations, whose society understood Euro-Atlantic reintegration as a national priority. Due to this new environment, available funding and patronage became a leading motivation for many of the efforts of the Polish movement.

Three organization-level trends contributed to this movement-level outcome. First, a number of solidarity-driven organizations were increasingly motivated by organizational survival. Consider the following typical example of the evolving motivations behind Polish transnational activism.\(^{29}\) Organization-D was established in 1994 as part of a two-year Rockefeller Brothers Fund program to train local civic leaders in Poland. Even as the program was running, Organization-D’s founders invited some of their Ukrainian colleagues to observe sessions in Poland. According to their own reports, they felt that as “recipients of foreign assistance, we [Poles] have a debt to repay” and that “Ukraine, due to its shared history and language” is the country most similar to theirs, so it could benefit from the Polish transition experience.\(^{30}\) Subsequently, Organization-D continued its work in Ukraine, and in cooperation with other Polish civic groups also began working in Belarus and the Western Balkans. As Organization-D was becoming known for its transnational work by more and more global governance actors in the late 1990s, it also began to increasingly leverage this work to continue its domestic projects and to expand its presence abroad. The Organization started looking for opportunities to consult on and be a subcontractor for its Western colleagues and ongoing sponsors and at times to also implement abroad well-funded projects the Organization had put

\(^{28}\) Interview with K.M., October 7, 2008; Interview with G.G., October 13, 2008; Interview with W.B., October 13, 2008; Interview with M.P., October 8, 2008.

\(^{29}\) This example is based on an interview with K. S., October 8, 2008.

\(^{30}\) Interview with K. S., October 8, 2008.
together on the basis of its own most successful domestic projects to date. These pursuits took the group to new recipient countries (such as Kosovo and Kazakhstan), in which it had not considered working.\(^\text{31}\)

Similarly, despite some member objections, Organization-L (introduced above as beginning its transnational work at the request of colleagues in Ukraine and Belarus) soon moved to the former Yugoslavia in the early 2000s, because “these countries had started working on decentralization reforms and there was a lot of European funding for such projects.” Organization-L subsequently continued leveraging its expanding network of Western European partners and patrons involved in the Western Balkans and the former USSR.\(^\text{32}\)

Second, struggling to compete at the global level, a couple of the solidarity-driven organizations participating in the Polish movement ceased their transnational work and re-focused on mobilizing resources for their domestic work domestically. For instance, Organization-M, which is a community-organizing group, had done some such work at the request of activists the region in the post-communist space in the 1990s when there was available support for the work of Polish democracy and human rights groups. In the early 2000s, however, given the new environment for transnational democracy and human rights work, Organization-M found it increasingly difficult and time-consuming to find sponsors for its international efforts. After “some soul searching,” Organization-M chose not to sustain its transnational civil-society program beyond the occasional, ad hoc project and instead continued its domestic community organizing where it felt it was doing some of its strongest work. Organization-M pays for its domestic programs by providing paid services to members and by applying for foreign and domestic grants.

Third, several new Polish civic groups joined the movement supporting democracy and human rights abroad in the 2000s. About half of them began doing international work because of the money and prestige it brought (compared to only 7% of the organizations who began working transnationally in the early 1990s mainly for these same reasons). In the mid-2000s, Organization-P’s leadership unanimously threw its support behind the founder’s plan of organizing trainings and conferences on democracy issues for neighboring elites as a way to work with the Council of Europe, a sponsor of such programs in these neighboring countries.\(^\text{33}\) The organization thought that it had “expertise to sell,” and wanted to accrue a reputational benefit from being associated with the Council. As Organization-P became more and more involved in the Western European network of democracy and human rights actors, it continued to leverage its expertise to secure the sponsorship of other Western European “heavy weight” patrons. Consider also, another example: some internal divisions notwithstanding, Organization-K began working internationally in the early 2000s by joining some of its Western partners’ projects for financial reasons. Calculating that the Polish government and the EU provide funding for international work, Organization-K began developing projects at the intersection of what those sponsors consider “important” issues and countries and Organization-K’s expertise and partnerships with beneficiaries abroad. This strategy has most recently taken Organization-K to Africa for a women’s rights project.\(^\text{34}\)

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\(^{31}\) This Polish SMO did not accept all donor invitations; for example, it turned down a few opportunities to work in the Middle East because the SMO’s leadership decided that their experience would not be applicable to the local realities in that region.

