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

Thomas Bremer / Alfons Brüning /
Nadieszda Kizenko (eds.)

Orthodoxy in Two Manifestations?

The Conflict in Ukraine as Expression of a Fault Line in World Orthodoxy

PETER LANG

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Table of Contents

Abbreviations

AUOCC	(All-)Ukrainian Orthodox Church Committee
CEC	Conference of European Churches
EP	Ecumenical Patriarchate (Constantinople)
KP	Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyivan Patriarchate
MP	Moscow Patriarchate
OCU	Orthodox Church of Ukraine
ROC	Russian Orthodox Church
SC	Bases of the Social Concept (Russian Orthodox Church)
SE	"For the Life of the World" – Towards a Social Ethos of the Orthodox Church
UAOC	Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church
UCCRO	(All-)Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations
UGCC	Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church
UOC	Ukrainian Orthodox Church
UOC-KP	Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyivan Patriarchate (or KP)
UOC-MP	Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (or UOC)
UOCC	Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Canada
WCF	World Congress of Families
WCC	World Council of Churches

Contemporary Liturgical Practices in the UOC and OCU and their Implications

Nadieszda Kizenko

"We knew not whether we were in Heaven or on earth."
– emissaries from Grand Prince Vladimir, Hagia Sophia, Constantinople

Lex orandi, lex credendi is a relatively new phrase in the Slavic Orthodox Christian context. Although one may argue that the connection between belief and form of worship is implicit in the apostolic tradition, the *lex orandi, lex credendi* formula does not appear in Orthodox liturgical or theological texts until the 20th century, engaged with in earnest for the first time by Alexander Schmemann.[1] Nevertheless, the insight that liturgical form mirrors belief is a helpful point of departure from which to consider contemporary liturgical practices in Ukraine. These liturgical choices include such classic issues as liturgical language (Church Slavonic, modern Ukrainian, modern Russian, modern Rumanian, etc.), the veneration or demotion of figures with national associations (Grand Prince Vladimir, Andrei Bogoliubskii, Petro Kalnyshevskyi, Ivan Mazepa), and the wording of such traditionally state-glorifying services as those to St. Vladimir and the Elevation of the Cross.[2] They also include, however, new rites or commemorations marking victims of the Holodomor, the Euromaidan events of 2014 (the "heavenly hundred"), and the so-called "green" *molieben* composed at the behest of Patriarch Bartholomew.[3] The liturgical choices of different Ukrainian churches

1 See Alexander Schmemann, *The Eucharist* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1988), 11; Alexander Schmemann, *For the Life of the World* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1973), 25; Andrii Dudchenko, "Kontseptsiia liturgiinoho realizmu v teolohii Oleksandra Shmemana," *Aktualni problemy filosofii ta sotsiolohii* 19 (2017), 27–30; "Pryntsypy liturhiinoi teolohii Oleksandra Shmemana: do pytannia reform u Pravoslavnii Tserkvi," *Bohoslovski rozdumky: Schidnoievropeiskyi zhurnal bohoslovia* 17 (2016), 213–221 and "Liturhiinyi realizm v bohoslovi Oleksandra Shmemana," PhD diss., National Drahomanov University (Kyiv, 2020).

2 The St. Vladimir service will be discussed below. For the 7th century emperor Heraklios, the cross was as much a political, imperial symbol as it was a religious one. The *troparion* for the Exaltation of the Cross, concluding with the words "Grant victory to the emperor against the barbarians through the power of Thy Cross," dates from his reign. See John A. McGuckin, "A Conflicted Heritage: The Byzantine Religious Establishment of a War Ethic," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 65/66 (2011–12), 29–44, esp. 40–41; and Daniel Galadza, "Sources for the Study of Liturgy in Post-Byzantine Jerusalem (638–1187 CE)," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 67 (2013), 75–94.

3 Andrii Fert, "Equivocal memory: what does the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate remember?" in *Religion during the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict,* ed. Elizabeth A. Clark and Dmytro Vovk (New York: Routledge, 2020), 192–210.

may reflect different political or cultural choices—or an urge to consider liturgy for its own sake. Similarly, when individuals are in a position to choose which church to attend, they may do so out of political or national commitment, out of aesthetic preference, or simply out of convenience. Liturgy is rarely an independent variable.

This chapter will explore these issues by comparing the contemporary liturgical practices of the UOC and OCU, the two canonical Orthodox Churches in Ukraine. Neither can be regarded as an embodiment of either pure tradition or innovation. Neither can claim to speak for "true" Ukraine. The UOC was formally created in 1990 when granted self-administration (though not canonical autocephaly), eliminating the old label of "Ukrainian Exarchate." Volodymyr Sabodan, Metropolitan of Ukraine 1992–2014, began his UOC first sermon with the words, "I have come to my homeland to serve the people and independent Ukraine." On Sabodan's watch, the UOC undertook several key initiatives, including the canonization of more Ukrainians and the cautious use of liturgical Ukrainian.[4] Although Sabodan enjoyed general popularity, 2014 events including the Maidan protests, war in Eastern Ukraine, and the Russian annexation of Crimea, made it difficult to reconcile radically different constituencies within the UOC. Some regarded themselves as Ukrainian patriots and insisted on the territorial integrity of Ukraine; others backed the Donbas separatists. Even some of those who wanted political independence might have agreed with the 2008 words of Patriarch Alexi of Moscow on the 1020th anniversary of the baptism of Rus: "Kiev, sacred to *all of us*, the initial seat of the *Russian* Church, whence, in the words of Nestor the Chronicler, 'the *Russian* land came to be,' and whence began the Christian enlightenment of *our* people, the establishment of ascetic struggle, the development of *Russian* culture and statecraft."[5]

Before 2018, it might have been enough to appeal to canonicity versus the nationalism of the Kyivan Patriarchate (henceforth KP).[6] With the establishment of the OCU and the departure of some for whom Ukrainian identity was key, however, the UOC has a higher proportion of those with sympathies rest with an

4 http://orthodox.org.ua/article/komissiya-po-kanonizatsii-svyatykh-pri-svyashchennom-sinode-upts.

5 In the Laurentian Chronicle, Nestor uses variants of the word "Russkykh." *Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh Letopisei,* vol. 1: *Lavrent'evskaia letopis',* 2nd ed. (Leningrad: izd. Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1926), col. 102–107, http://litopys.org.ua/lavrlet/lavr05.htm. Following the practice of many Russians, Alexi II renders Nestor's usage as "Russian." For a discussion of the contested terms *russkii* and *rossiiskii,* see Hryhorii Pivtorak, "Shcho take 'Rus', 'Rosia', 'Malorosia', i iak my vtratyly svoe spokonvichne imia," *Materialy do ukrainskoi etnolohii* vyp. 13 (16) (2014), 32–51. For Alexi's report, see http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/426666.html. Emphases are the author's.

6 Tadeusz A. Olszanski, "The Ukrainian Orthodox Church's stance on the revolution and war," OSW Commentary, Oct 30, 2014, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014–10–30/ukrainian-orthodox-churchs-stance-revolution-and-war.

"all-Rus identification," and must compete even harder to maintain the allegiance of multiple constituencies. Its approach to liturgy reflects the need to balance these different allegiances.

The OCU's situation is both more explicitly committed to Ukrainian identity and more flexible. Although it too has to operate within certain political constraints—most notably, a clear commitment to Ukrainian independence—because it arose as a new, autocephalous formation, it had a unique opportunity to start fresh. It could compose new rites and texts, or pick and choose from existing ones. They included those of the UOC, the KP, and the UAOC. (The UGCC, with its prominent role in Maidan protests and its simultaneously ecumenical and particularist emphasis on "Church*es* of the Kyivan tradition," occasionally serves to provide a source base as well.)

This study is based primarily on a comparison of the liturgical rubrics and service books used in both Churches. But, as rubrics do not always reflect what clerics and choirs actually choose to read and chant, it also draws on qualitative interviews with urban priests, choir directors, and singers from the OCU and UOC from Kyiv and Central Ukraine, and a UOC bishop from the Donetsk diocese.[7] All those queried stressed that their situations reflected the specificity of their urban locations, the higher proportion of religious indifference in Eastern Ukraine, and that practices in Western Ukraine, especially in rural regions, were markedly different. All noted that less than five years have passed since autocephaly, and that the situation might evolve in future decades. This chapter is therefore meant to capture this moment of transition and to provide an initial exploration of liturgy in a single region among those who "produce" it (which includes chanters as well as clerics) rather than an exhaustive survey of liturgical "consumers" in all of Ukraine. The questions it poses and the evidence and framework it provides, however, may be useful to researchers exploring different regions in years to come.

Language

The most basic issue is that of liturgical language. The OCU has no set liturgical language policy ("We have no language issue," an OCU priest told me. "People can serve in whatever language they wish: in Kherson, some OCU priests serve in modern Russian. But the tendency is to switch to Ukrainian.")[8] Nevertheless, using Ukrainian as a liturgical language is part of the Ukrainian national project for OCU, as it was for the UAOC and the KP. Following that discourse, the OCU

7 Interview subjects who agreed to be identified are Priest Andrii Dudchenko (28 February 2021, OCU, Kyiv; henceforth AD); Priest Georgii Taraban (1 March 2021, UOC, Sumy; henceforth GT); choir directors and singers Lidiia Lozova (24 February 2021, OCU, Kyiv; henceforth LL); and Daria Morozova (UOC, Kyiv; henceforth DM, 1 March 2021).

8 AD, 28 February 2021.

tends to identify Church Slavonic with an unwelcome imperial outsider and "imperial great-power connotations."[9] There is a practical reason for resistance to Church Slavonic as well as an ideological one, in Western Ukraine in particular. Modern literary Ukrainian contains relatively few Church Slavonic elements, as they were removed when the Ukrainian literary language was created in the 19th century and replaced by words from various dialects, as well as from Polish and from Latin.[10] Choosing Ukrainian may therefore imply choosing the non-imperial and the non-Russian, but it may also imply a preference for the modern vernacular as opposed to archaic language historically linked to liturgy. There are both ideological and practical considerations involved in the OCU's favoring Ukrainian over Church Slavonic.

Using Ukrainian in liturgy is not a straightforward project, however. The situation is not unlike that of English-language Orthodox parishes in the United States. There is no standard OCU version in universal use. Instead, clerics and choirs who wish to chant and sing in Ukrainian must draw on existing service books and texts, whether from the KP, the UAOC, or even Greek Catholics. As of this writing (summer 2021), there are at least seven different versions of liturgical Ukrainian to choose from. Most Ukrainian translations from Church Slavonic tend to the colloquial rather than the lofty, and are not always of the highest quality.[11] Existing translations include those of the *menaia*, the priest's service book (*sluzhebnyk*), and a revised prayerbook (*molytovnyk*) that is also available as an app.[12] But there is neither a coherent corpus of Ukrainian-language service books, nor a consensus on which translation is best. "It's a mess," one respondent noted, "at the same service you can hear people singing three different versions of the Creed. If you're a singer who joins a new choir, you can find yourself automatically singing the Cherubikon text you're used to instead of the one on the music stand."[13]

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9 Yulia Yurchuk, "Religion in Ukraine: political and social entanglements," Andriy Fert, "Church independence as historical justice: politics of history explaining the meaning of the Tomos in Ukraine 2018–2019," both in *Baltic Worlds* 13, no. 2–3 (2020), 69–73 and 74–83; DM 1 March 2021. Per-Arne Bodin aptly cites the term *impersko-velikoderzhavnye konnotatsii* (imperial-great power connotations) in his "Church Slavonic or Ukrainian? Liturgical Language, Tradition, and Politics," *Teologinen Aikakauskirja* 125, no. 2 (2020), 176–186. For a discussion of the historical context of Church Slavonic versus Ukrainian for liturgy, see Nicholas Denysenko, *The Orthodox Church in Ukraine: A Century of Separation* (DeKalb, IL: NIU Press, 2018), 21–37.

10 Bodin, "Church Slavonic or Ukrainian?" (see n. 9).

11 AD, 28 February 2021.

12 For earlier translations of the *minea*, see http://sophia.church/minea-yuri-pinchuk/. For the priest's service-book (including the hours as well as the Liturgies of St. John Chrysostom and St. Basil the Great), see https://parafia.org.ua/biblioteka/bohosluzhbovi-knyzhky/liturhikon/. For the prayer-book (with a link to the app), see https://молитовник.укр.

13 LL, 24 February 2021.

It is thus a matter of personal preference—with one exception. Where no Ukrainian translation exists, or where either clerics, readers, or singers, prefer to use it, one solution is to use Church Slavonic in what is called *z vymovoiu* (with Ukrainian pronunciation) or, more technically, Kyivskyi *izvod*. That means to pronounce Church Slavonic as a Ukrainian and not a Russian might: pronouncing the letter *g* as *h* (*Hospodi,* not *Gospodi*), the letter *iat* as if it were written *i* and not *e* (*svit*, not *sviet*) or softening the sound where it would occur in modern Ukrainian (*pam'iat*,' not *pamiat*). This is also the solution favored by those who argue that Church Slavonic is a part of Ukrainian tradition (as of all East and South Slavic traditions), and not something to associate either exclusively or inherently with Russian. They may include Greek Catholics. In Kyiv's Greek Catholic Cathedral of the Archangel Michael, the "To Thee the Champion Leader" hymn at the end of Matins is sung in Church Slavonic with Ukrainian pronunciation. Indeed, as one UOC singer bemoaning Moscow-redaction and Russian-pronounced Church Slavonic told me, "If Kyivs'kyi *izvod* Church Slavonic has survived anywhere, it is thanks largely to the UGCC."[14]

The UOC's position on liturgical language is different. Although serving in Romanian or Greek would pose no problems, Metropolitan Onufrii opposes any use of Ukrainian in liturgical practice, declaring that the liturgical language of the UOC is Church Slavonic. "We are not," he states, "going to change anything."[13] Nevertheless, the UOC allows its clerics to serve in Ukrainian in parishes where a 2/3 majority of the parish wishes it (an echo of the 2/3 rule approved by Patriarch Tikhon in his appeal to the Ukrainian faithful in 1921).[15] In rural areas like Volyn, some UOC parishes do serve in Ukrainian. In 2011, the UOC produced a bound Ukrainian-language *book of needs* (*trebnyk*); a liturgical Gospel followed in 2013. The UOC has not issued its own Ukrainian-language service-book (*sluzhebnyk*), however.[16]

There is another aspect of choosing or shunning Church Slavonic as opposed to vernacular Ukrainian that is worth noting. The OCU's rejection of Church Slavonic may carry the unintended consequence of rejecting of the legacy of early Rus as well as of Moscow and St. Petersburg. The earliest liturgical language used in Rus was Church Slavonic, albeit an older variant of the language (*Old* Church Slavonic) as opposed to the *New*, or revised, Church Slavonic used later in the Russian Empire and still used in the ROC and the UOC.[17] If the OCU had wanted

14 T. V. Novikova, "Istoriia Tserkovnoslovianskoi movy na terenakh Ukrainy ta ii periodyzatsiia," *Naukovyi visnyk Chernivetskoho universitetu*, vyp. 678 (2013), 145–149; interview with DM, 4 March 2021; AD, 28 February 2021.