\(^{32}\) Interview with K.M., October 7, 2008.

\(^{33}\) Interview with Z. P., October 9, 2008.

\(^{34}\) Interview with P. P. October 22, 2008.
Overall, 27% of the SMOs studied for this paper and working internationally as the Polish movement was maturing in the late 1990s and especially the 2000s were driven by organizational survival. [See Table 1.] In other words, there is an almost four-fold increase in the share of such groups compared to the early years of the movement’s development. Previous social movement studies have found that as certain themes, countries, or populations fall in and out of “fashion” with global governance actors, the social movement organizations competing for their support are usually likely to follow suit (Hertel, 2006). Many of the groups participating in the Polish movement reported feeling that they did not have the capacity and expertise to compete for and win projects on new themes but that their patrons were willing and sometimes even eager to support the “export” of the most successful Polish domestic projects to new beneficiary countries.

As a result, the diminishing importance of solidarity has had a threefold impact on the activities of the Polish movement. First, in catering to their patrons rather than to recipient beneficiaries, a number of Polish organizations have opted for “recycling” their most “successful” domestic projects.35 Second, not only has survival-driven activism sometimes stifled innovation,36 but it has also expanded the scope and geographical reach of the Polish movement while sometimes reducing the “usefulness” of the movement’s expertise at the same time. Third, as some of the examples above suggested, survival-driven activism has tended to be more ad hoc and less sustained than solidarity-motivated international work. At the same time, however, it has tended to include bigger programs with more funding used not just for organizational maintenance but also assisting more recipient beneficiaries abroad.

[Table 2]

**Slovakia**

*The Early Years of the Slovak Movement*

As in Poland, the transnational democracy and human rights work of Slovakia’s civil society built on the international solidarity of the activists who prepared the country’s democratic breakthrough. In 1989, Slovakia began transitioning away from communism as part of Czechoslovakia, which dissolved peacefully in 1993. By the mid-1990s, Slovakia’s democratization and Euro-Atlantic integration had already been slowed down by the illiberal, nationalist, and populist elites who negotiated Slovakia’s independence and subsequently assumed power. Civil society, however, not only continued to develop with foreign, and especially US, support but also organized a democratic breakthrough in 1998 (Forbrig and Demes, 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2011). The potential of the Slovak breakthrough to serve as a model for defeating illiberal incumbents reigning over “electoral democracies” was immediately recognized by its organizers, by other pro-democracy activists in the region, and by a few US donors (Bunce and Wolchik 2011). In late 1998, a US donor encouraged and provided support for several of the Slovak breakthrough organizers to share their campaign experience with interested representatives from Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia.37 At the request of

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36 On the homogenization of practices and organization cultures across civic groups as a by-product of the material incentives structuring transnational activism, see also Simeant, 2005.
oppositions throughout the post-communist region, prominent Slovak civic activists subsequently led a number of additional exchanges and seminars.

Around the turn of the century, despite available foreign funding for domestic democracy and human rights work in Slovakia and building on early efforts and transnational contacts, a number of Slovak organizations, like the Pontis Foundation and Memo 98, began turning these consultancies into full-fledged transnational democracy and human rights programs.\(^{38}\) By the mid-2000s, a number of additional organizations, such as Academia Ispolitana Nova and the Center for European Politics, which had previously worked primarily at home, also began doing democracy work abroad.\(^{39}\) About a dozen of Slovakia’s largest civil society groups were supporting democratization abroad, and about a dozen more had at least one international democracy project.\(^{40}\)