15 Cited in *Pershyi Vseukrainskyi Pravoslavnyi Tserkovnyi Sobor UAPTs, 1921*, ed P.S. Sokhan, S. Plokhy, and L.V. Yakovleva (Kyiv: M.S. Hrushevsky Institute of Ukrainian Archeography and Source Studies, 1999), 503.

16 AD, 28 February 2021.

17 For an argument that 9th century Church Slavonic was vernacular Ukrainian, see Andrii Danylenko, "Constantine and Methodius, "foolish Rus," and the vagaries of literary

to emphasize its historicity, that older variant of Church Slavonic would have done so while also differentiating from the UOC's and the ROC's New Church Slavonic. But because this solution does not appear to have been considered by the OCU, this suggests that appeals to historicity were not the goal. Nor did the OCU seem to have considered the compromise legacy-accessibility solution reached by the Serbian Orthodox: to switch to modern Serbian for everything read or chanted by clerics, but to maintain Church Slavonic for the hymns sung by cantor or choir. Finally, unlike the KP hierarch Filaret, who calls himself "Patriarch of Kyiv and all *Rus-Ukraine*," the OCU does not use Rus as part of its official name: Epifanii's title is "Metropolitan of Kyiv and all *Ukraine*."[18] All this suggests that, for the OCU, the argument for continuity with the Rus past or conveying ancient sacrality is less central than emphasizing the unique connection of the OCU to contemporary Ukraine. Bodin thus fairly concludes that "[t]he choice of Ukrainian weakens the claim that Ukraine is the only legitimate heir of Rus, that is, the Kievan State."[19] At the moment, however, the OCU does not appear to see the potential ideological and cultural implications of the rejection of any version of Church Slavonic as a problem.

Veneration of National Saints (and Demotion of Those Bad for Ukraine)

In the liturgical veneration of saints, the central issues are whether someone has been designated for general ("universal") or local veneration and whether a saint may be regarded as "good" or "bad" for Ukraine. Most East Slavic saints designated for "general" veneration continue to be commemorated by both the UOC and the OCU, with some exceptions. If a Rus-era saint is more associated with imperial Russia, such as St. Alexander Nevskii, OCU practice is to quietly ignore him, preferring instead to serve the "universal" (i.e., Byzantine-era) saint of the day.[20] This is especially the case when a canonized figure is perceived to have

Ukrainian," in *Old Church Slavonic Heritage in Slavonic and Other Languages* ed. Ilona Janyšková, Helena Karlíková & Vít Boček (Prague: NLN, 2021), 31–44. For a discussion of Church Slavonic literacy in the Russian Empire and a knowledge of Church Slavonic among Ukrainians vs. Russians, see A. G. Kravetskii and A. A. Pletneva, *Istoriia tserkovnoslavianskogo iazyka v Rossii (konets XIX-XXv.)* (Moscow: iazyki russkoi kul'tury, 2001), 25–73.

18 Onufrii has the same title as Epifanii. As Alfons Brüning suggested to me, the crucial point may be that both are metropolitans under different patriarchs, whereas Filaret claimed the title of patriarch. Perhaps only patriarchal rank allows a hierarch to fully enter the continuation of Rus controversy.

19 Bodin, "Church Slavonic or Ukrainian?," (see n. 9.), 184 ; DM, 1 March 2021.

20 For OCU practice, see AD. For Nevskii's cult and its implications, see Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, *Aleksandr Nevskii v russkoi kulturnoi pamiati* (Moscow: NLO, 2007), originally

damaged the Ukrainian national cause, as will be seen in the case of Andrei Bogoliubskii.

Saints and icons can be problematic even when both the OCU and UOC agree they should be venerated. Prince Vladimir (Volodomyr), who earned the "equal-to-the-apostles" title for the adoption of Orthodox Christianity for himself and his land ca. 988, would be the prime example. *Menaia* texts in the Russian Empire used Vladimir to foster the shared all-Rus narrative: "Rejoice, glory of Rus," in the *aposticha* is emblematic. But the service also glorified the authority of Russian Orthodox Christian rulers over their subjects. The *troparion* and *kontakion* hymns (sung at Vespers, Matins, Liturgy, and any *molieben* to the saint) both end with the words "Pray that the leaders of *your Russian* realm, the Christ-loving *Emperor*, and the multitude of *subjects* be saved."[21] Interestingly, the Greek Catholic *menaion* used from the 18th to the 20th centuries contains nearly identical phrasing, substituting only the word "king" for "emperor."[22] The *ikos* (an expansion of the themes in the previous *kontakion* hymn) similarly compares Vladimir to the Biblical Moses enlightening his land and redeeming "the *Russian* land sunk in sin," and calling upon him to save "his inheritance, the Christ-loving *Emperor* and multitude of [his] *subjects* from the pagans that oppose it."[23]

These and other references to the "Christ-loving emperor" and his "subjects" became anachronistic with Nicholas II's abdication in March 1917 and vanished under the Provisional Government.[24] In the Soviet period, with an atheistic government going after Orthodox Christianity in part because its previous support of the Tsars, finding new language in which to pray for the authorities was even more problematic. The Ukrainian Exarchate and then the UOC initially used (and in

published in 2004 as *Aleksandr Nevskij: Heiliger-Fürst-Nationalheld: Eine Erinnerungsfigur im russischen kulturellen Gedächtnis (1263–2000)* (Cologne: Boehlau, 2004).

21 *"Moli spastisia derzhavy tvoeia Rossiiskiia nachal'nikom, khristoliubivomu Imperatoru i mnozhestvu vladomykh*," *Miniia. Miesiats iulii* (St. Petersburg: sinodal'naia tip., 1895), 120–129. All emphases mine.

22 Augustus III of Poland was king of Poland in 1761 and the term *khristoliubimomu koroliu* stayed. *Mesiats iulii*, ([Pochaev]: v sviatoi chudotvornoi lavrie Pochaevskoi tipom izdana, 1761), title page, 73–73ob. Note that the reigning hierarch is called "Silvestr, exarch of the Kiev, Galich, and *all Russia*; bishop of Lutsk and Ostrog" (title page). According to Daniel Galadza, the 1761 Pochaev menaion is still the official one used by the UGCC.

23 "Обветшавшу же видя страну Русскую грѣхомъ, Духъ Твой послалъ еси въ крѣпкоразумнаго душу славнаго Владиміра, познати Тебе, Единаго отъ Троицы Христа Бога, и Твоимъ Крещеніемъ просвѣтити избранныя Твоя и отъ Тебе порученныя ему люди, и привести къ Тебѣ вѣрою вопіющія: избави отъ сопротивныхъ поганъ Твое достояніе, христолюбиваго Императора и множество владомыхъ." *Miniia*, 125.

24 For post-February 1917 changes in service books, see M. A. Babkin, *Dukhovenstvo Russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi i sverzhenie monarkhii (nachalo XX v. – konets 1917 g.)* (Moscow: izd. Gos. Publichnoi istoricheskoi biblioteki Rossii, 2007), 414–462.

some cases still continue to use) the old *menaia* with inappropriate phrases crossed out and overwritten, as on the page from an 1895 edition (Figure 1).



Figure 1: 1895 Menaion, personal collection of Priest Georgii Taraban, Sumy, Ukraine.

Some post-Soviet UOC service books used similarly neutral language ("our country" instead of the Christ-loving emperor, "Orthodox Christians" instead of "a multitude of subjects"). Indeed, the most recent Church Slavonic version of the *troparion*'s last line, used by both the UOC and the ROC in the dedicated service book to St. Vladimir, has been shortened to the highest and most democratic degree possible, to only the phrase "pray that our souls be saved."[25] But, if one does not have the dedicated service book, the "default" in both Russia and the UOC is to use the standard "green" *menaia*. They tell a different story. They contain entirely new variants of the *troparion*, sung in different tones than the original tone four. One (tone 1) ends with the words, "glory to Him who through you glorified the entire Rus land"; the other (tone 8) starts with the words "teacher of the true faith and enlightener of all Rus." Thus while the *troparion* was initially neutralized and democratized, the new "supplementary" versions on offer restore St. Vladimir as the enlightener of the "entire Russian land." More tellingly, where the pre-revolutionary version used the words *russkikh* and *russtii* for the word Russian, the green *menaia* version replaces them with the words *rossiiskikh* (another example of the tensions and implications of the terms russkii-rossiiskii issue discussed in footnote 5). Finally, the democratic variant of the *troparion* is gone, replaced with wording that restores the emphasis on the realm's leaders and the multitude of subjects—a pattern duplicated in the *kontakion* and *ikos*. [26]

The *menaion* also includes two alternate *kontakia* hymns. The first alternate, in tone 8, paraphrases the familiar "To thee, O Champion Leader" hymn, initially substituting "Vasilii" (Vladimir's name after baptism) for the Mother of God and "all Rus" for "thy servants," but somewhat confusingly restoring Vladimir's pagan name in place of "bride unwedded." However, the second alternate *kontakion* and *ikos*, both in tone four, do not mention Rus or Russia at all, concentrating on casting aside "ancestral idolatry" in favor of Christ, and refer to Vladimir by name only once.[27] The UOC thus offers three different Vladimirs to suit three different ideas of his role in Christianity and in Rus history, and priests and singers can choose among them.

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25 The UOC Cathedral in Sumy, for example, uses a book containing only the service to St. Vladimir and the baptism of Rus (*Sluzhba Gospodu Bogu nashemu, v troitse slavimomu, v pamiat kreshcheniia Rusi, i sviatomu ravnoapostolu, velikomu kniaziu Vladimiru* (Moscow: izd. Moskovskoi Patriarkhii Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi, 2013), 15. GT interview, 19 February 2021.

26 *Vsieia zemli russkiia* and *pravovieriia nastavniche i vseia rusi prosvietiteliu*, respectively. Ibid, 15–16.

27 "изрядному воеводе и правоверному, благодарственная восписует ти вся Русь, Василие, имущи тя начальника и заступника, яко избавил еси нас от всякия скверны и лести, темже ти вопием, радуйся великий княже Владимире преблаженне." *Minea. Iul'* (Moscow: izd. Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, 2014), 186, 191, 195.

The OCU makes tellingly different textual choices.[28] Small vespers is cut altogether (a pragmatic choice, as in practice it is almost never served outside monasteries). The *litia* hymns replace "the father of Rus" (*otsa Russkago*) with "*our* father of Rus" (*otsa nashego Ruskogo*): *Rus* is kept, but "our" is added and emphasized. The third *sticheron* in the *aposticha* implicitly acknowledges the ambiguous valence of the word "Ruskii," replacing "Rejoice, glory of Rus," with "Rejoice, glory of Kyiv."[29] The "Glory" verse on the *aposticha* replaces the "leader of *leaders* of Rus" (with the emphasis on national leadership), with the assembled *Ukrainian faithful,* with the Grand Prince *of Kyiv* at their head.[30] The issue of national primacy and rulers vs. subjects is similarly democratically sidestepped in the *troparion*, which ends with "therefore we, *your people*, celebrate your dormition. Pray that *our souls* be saved" (a phrasing repeated in the *kontakion*). This democratic trend continues in the alternate canon, Ode 3, which replaces "As a divinely-sounding trumpet, raise your spiritual tongue, o blessed one, resounding to all the ends of the Russian land" (*zemli Rossiiskiia)* with "all the ends of *our* land" (*zemli nashei*). The *theotokion* for Ode 6 similarly replaces "the rightly-believing Russian Emperor and right-believing assemblies" with "the Orthodox assemblies" (*pravoslavnykh sobory*): it is not about the nationality of the land or its leader, but the Orthodoxy of its inhabitants. The first *troparion* in Ode 8 replaces "you have become a new Constantine in all the land of *Rus*" with "you, o holy Volodymyr, have become a new Constantine in all *Kyivan* Rus."[31] Thus a service which in the ROC emphasized empire, and which in the UOC still refers to both rulers and ruled, here emphasizes Vladimir's spiritual unity with his heirs, who are all Orthodox Christians in Ukraine. A service using a nation's Christianizer to support its current political leaders has been turned to the service of spiritual unity.

St. Vladimir/Volodymyr highlights the opportunities and landmines of liturgically celebrating someone venerated across national boundaries.[32] Someone like

28 All OCU texts cited here from a KP menaion, *Mineia. Lypen. Chastyna persha* (Kyiv: vyd. Viddil UPTs KP, 2019), 611–633. I am grateful to Lidiia Lozova and Hieromonk Sofronii (Tiutiunnyk) for their help with locating these texts.

29 For the contested nature of the word "Ruskii," see note 5.

30 *Kniazei russkikh verkhovnago, dnes' Russtii sobori* versus *nachal'nyka blagochestia i propovidnika viry,* ***velykoho kniazia Kyivskoho****, nyni,* ***ukrainski*** *sobory virnykh* (*Iul,* 191; *Lypen,* 616).

31 *v usii Kyivskoi Rusi (Lypen'*, 612, 629, 617–19, 623, 628).

32 Recasting Vladimir for its own national purposes, the Orthodox Church in America sings of Vladimir as a generic apostle-to-a-new-land, dropping all references to Kyiv and to Rus ("Holy Prince Vladimir, you were like a merchant in search of fine pearls. By sending servants to Constantinople for the Orthodox Faith, you found Christ, the priceless pearl. He appointed you to be another Paul, washing away in baptism your physical and spiritual blindness. We celebrate your memory, asking you to pray for all Orthodox Christians and for us, your spiritual children"), N.N., *Holy Great Prince Vladimir (Basil in Baptism),*

St. Feodosii (Uhlytskyi) of Chernihiv (d. 1696, canonized 1896) is more subtle. Praised in his Russian-language vita for "fighting pernicious Uniate influence," "fostering a sense of Russian nationhood," and "quelling the occasional outbursts of fiery self-willed Ukrainians, thereby protecting the State from harmful disturbances," one could just as easily—as his Ukrainian vita does—note his connection to local traditions and to Ivan Mazepa, and to substitute the word "Chernihiv" for "Rossiistei, Rossiiskoi" in his liturgical service. Although locally venerated saints might seem to be less problematic, here too there are nuances. In 2006, the UOC approved numerous individuals for local Ukrainian veneration, mostly monastics from the 19th century and new martyrs from the 20th.[33] Some saints initially commemorated only by the KP—Iaroslav the Wise, Petro Mohyla—have been adopted by both the UOC and the OCU. Particularly telling was the eventual UOC canonization of Petro Kalnyshevskyi, the last Hetman who after Catherine II's destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich spent the last twenty-seven years of his life incarcerated in Solovki. Coming as it did after the Euromaidan deaths of 2014 and the war's start in Eastern Ukraine, this 2015 canonization seemed to hopeful patriots in the UOC to be an acknowledgment of the real violence wrought against independent Cossacks by the imperial state. Despite particular emphasis in Zaporizhia (he is listed as the "righteous warrior Petro Zaporozhskyi"), however, the canonization prompted neither popular veneration nor a shift in other UOC attitudes.[34]

In 2020, the UOC published a new full (twelve months in 21 volumes) Church Slavonic edition of the *menaia.*[35] As well as saints from Ukraine approved for universal veneration—Luka of Crimea, Gavriil Urgebadze, Iona of Odesa, among others—unique to UOC is the inclusion of saints locally venerated in Ukraine, including those from Kyiv, Odesa, Galicia, Zhytomyr, Rusyn areas, Kherson, Vinnytsia, and Poltava. This seems a step towards adopting a Ukrainian Orthodox

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Equal of the Apostles, and Enlightener of Rus' - Troparion & Kontakion, https://www.oca.org/saints/troparia/1999/07/15/102031–holy-great-prince-vladimir-basil-in-baptism-equal-of-the-apostle. For Vladimir's vicissitudes in earlier periods, see Francis Butler, *Enlightener of Rus: The Image of Vladimir Sviatoslavich across the Centuries* (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2002).