This work grew out of the Slovak activists’ personal contacts and professional ties to other Western grantees in the post-communist space. The solidarity that developed within such regional networks motivated participating Slovak organizations with the necessary capacity to begin supporting democracy abroad. Much as in the Polish context, the similarities constructed within such regional networks created demand for and a strongly felt responsibility by many Slovak activists to assist pro-democratic and human rights activists abroad. Although democracy and human rights promotion became a “business” during the 1990s, the vast majority of organizations around which the Slovak movement developed in the late 1990s were motivated by solidarity. 89\% of the Slovak groups studied here and working internationally on democracy and human rights issues in the movement’s early years were driven primarily by solidarity. [See Table 1.]

A number of these Slovak organizations report that they began, and continue, working abroad because “there are still some similar countries, which are still authoritarian.”\(^{41}\) Many Slovak activists reported their belief that: “It’s necessary, it is our obligation, to share our experience with people who need it and ask for it.”\(^{42}\) There have been three principal overlapping communities/identities that have formed the foundations of this solidarity and motivated the transnational democracy and human rights activism of Slovak civil society: receiving Western democracy support; belonging to the Euro-Atlantic community of democracies; and sharing a history of communism and post-communism. A leading civic activist succinctly expresses the responsibility felt by many Slovak activists: “There is not only a sense of constitutional obligation and a civic obligation [to support democracy abroad], but also a moral obligation because when we were going through our transition, we were also helped by other countries.”\(^{43}\) Additionally, several Slovak activists further emphasized the values around which the European community is organized: “We are part of the European community and I think this [support for democracy abroad] is our moral duty and our people [Slovak

\(^{38}\) Interview with J. K., November 27, 2008; interview with I. K., November 21, 2008.

\(^{39}\) Interview with L. B., November 12, 2008; and interview with A. L., November 14, 2008.


\(^{42}\) Interview with L. B., November 11, 2008.

\(^{43}\) Interview with M. J., November 18, 2008.
constituents] want us to do this and judging from the emails we receive, their people [recipient countries] want us to do this.\textsuperscript{44}

Finally, the rhetoric of the Slovak organizations doing democracy and human rights work abroad often references the demands and needs of recipients from countries “close and similar” to Slovakia.\textsuperscript{45} These are most frequently defined to be the nations in the communist and post-communist space that used to be part of larger empires, which currently occupy the grey zone between democracy and authoritarianism, and/or are struggling with nationalism and international isolation. For instance, most Slovak activists consider the Western Balkans countries kindred peoples—“small nations” with “close mentality” but still struggling with nationalism, arrested transitions, and setbacks on the road to Euro-Atlantic integration.\textsuperscript{46} The Slovak activists have also developed solidarity with pro-democratic activists in Ukraine and Belarus. While these two countries are both very big and traditionally part of the Northeastern European historic-political space, they also are—much like Slovakia—new European states, which emerged at the end of the Cold War and initially made hesitant progress towards democracy and EU integration.\textsuperscript{47} These similarities between Slovakia in the one hand and Ukraine and Belarus on the other hand were articulated by some US donors and by opposition groups working in these countries and were quickly embraced by a number of Slovak groups.\textsuperscript{48}

This solidarity motivating the emergence of the transnational democracy and human rights work of the Slovak civil society, has also influenced and been expressed in the geography of this activism. [For the recipient countries in which the Slovak civil groups have worked, see Table 2.] Many Slovak groups started their work and have been most active in Serbia as the “closest” to Slovakia of the Western Balkans countries, where 86% of the Slovak organizations studied for this paper have had significant involvement. Additionally, 71% and 57% of Slovak groups doing democracy and human rights work abroad have worked in Ukraine and in Belarus respectively since the beginning of their international work. As is the case in Poland, only a third of the Slovak organizations work in the developing world. As many Slovak activists explained, there are abundant available resources for doing democracy and human rights work there but there are also fewer “important”/perceived similarities between Slovakia and these countries.\textsuperscript{49}

\textit{The Mature Period of the Slovak Movement}

By the early to mid-2000s, pursuing available funding and the prestige of certain partnerships had already become a leading motivation for some of the latest programs of the Slovak movement. It developed around a group of organizations whose solidarity with other pro-democracy activists abroad usually preceded and motivated the search for patrons. One activist bluntly stated what the program histories of most other organizations participating in the

\textsuperscript{44} Interview with G. S., November 6, 2008.