33 http://orthodox.org.ua/article/komissiya-po-kanonizatsii-svyatykh-pri-svyashchennom-sinode-upts.

34 https://pravlife.org/ru/content/v-svyatyh-proslavlen-petr-kalnyshevskiy; http://kapelan.org.ua/shanuvannya-pamyati-svyatoho-pravednoho-vojina-petra-zaporozhskoho/; GT 1 March 2021. Kalnyshevskyi was canonized in 2008 by the UOC-KP, who also dedicated a church in his memory in 2015.

35 For menaia revisions in the modern period, see A. G. Kravetsky and A. A. Pletneva, "Mineinye sluzhby novogo i noveishego vremeni: istoriia, poetika, semantika," in *Minei: obrazets gimnograficheskoi literatury i sredstvo formirovaniia mirovozzreniia pravoslavnykh*, ed. Elena Potekhina and Aleksandr Kravetskii (Olsztyn: Centrum Badań Europy Wschodniej Uniwersytetu Warmińsko-Mazurskiego v Olsztynie, 2013), 15–90.

Christian identity distinct from that of Russia. While generic services to such categories as "one Caves saint," "two or more Caves saints," are appropriate, it might seem a bit awkward that generic services to all 20th-century confessors, martyrs, and hieromartyrs are invariably described here as *Russian* saints (*prepodobnomuchenitse* ***russkoi*** *XX veka edinoi, prepodobnoispovednitse* ***russkoi*** *XX veka edinei*, for example).[36] Referring to Rus era saints as "*rossiiskikh*" represents a similar semantic and ideological choice: while it may be argued that *rossiiskikh* is meant to serve the same overarching function as "British" (as opposed to English, Scottish, Irish, or Welsh), the current identification of the word with the Russian nation prevents the word from being neutral and acceptable in contemporary Ukraine. It is arguably as anachronistic to refer to Rus-era saints with any contemporary national label.

The OCU calendar has already quietly removed several saints who were either purely Russian and/or "bad for Ukraine." Grand Prince Andrei Bogoliubskii exemplifies the latter. A son of Iurii Dolgorukii, he was, according to the *Orthodox Encyclopedia,*

> one of the key figures in the 12th century Rus, playing a decisive role not only in transforming the powerful Vladimir-Suzdal principality from the peripheral backwater it had been under his grandfather, Vladimir Monomakh, but also initiating an essentially new policy aimed at making Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma the chief political center of Rus, *called to replace ancient Kiev* in this role.[37]

"Called to replace" is putting it mildly. In 1169, Andrei Bogoliubskii joined Volyn Prince Mstislav Iziaslavich in a joint Rus expedition (princes from Smolensk, Chernihiv, and Dorogobuzh also took part) against Kyiv, seizing a revered Byzantine icon of the Mother of God and taking it for his own cathedral (after which point it would be known as the "Vladimir" icon of the Mother of God). A subsequent attack on Novgorod, a second attempted attack on Kyiv, and other aggressive moves finally prompted his murder at the hands of local boyars in 1174. Kyiv never fully recovered its role as the political center of Rus.

It would be hard to justify Andrei Bogoliubskii as someone to be venerated in Ukraine. But he was not exactly embraced by the Russian Orthodox Church, either. Andrei appeared on lists of local Vladimir saints only the end of the 17th century and was approved only for local veneration in 1702; he never made it into the official *menaia* of the Russian Empire; the earliest extant service to him, published separately, dates only from 1914. The cult might have been quietly buried or localized in Vladimir if it had not been resurrected as an option in the Soviet-era "green" *menaia* still found (though not necessarily used) in many UOC

36 https://foma.in.ua/news/v-upts-izdali-unikalnye-bogosluzhebnye-minei. Emphases are the author's.

37 A. V. Nazarenko, "Andrei Iurevich Bogoliubskii," *Pravoslavnaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 2 (Moscow: Pravoslavnaia entsiklopediia, 2001), 393–397.

churches. Besides standard formulae for a martyr and comparisons to his martyr-ancestors Boris and Gleb, the service exhorts "all Russian tribes" and "Russian people" to glorify Andrei, nourisher of the Russian land" (*zemli Rossiistei udobrenie)* and "unwatering pillar of Russia" *(Rossii stolpa nepokolebimago)*.[38] Given that the service also lauds Andrei for his removing the celebrated now-eponymous icon of the Mother of God to the Vladimir cathedral from Kyiv, it is more than a little ironic that the Vasnetsov fresco of Prince Andrei can still be seen in Kyiv's Volodymyr Cathedral.[39] Not surprisingly, rather than commemorating Bogoliubskii, both UOC and OCU clerics prefer to celebrate the universal saint of the same day—St. Andrew of Crete, who wrote the canon read in the first and fifth weeks of Lent.[40]

Other imperial associations impel other liturgical choices. Both the UOC and OCU continue to use service books incorporating an 18th century change—a service composed at the behest of Peter I to celebrate the birth of his daughter (the future Empress Elizabeth) to St. Elizabeth, the mother of John the Baptist, containing a discreet reference to the empress in the first *troparion* of the canon's ninth ode.[41] By contrast, the Akhtyrka/Okhtyrka icon of the Mother of God, as Christine Worobec has noted, represents the incorporation into the Russian Empire of Sloboda Ukraine (northeastern Ukrainian frontier lands populated by Cossack settlements defending the empire from Ottoman incursions). In this icon, Mary is shown as a maiden with loose hair foreseeing the Passion (juxtaposed against a miniature crucifixion), holding her hands in a traditionally Western gesture of prayer. Despite the Akhtyrka's widespread enduring veneration in Kharkiv and Sumy, because of its associations with voluntary incorporation of part of Ukraine into the Russian Empire, the Ukrainian Wikipedia describes it coldly as

38 Bogoliubskii did not appear in the 1885 edition of the relevant *minea* (see *Miniia mesiats iulii* (Moscow: sinodal'naia tip., 1885). *Sluzhba sviatomu blagoviernomu velikomu kniaziu Andrieiu Bogoliubskomu vladimirskomu chudotvortsu* (Moscow: Sinodalnaia tip., 1914)). His acknowledgment for the icon transfer appears in the *theotokion* to the first ode of the canon and troparia in the third and fourth odes. See also A. V. Sirenov, "Zhitiie Andreia Bogoliubskogo," *Pamiati Andreia Bogoliubskogo: sbornik statei* (Moscow-Vladimir: Moskovskie uchebniki, 2009), 207–240. A new generic service in Church Slavonic to holy princes (or rulers) was composed on the basis of existing services to holy princes and published in 2012 (*Sluzhba obshchaia blagoviernomu tsariu ili kniazi* (St. Petersburg: Russkii sluzhitel, 2012)). The version currently in use is https://azbyka.ru/otechnik/Pravoslavnoe_Bogosluzhenie/mineja-iyul/4_2

39 Olenka Pevny, "In Solntsev's Footsteps: Adrian Prakhov and the Representation of Kievan Rus," in *Visualizing Russia: Fedor Solntsev and Crafting a National Past,* ed. Cynthia Hyla Whittaker (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 85–108.

40 For OCU practice, AD; for UOC practice, GT.

41 Published first as a separate service (*Sviatago proroka Zakharii, i sviatyia i pravednyia Elisaveti* (Moscow: v Moskovskoi tipografii v 1723), then incorporated into ROC and "green" *menaia* from 1765 on. Byzantine *menaia* had no service to St. Elizabeth.

being "venerated by the *Russian* Orthodox Church."[42] As with Nevsky, the issue is one of real or perceived associations with the Russian Empire. When one OCU priest started to read an *akathist* to the Iveron icon of the Mother of God in Church Slavonic and came across references to its defense of the "Russian dominion" (*derzhava rossiiskaia)*, he changed them orally on the fly, eventually switching to a Ukrainian edition published by the KP. This is typical of the challenges faced by the OCU in its transition to full Ukrainness.

Perhaps the most telling difference in liturgical veneration of saints comes in the second week after Pentecost, designated in Slavic Orthodox Churches for the commemoration of all the saints of any given nation (the first week after Pentecost is All Saints). In the OCU, it is clear: that week commemorates all saints *of Ukraine*. In 2021, Metropolitan Epifanii led a service and an "all-Ukrainian prayer" on the Cossack graves marking those fallen at Bohdan Khmelnytskyi's 1651 Berestechko battle at the Georgiev Monastery in Rivne. By contrast, although the UOC had a thoughtful discussion in 2015 on commemorating all saints of Ukraine (noting that the first such service came in the 17th century at the initiative of Petro Mohya), stressing that the best such day would actually be the Sunday after July 15/28 marking St. Vladimir, nothing came of that initiative. There are, however, several UOC churches dedicated to "all saints of the Rus/sian land."[43]

Holodomor Commemoration

Recent political events pose the most challenges. The famine of 1932–1933 (*Holodomor*) has been a cornerstone of Ukrainian memory culture since independence in the early 1990s.[44] It is reflected liturgically in different ways in the UOC

42 Christine Worobec, "The Akhtyrka Icon of the Mother of God: A Glimpse of Eighteenth-Century Orthodox Piety on a Southwestern Frontier," in *Framing Mary. The Mother of God in Modern, Revolutionary, and Post-Soviet Russian Culture,* ed. Amy Singleton Adams and Vera Shevzov (Ithaca: NIU, 2018) 58–81; http://artmuseum.sumy.ua/galereya1/albom-2/ohtirska-ikona-bozhoi-materi.html. For commemoration in Sumy, see http://dancor.sumy.ua/news/newsline/241692 and interview with GT, 1 March 2021.

43 "Predlozhenie o vvedenii v UPTs prazdnovaniia sobornoi pamiati vsekh sviatykh v zemle Ukrainskoi prosiavshikh," 14 October 2015, https://spzh.news/ru/zashhita-very/26369–predlozhenie-o-vvedenii-v-upts-prazdnovaniya-sobornoj-pamyati-vsekh-svyatykh-v-zemle-ukrainskoj-prosiyavshikh. "UOC churches dedicated to all saints in the Russian land include the Lutserna Church in Zaporizhia", https://hramzp.ua/church/khram-v-chest-vsekh-svyatykh-v-zemle-russko

44 Wiktoria Kudela-Świątek, *W labiryncie znaczeń: pomniki ukraińskiego Wielkiego Głodu 1932–1933* (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2020) and Wiktoria Kudela-Świątek, *Eternal Memory. Monuments and Memorials of the Holodomor* (Edmonton/Toronto/

and the OCU. Both the UOC and the OCU commemorate the *Holodomor* on the official Remembrance Day (observed annually on the fourth Saturday of November since 2006) in civil state ceremonies and through such parish-level liturgical forms as *litias, panikhidas*, and augmented litanies. In general, UOC tendency is to follow what Church leadership officially prescribes regarding *Holodomor* commemoration.[45] The OCU's participation is more vocal, more diverse, and more enthusiastically engaged with secular memory culture—an approach they share with the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church (EAOC), the Orthodox Church in Estonia under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The OCU is also more inclined to use forms of *Holodomor* commemoration developed in the North American diaspora in the 1950s-mid 1960s (for example, referring to *Holodomor* victims as martyrs—a problem discussed below in the context of the Euromaidan victims).[46] Perhaps because of the OCU's embrace of secular memory culture, and because of their willingness to take part in joint religious commemoration ceremonies (something some UOC clerics resist, as it implies recognition or concelebration), some in the UOC opine that the OCU "politicizes" the *Holodomor*, especially by using the contested word "genocide." It might be worth noting (one OCU cleric told me he could neither forgive nor forget this) Metropolitan Onufrii's 2008 referring to the *Holodomor* as a punishment sent by God for the sins of Ukrainians, using the colloquial phrase "*katiuzi po zasluzi*"—something prompting only private murmuring at the time but after 2014 negatively commented upon in the Ukrainian press.[47] As regards other forms of liturgical commemoration, there is no official instruction in either the UOC or OCU on inserting as a separate category names of Orthodox famine victims on the Saturdays earmarked for commemoration of departed kin (*roditelskie subboty)*.[48]

Cracow: University of Alberta, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, Księgarnia Akademicka, 2021).

45 https://news.church.ua/2019/11/24/v-usix-jeparxiyax-upc-vshanuvali-pamyat-zhertv-golodomoru-ta-politichnix-represij-foto-video/; https://news.church.ua/2019/11/23/predstoyatel-upc-vzyav-uchast-u-derzhavnij-ceremoniji-vshanuvannya-zhertv-golodomoru-1932–1933–rokiv/.

46 Frank Sysyn, "The Sacralization of the Holodomor: the Role of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the USA and the Memorial Church in Bound Book," https://em3byzx68tj.exactdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Sysyn_The-Ukrainian-Orthodox-Church.pdf.

47 AD; https://ostannipodii.com/a/201408/mitropolit_onufriy_ranishe_zayavlyav_scho_golodomor_ce_bozha_kara-100004002/; https://raskolam.net/ua/3473–катюзі-по-заслузі-у-виконанні-упц-кп.

48 DM, 4 March 2021; AD, 28 February 2021.

"Heavenly Hundred" (Euromaidan) (Revolution of Dignity) Commemorations

Everyone can agree that the deaths of millions from hunger were a tragedy, and that the death of Orthodox Christian believers ought to be marked. Commemoration of those who perished at the 2014 Maidan protests is more directly political and politicized. Greek and Roman Catholics, who together with KP clerics dominated the religious aspect of the protests, unabashedly refer to the "heavenly hundred" as "new martyrs," acclaiming them in a Stations of the Cross prayer as "rebelling against the evil that dominated our state, against the aggressors from the East, from Moscow swamps."[49] Both the KP and the UGCC depict the "heavenly hundred" on icons with "The Mother of God, Protector of Ukrainian Warriors" (such icons may also include OUN-UPA banners and Stepan Bandera). The approaches of the UOC and the OCU are markedly different. The OCU, which commemorates those perished as "all warriors of the Maidan killed by Russian aggression," takes part in joint processions with Greek Catholics starting at the UGCC Archangel Michael Cathedral to the UGCC "ecumenical" chapel to the "heavenly hundred," described as "new martyrs."[50] *Panikhidas* commemorating "fallen ATO warriors" (soldiers fighting in Eastern Ukraine) are another part of OCU's participating in secular memory culture. However, there is no Eucharistic concelebration for the "heavenly hundred" between the OCU and any non-Orthodox confession. Both UOC and OCU clerics dismiss such productions as Ioann Shvets's *akathist* to the "heavenly hundred" as "amateurish at best" (OCU) or "political acts" (UOC).[51]

New Martyrs (Orthodox Christians Martyred in the Soviet Period)

Although both the OCU and the UOC use the category "new martyrs," they interpret it differently. For the UOC, as for the ROC, the phrase "new martyrs"

49 Stations of the Cross prayer cited by Andriy Fert, "Sacralization of Memory of Euromaidan Protests from a Post-secular Perspective," forthcoming in *Sacralization of History in (Contemporary) Eastern Europe: Actors – Networks – Topics*, ed. Liliya Berezhnaya.