\textsuperscript{47} Interview with J. K., November 27, 2008, interview with L.B., November 12, 2008, interview with G. S., November 6, 2008, and interview with M. J., November 18, 2008.

\textsuperscript{48} Interview with J. M., November 26, 2008 and interview with B. S., November 28, 2008.

\textsuperscript{49} Interview with M. S., November 13, 2008; interview with I. K., November 21, 2008; Interview with J. M., November 26, 2008.
movement also suggest: “As we benefited from outside help, it’s important to give back. So we try to find donors who would cover our work abroad.”\textsuperscript{50} Yet, even as the Slovak movement was emerging in the wake of the 1998 Slovak democratic breakthrough, its cause was already a priority on the agenda of numerous global governance actors. Like the Polish movement, the Slovak one was initially linked to and the target of some of these actors. As the country secured its membership in the EU and moved into a perceived period of democratic consolidation, many of these actors began pulling out of Slovakia and looking for partners rather than recipient beneficiaries among the Slovak democracy and human rights groups. At the same time, a couple of groups that had mobilized resources mostly from domestic constituents and patrons even for transnational project became more involved abroad and thus looking for foreign sponsors. Again, as was the case in Poland, the Slovak movement built up the number and diversity of its exchanges with global governance actors. The Slovak movement, however, became anchored in a more resource-rich global governance system more quickly, which in turn sped up and amplified the changes in the motivations behind the Slovak movement.

As in Poland, three organization-level trends contributed to this movement-level outcome. A number of solidarity-driven organizations were increasingly motivated by organizational survival. Consider the following typical example: \textsuperscript{51} Organization-E was established in 1998 with financial and technical assistance by the US International Republican Institute. Following its key role in the Slovak democratic breakthrough, Organization-E was showcased in a US donor’s regional workshop on civil society development in post-communist Eastern Europe and subsequently received a number of requests for transnational cooperation. The first one came on the occasion of Ukraine’s 1999 elections. Given its limited funds but also its “solidarity with the cause,” Organization-E’s leaders united behind a plan to send 20 observers. Another US donor introduced Organization-E’s director to a group of Belarusian activists. Because of the repressive political climate in Belarus, the Slovak activist felt it was his duty to assist these activists, so he secured funding for a few subsequent small projects in Belarus. Additionally, as a result of Organization-E’s participation in OSCE’s regional forum for election observers, the Organization was asked to help train Croat monitors and to send Slovak monitors to Croatia’s presidential elections in 2000. After a very short internal deliberation, Organization-E’s leadership, which generally “wanted to help similar groups,” signed the Organization up with the OSCE to participate in its election observation mission to Croatia and approached one of its patrons to finance the mission to Croatia. \textsuperscript{52} Again, what Organization-E itself defined as “solidarity” with civic activists in the Western Balkans motivated and united its leadership to seek US funding to train election observers in, and to send monitors to, Serbia. Also in 2000, some of Organization-E’s activists further approached the Slovak government to co-sponsor election observers the Organization wanted to send to Bosnia and Kosovo.

Given its expertise and the importance the international community accords to free and fair elections as a means to support the global spread of democracy, by the early 2000s, Organization-E had become embedded in the global election monitoring regime and began receiving invitations to participate in various election monitoring missions and to do election monitoring trainings for a number of different European and American organizations.

\textsuperscript{50} Interview with B. S., November 28, 2008; and interview with P. D., November 26, 2008.

\textsuperscript{51} This case study is based on the organizational archives of this group and an interview with P. N., November 11, 2008.