50 In the Greek Church, the term "neomartyr" also suggests a national hero. Greek scholars have recently begun to grapple with the term and its uses. See Yorgos Tzedopoulos, "Martyrdom and Confessionalization among the Greek-Orthodox of the Ottoman Empire, late 15th – mid 17th centuries," paper delivered at "Entangled confessionalizations? Dialogic perspectives on community and confession-building initiatives in the Ottoman Empire," Budapest, June 1–3, 2018. For the Ukrainian context, see Maria Grazia Bartolini, "The Discourse of Martyrdom in Late Seventeenth-Century Ukraine: The 'Passion-Sufferers' Boris and Gleb in the Homilies of Antonij Radylovs'kyj and Lazar Baranovyč," *Zeitschrift für Slawistik* 61 (2016), 499–527.

51 AD; GT; DM.

means victims of communist persecution and includes the Romanovs. In effect the UOC reproduces the martyr category as defined by the ROC, with the primary villain being the atheistic regime and the martyrs being Orthodox Christians as such (but especially those who perished on the territory of Ukraine, at least in local veneration). For the OCU the situation is more problematic. They are not ready to declare all victims of the *Holodomor* martyrs, as did the Armenian Church with the victims of the genocidal Turkish policies of 1915–1923.[52] Nor are they, like the UGCC, ready to canonize the victims of Euromaidan along with everyone killed post-1945. With time, we may see a process in the OCU similar to what Irina Paert has explored for the EAOC in Estonia. Although the EOC (the Estonian Orthodox Church in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate) commemorates the same new martyrs as does the ROC, it has grappled less successfully with incorporating such *local* victims of Stalinism as Ivan Lagovskii (killed in 1944 and canonized by the EAOC). This may, as Paert suggests, indicate a lack of deep engagement with the memory of communist repression—or it may indicate a fear of stoking an anti-Russian narrative. Like the UOC, the EOC prefers such overarching, all-embracing figures as the 15th century saint Isidor of Iuriev (a pre-national, pre-Muscovy symbol whose cult the late imperial Russian Orthodox Church revived in the early 20th century). But the EAOC, like the OCU, has little interest in anything that might strengthen the EOC's (or the UOC's) attempted supra-national imperial project. Instead, it emphasizes those local saints who suffered martyrdom in the Soviet period, canonizing many new Stalin-era martyrs in the years 2012–2019. By doing so, as Paert notes, they try to incorporate the local Orthodox story into the reigning national narrative of victimhood, injustice, and suffering.[53] For the OCU, if the goal is similarly to differentiate from Russia and to claim exclusive rights to the nation, an equivalent process might mean more or continued focus on Holodomor, Soviet-era, and post-Soviet

52 For the 2015 canonization, see N.N. "The Armenian Genocide: 1915–1923," https://armenianchurch.us/the-saints/holy-martyrs-of-the-armenian-genocide/; for the construction—and 2014 destruction by Islamic fundamentalists—, see Alexander Mikaberidze, "Deir ez-Zor," *Behind Barbed Wire: An Encyclopedia of Concentration and Prisoner-of-War Camps* ed. Alexander Mikaberidze (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2019), 86–87. For the post-Soviet discourse, see Karin Hyldal Christensen, *The Making of the New Martyrs of Russia: Soviet Repression in Orthodox Memory* (New York: Routledge, 2018).

53 Irina Paert, "Novomucheniki Estonii 1919g. Vospriiatie sovremennikami i praktiki pamiati," in *Tserkva muchenykiv: honinnia na viru ta tserkvu u XX stolitti* ed. S. V. Shumylo (Kyiv: vyd. viddil UPTs, 2020), 90–102; Irina Paert, "A family affair? Post-imperial Estonian Orthodoxy and its relationship with the Russian Mother Church, 1917–23," *Canadian Slavonic Papers,* 26, no. 3–4 (2020), 315–40; Eadem, "Memory of socialism and the Russian Orthodox believers in Estonia," *Journal of Baltic Studies* 47, no. 4 (2016), 497–512.

Orthodox martyrs. If the goal is also to play up a "modern, liberal" approach to Orthodox Christianity in Ukraine (as in the EAOC), this might mean canonizing ecumenically minded or social engaged holy people broadly speaking (the OCU's honoring such saints as Mother Maria Skobtsova of Paris and Ravensbrück would be one such example). It might also mean embracing the "ten theses" based in liturgical reform (rather than Ukrainian nationality) described by Lidiia Lozova and Tetiana Kalenychenko in this volume.

New and Revised Liturgical and Para-Liturgical Texts and Practices

Both the UOC and the OCU maintain most of their pre-2014 liturgical and paraliturgical practices, which include *akathists* before specially venerated icons, delivering not one but two homilies—one after the Epistle, one after the Gospel—and cross processions. Both preserve liturgical customs more common in Ukraine than in Russia—for example, having parish choirs singing carols instead of prescribed communion hymns at Christmastide; strong traditions of communal liturgical singing. Some UOC parishes preserve the custom of singing the Marian hymn, *Tsaritse moia preblagaia*, before their local Marian icon (such as before the Korsun icon in Sumy). UOC Kherson maintains a post-1917 custom of serving a *molieben* after every liturgy. This practice is emblematic of the UOC's approach to liturgy reflecting practices from the late 19th and 20th centuries. It acknowledges that some laypeople see the liturgy proper as the "official" part of the "program," but the paraliturgical interpolations that may follow—*akathist, molieben*, water-blessing—as "ours," or "for the people." This is antithetical to the Eucharistic-revival approach, where the liturgy itself and especially the Eucharist are meant to be everything—something more visible in the OCU though not exclusive to it. But one should not exaggerate this tendency. At Matins, both UOC and OCU often substitute an *akathist* for the *kathisma*.

After 2014, both the OCU and the UOC have seen revised liturgical and paraliturgical practices, both voluntary and involuntary. The UOC's paraliturgical changes have been prompted by mostly external, involuntary phenomena, especially when attempting to carry out services outside of church. In Sumy, for the feast of the Protection of the Mother of God, a UOC parish used to serve in front of an administrative building that was formerly the regimental church of the Sumy hussars. After 2014, however, local hoodlums have disrupted the services, in "provocations reminiscent of the 1930s." Attempts for local authorities' support have had no success. Another liturgical victim of politics is the former tradition of joint Ukrainian-Russian revering of the Priazhenskoi icon of the Mother of God. The icon had been solemnly carried back and forth from the Russian side of

the border to Ukrainian side in a procession. However, the ROC archbishop ended the procession in 2013.[54]

The OCU has been more explicitly creative (one might say proactive). In an example of voluntary initiatives, the OCU has borrowed a text and practice from the Constantinople Patriarchate: an "eco-*molieben*" served on the Church New Year. This has been translated from the English translation of the original Greek version into both Ukrainian and Church Slavonic, although in practice only the Ukrainian has been celebrated. But the OCU is, like the UOC, on the Julian Calendar. That meant that they could not serve the *molieben* on the same calendar date as it is served in (for example) Istanbul, Athens, or New York (September 1), but on the equivalent date on the Old Calendar (September 14).[55] If the goal is consistency with the "mother" patriarchate, a calendar change may eventually follow.

Specific to 2020–2021 has been grappling with Covid-19. By and large, masks and such alternate forms as receiving communion in one's hand were more typical of the OCU, as was discussion of "virtual" communion. The UOC did not enforce mask-wearing and largely maintained the practice of distributing communion into the mouth from a common spoon.[56]

Naming the Nation (and the Church)

In litanies, Orthodox services often implore God for protection from danger, pestilence, invasion, and so on. But they also (following 1 Pet. 2:13-21) pray for their land and for their rulers. Before 1917, as seen also in the *troparia* to St. Volodymyr and the Holy Cross, that meant "our sovereign EMPEROR x." In the Soviet period, that meant referring only "this land, its authorities, and its armed forces"—a formula repeated in service books after the fall of communism. Pre-2018 service books, whether Church Slavonic (UOC-MP) or Ukrainian (UOC-KP), continued to avoid naming the nation, using the terms "land" or "country"—this is still the phrasing used in the UOC—sometimes inserting "God-preserved" (*bogokhranimoi).* OCU books, however, now consistently refer to "our state, Ukraine,"

54 GT, 1 March 2021.

55 For an English version of the *molieben*, see "The Order of a Service of Prayer for the Preservation of God's Creation," http://www.orth-transfiguration.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Ecological-Moleben.pdf. For Bartholomew's 2020 ecological address at the Vatican, see https://www.vaticannews.va/en/church/news/2020–09/bartholomew-i-message-for-world-day-of-creation-full-text.html.

56 Interviews with LL, IT, AD; https://www.nta.ua/velykden-prychastya-ta-spovid-pid-chas-pandemiyi-otecz-yustyn-bojko/. See the July 2021 publication of *Fenomen onlain-prichastia. Refleksii. Polemika. Perspektyvy* http://www.mvfund.org/vidannya/933–fenomen-onlain-prychastia-refleksii-polemika-perspektyvy.

(*derzhavu nashu Ukrainu*) or "our God-preserved Ukrainian state." The insertion of "Ukrainian" as a modifier has also crept into UOC practice, at both parish and monastery levels: a 28 February 2021 *paraklesis* service in the Sviatogorskaia Lavra for relief against "harmful contagion" (ie, Covid-19) used the wording "Ukrainian land" (in Church Slavonic). UOC clerics may sometimes emphasize the phrasing "our God-preserved land and its *Orthodox* authorities" to underscore how few of them are identified as Orthodox Christians. [57]

A UOC bishop resents OCU claims that the lack of a modifier connotes loyalty instead to a northern neighbor, referring to this as "lunacy." Even more resented are the recent secular attempts to force renaming the UOC as the ROC or the MP, or accusations of criminal responsibility for collaborating with a military aggressor. "What will fall into this category?" he asked me. "Perhaps commemorating Patriarch Kirill at Divine Liturgy?" Such legislation, he noted, belies the claim that Ukraine is a multi-confessional country.[58]

Conclusion

Although many in both the UOC and the OCU share the desire for a canonical church in the local tradition, their liturgical approaches reflect different interpretations of what that means. The OCU is characterized by liturgical tolerance and experimentation. As long as one is loyal to Epifanii and the cause of Ukrainian liturgical autocephaly, there is a wide range of flexibility and room for individual variety. One might see this as innovation—or as a broad application of the old tradition of "as the priest in charge deems" (*ashche izvolit nastoiatel)*. Most such changes seem to stem not so much from a desire to reform liturgy as such—despite the proposed "ten theses," this is not a reprise of Vatican II—as from a political commitment to Ukraine as an entity distinct from Russia. Dropping the words "Russian," dropping saints and icons associated with imperial Russia, and using Ukrainian in liturgy, are ways of doing this. The mere fact of a plurality of liturgical expression and an overall climate of flexibility, of a multiplicity of translations into Ukrainian (as opposed to one "canonical" one), and of a larger (though not exclusive) number of clerics and laity involved in ecumenical initiatives, may well result in more liturgical experimentation in the years to come. Their attitude to the past is selective, their attitude to the present is one of tolerant latitude, and their attitude to the future is expansive. Their overall tendency is to move away from such external forms as head-coverings for women and a less hierarchical clergy-laity relationship. In this sense the OCU seems to be evolving in the overall direction of the Paris Exarchate in the 1920s-1950s, the OCA in the

57 For UOC practice, GT and IT; for OCU, AD.
58 Private communication, 19 February 2020.

1960s-1970s, or (in its emphasis on nation-building and secular memory culture) the contemporary EAOC.

Although the UOC also contains clerics who identify with Afanasiev, Meyendorff, and Schmemann, the UOC's overall liturgical practice may be described as conservative, emphasizing ceremony and hierarchy. UOC clerics and hierarchs may speak Ukrainian and describe themselves as Ukrainian patriots, but they do not see the liturgy as the primary place to display those allegiances. They are more likely to say that people do not want to hear priests talk about politics or "schismatics." They see Church Slavonic as a link to their own liturgical tradition—not one imported or imposed upon them by outsiders—and indeed as something potentially connecting all Slavs, including those in Serbia and Bulgaria. Moreover, even as they may acknowledge heavy-handed historical attitudes on the part of either St. Petersburg or Moscow, they do not reject their role in Ukrainian Church history or evolving tradition of the Orthodox Church on their territory, whether of Rus, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, or of independent Ukraine. They express more concern that they are losing "the kind of people who attend lectures and read books." They are more likely to fear being "outed" for comments on social media. Their attitude to the past is inclusive, their attitude to the present is conservationist, and their attitude to the future is cautious. Clerics share the desire of their flocks for a "sacral" atmosphere and for conveying the sense that liturgy is a link to the past as well as to the living body of Christ. In this sense they may be compared to the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese in America (with its maintenance of liturgical Greek), the Estonian Orthodox Church in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate, or the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia.

It is not clear if the liturgical trends outlined here will continue or if they will be replaced by others. With its continued emphasis on hierarchy, a sense of the sacral, and maintenance of popular paraliturgical devotions, the UOC may come to play the part of the "high Church"—while, with its overall democratization (which includes such things as a lack of concern in policing laity's dress and comportment), the OCU may assume the role of the "low Church" in post-Reformation England.[59] An important potential factor in the evolution of Ukrainian liturgy overall is monasticism. For centuries, monasticism has defined the Orthodox Church; bishops have been drawn mostly from male monks. Most monastics in Ukraine are UOC and loyal to their UOC abbots or abbesses. This applies especially to Eastern and Central Ukraine.[60] Western Ukraine has a different profile, with some formerly KP monasteries now under the OCU (the Elevation of the Cross in Maniava, that of St. George in Rivne, and that of the

59 DM, 1 March 2021.

60 In July 2021, Metropolitan Arsenii told a conference of UOC that not a single monastic had gone over to the OCU *Vystuplenie mitr. Arseniia na S''ezde monashestvuiushikh UPTs v Pochaevskoi Lavre 15.7.21 g.* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o6bfVaxOoGw.

Transfiguration in Ivano-Frankivsk). If OCU monasticism develops in Eastern or Central Ukraine, it may come from a different profile of monastics displaying a different kind of piety—perhaps a more socially engaged one, as with some Western Christian monastic orders. This may affect liturgy at the parish level as well. But those are hypotheses. For the moment, the UOC and the OCU's liturgical choices reflect with particular clarity some of the many other choices facing Ukrainian Orthodox clerics, monastics, and laypeople in other spheres.

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In 2018/19, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople initiated the establishment of an autocephalous (independent) Orthodox Church in Ukraine. This process was met with harsh criticism by the Russian Orthodox Church and eventually led to a split in the entire Orthodox world. The contributions to this volume examine this conflict and discuss the underlying causes for it in a broader perspective. They deal with several aspects of Orthodox theology, history, church life and culture, and show the existence of a serious rift in the broader Orthodox world. This became visible most recently in the conflict over the Ukrainian Church autocephaly, yet it has a longer, and more complex historical background.

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