\textsuperscript{52} Interview with P. N., November 11, 2008.
Organization-E’s leadership did not hesitate much before accepting many of these invitations and reported doing so increasingly in order to survive financially and to maintain its legitimacy and visibility. As a result, Organization-E expanded its presence in the Western Balkans and the Eastern EU neighborhood, and also began doing work in Central Asia and eventually in developing countries, such as Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Yemen, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Some of these latter projects neither benefited from previous direct ties, nor resulted in sustained transnational cooperation or in the maintenance of these connections. Likewise, the ad hoc presence of some Slovak groups in the Middle East was, according to their own accounts, mostly opportunistic.\textsuperscript{53}

In addition, some new organizations, famous for their domestic work and high capacity, recognized that they could convert these resources into funding and prestigious partnerships by joining the Slovak movement for supporting democracy and human rights abroad. For instance, after seeing a SlovakAid call for projects in Serbia, Organization-T decided to develop a proposal with a sister group from Belgrade. Organization-T then began looking for similar opportunities with other donors it worked with.\textsuperscript{54} Similarly, a Slovak branch of an international non-profit saw an invitation by the headquarters office to support its expansion into the post-communist space as recognition of the work of the Slovak branch and an opportunity to solidify its place within the international non-profit; accordingly, the Slovak branch accepted the request and subsequently sought out additional similar opportunities with some of the other global governance actors with which it had contacts.\textsuperscript{55} In general, about two-thirds of the organizations that joined the Slovak movement in the mid-2000s began doing international work because of the funding and prestige it delivered. This level of survival-driven activism is about six times higher than the 11% of similarly motivated Slovak activism at the end of the 1990s.

Lastly, a couple of solidarity-driven organizations, which initially participated in the Slovak movement supporting democracy and human rights abroad returned to doing mostly domestic work in the mid-2000s. Organization-N offered civic and rights training in Ukraine because of a perceived “duty” to help this and other Slovak “neighbors.” As the Organization’s domestic programs grew and securing support for them became harder, Organization-N’s divided leadership failed to find sponsors for its international program, which eventually died out.

Overall, 38% of the organizations studied for this paper and working internationally as the Slovak movement was maturing in the mid- to late 2000s were driven by organizational survival. [See Table 1.] As with the Polish groups, there is a fourfold increase in the share of such groups compared to the early years of the development of the Slovak movement. Given the embeddedness of the democracy promotion agenda in the global governance system even as the Slovak movement was emerging, the share of survival-driven Slovak groups grew faster and higher than the share of pragmatic Polish groups. As in the Polish case, though, the survival-driven activism has had a similar impact on the Slovak movement: allowing mostly high capacity organizations to ensure their survival through winning international assistance tenders in the highly competitive democracy and human rights market in the 2000s; encouraging the recycling of successful domestic programming in recipient beneficiaries which are patron

\textsuperscript{54} Interview with E. B., November 28, 2008.
\textsuperscript{55} Interview with K. M., November 5, 2008.
priorities; and frequently reducing the sustainability and the relevance of the movement’s efforts.

**Discussion and Alternative Explanations**

Both Polish and Slovak transnational democracy and human rights activism grew out of the international solidarity efforts of the activists who prepared these countries’ democratic breakthroughs. Through their contacts with other pro-democratic activists abroad and in conversations with patrons, these Polish and Slovak activists discovered and recognized similarities and shared aspirations with certain activists abroad. In response to solidarity with them, the Polish and Slovak activists perceive a sense of obligation towards such nations struggling for democracy, especially in the post-communist space. This sense of obligation motivated the Polish and Slovak organizations with the necessary capacity to begin doing democracy work abroad.

Yet, as these movements grew and became increasingly involved with and interdependent on global governance actors, which had prioritized democracy and human rights promotion, the motivations behind both the Polish and the Slovak movements began to change. Available funding and subcontracting, and the prestige and legitimacy of certain partnerships, became the leading motivation for some of the latest programs of both movements. Organizational survival became an increasingly important driver of the Polish and Slovak participating groups as they were more and more embedded in the lucrative and prestigious but also marketized and highly competitive global governance regime in the field of democracy and human rights.

These survival-driven activities of both the Polish and the Slovak movements have included many episodic initiatives, unlike the majority of the sustained but smaller transnational democracy and human rights programs. It could be expected, however, that this motivational shift from solidarity to organizational survival would become even more pronounced in the future. In Slovakia, the share of such activism became larger more quickly than in Poland because when the Slovak movement was emerging in the late 1990s, its goals were already well embedded in the global governance system. The Slovak movement was thus shaped much more by the global governance system—a situation that especially influenced the scope and direction of the Slovak transnational networks. At the same time, the Slovak movement has also been driven more by recipient demand and by the desire to project the values of this global regime and its core of transatlantic democracies.

By providing democracy assistance to the EECs, the West set an example of how democratic societies should aid democratizing ones, and encouraged, funded, and legitimized the efforts of the EEC movements supporting human rights and democracy abroad. Nonetheless, the West has primarily facilitated rather than spurred these movements. The activists around whom the Polish movement eventually developed began working on democracy and human rights issues at home and abroad in the early 1980s, that is, before there was any external support for their efforts; the Polish case, thus, demonstrates that there are no strong endogeneity effects with activists choosing an issue area in which there would be support for their efforts. Consider also the US introduction of several Slovak groups to Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Iraqi activists. This US brokerage led to the blossoming of Slovak work in Ukraine and Belarus; yet, despite abundant funding made available for work in Iraq, no Slovak group sustained its activities there beyond the end of the occasional project. To take the difference in regional context between these Slovak beneficiary recipients out of the equation, it should be noted that
some of the same Slovak groups have eagerly looked for funding to assist fellow activists in other third world countries like Cuba. Similarly, while the EEC movements are often guided by shared national values and perceived interests, their activism should not be reduced to a derivative of their states’ foreign policies. In fact, these movements’ advocacy preceded and was formative for these foreign policies. Also, despite some important overlaps, there are important differences in the recipient beneficiaries of the EEC movements and foreign policies in support of democracy and human rights abroad.

Unlike the global embeddedness account this paper theorizes as the primary explanation of the motivations cycle behind transnational activism, alternative explanations might focus instead on the internal culture or material incentives shaping transnational activism. For instance, some have suggested that as a new generation of activists replaces those who organized the Eastern European democratic breakthroughs, the internal culture of the EEC movements might shift away from solidarity with fellow democracy and human rights activists abroad toward more pragmatic, organizational-maintenance concerns. Such a new generation entered Polish civic life in the mid-2000s, but has not yet appeared in the Slovak civil society. Yet, the motivations behind both the Polish and the Slovak movements follow a similar cycle from principle to pragmatism.

Similarly, some have argued that internal organizational politics shape the goals, structure, and strategies of social movements. Building on Michels’ “Iron Law of Oligarchy,” they claim that organizations have a natural tendency to develop oligarchical leadership and conservative goals, as officials gain power and organizational maintenance becomes their highest priority (Michels, 1999; Piven and Cloward, 1977; Jenkins, 1977; on the developing world, Edwards and Hulme, 1996). If such changes were at play, they should be observable and similar in both the Polish and the Slovak movements. The shift from solidarity to organizational survival within the Slovak movement, however, was much faster and more pronounced than within the Polish movement. This suggests that factors other than internal material imperatives are behind these transnational movements’ evolving motivations. In fact, this difference between the Polish and the Slovak movements is in line with the global embeddedness account put forth by this paper.

Conclusions and Caveats
Understanding SMOs’ motivations for participating in transnational activism is important for both empirical and theoretical reasons. At the level of theory-building, this debate is about the foundations of the transnational sector—whether it is founded on principles, shared liberal values and cross-border solidarity or primarily driven by the material interests, organizational insecurity, and competitive pressures generated by the global governance system. At the empirical level, this debate is about the principals who structure transnational activism—movements’ recipient beneficiaries or patrons. Consequently, distinguishing between these two ideal types of motivations—solidarity and organizational survival—and assessing their overall importance is critical. This paper solves the disagreement in the literature about the motivations behind transnational activism by proposing that these motivations follow a cycle from solidarity to pragmatism, observable at the level of individual transnational movements.

58 For critiques and exceptions, see, for example, Useem and Zald, 1987, Voss and Sherman, 2000.
This paper thus contributes to the literature on social movements and international relations by moving beyond previous understandings of these motivations as static and as primarily principled or pragmatic. The argument here is that both types of motivations coexist and drive transnational activism throughout a movement’s lifecycle, but that their overall importance changes in the course of that lifecycle. Moreover, this paper illustrates and tests this argument through previously overlooked cases from the non-Western/Eastern European world, correcting a bias in the literature on transnational activism, which neglected the normative leadership of these societies and their contribution to maintaining the international liberal order.

Still, when thinking about the generalizability of this paper’s findings, some caveats are in order. First, this paper proposed that the embeddedness of the movement and its cause in the global governance system serves to open up the movement environment. How movements might react to a closing of the movement environment, however, is a question that deserves further attention. On the one hand, some scholars working on domestic social movements have argued that restrictive environments might make movements even more vulnerable and sensitive to environmental pressures (Minkoff, 1999). On the other hand, these scholars have pointed out that the potential influence of resource availability might be mixed, in that it can produce either more or less competitive environments (Minkoff, 1999). Further work is thus necessary to identify and study cases, in which movements do not outpace available support as they and their cause become embedded in the global governance system and in which movements grow and become increasingly engaged with and interdependent on global governance actors, which have de-prioritized the movement’s cause and provide little support for it (see also von Bulow, 2010).

Second, the EEC movements supporting democracy and human rights abroad have subsumed organizations working in the area of women’s rights. Similar to the motivations of other groups in these movements, the motivations of these women’s rights groups have followed a cycle from solidarity to survival. Still, movements centered on the grievances of an oppressed social group (rather than pursuing collective goods for the general public) might have different patterns of transnational solidarity creation and resource mobilization (Zald and Ash, 1966). For example, certain regional/North-South divisions in women’s rights activism (Smith and Johnston, 2002) as well as higher levels of resource mobilization from constituents rather than patrons have been documented (Jenkins and Eckert, 1986). The possibly differential impact that different types of movements had on the motivations behind transnational activism begs further examination.

Third, in terms of the empirical test in this paper, the cases presented above cannot provide a definitive test of the theorization. Future work is necessary to document whether global governance regimes in the past were as “lucrative, crowded, and marketized” as the current ones. Similarly, the EECs received a lot of Western support in their struggle for democracy and human rights at home as well as abroad and the transnational movements that further these issues in their neighborhood and beyond eventually became anchored in the most elaborate and institutionalized democracy and human rights in the world (Wiest and Smith, 2007). Future work is thus necessary to study the extent to which this paper’s findings travel to other regions.

59 Similarly, the openness of the domestic political system might further shape the capacity of participating organizations to engage in transnational activism since most transnational relationships are filtered through the domestic context (Imig and Tarrow, 2001; Smith and Weist, 2005).
References


Tables

Table 1. Share of Groups Driven Primarily by Solidarity Out of All Groups Participating in the Polish and Slovak Movements Assisting Democracy And Human Rights Abroad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early Movement Period</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mature Movement Period</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Data from author calculations based on interviews with and the archives of these organizations.

Table 2. Percent Organizations with Projects in Target Countries Out of All Organizations Participating in the Polish and Slovak Movements Assisting Democracy And Human Rights Abroad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Partner Country</th>
<th>Percent of Polish Democracy Promoters with Projects</th>
<th>Percent of Slovak Democracy Promoters with Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America / Cuba</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Priority recipients for the Polish and Slovak movements for assisting democracy abroad are highlighted. Data from author calculations based on interviews with and the archives of these organizations.